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In The 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Gilpin Willson, in his own right and 
as Trustee under the will of William 
G. Kahle, Deceased 
V. PETITION FOR APPEAL 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W. H. Steele 
and L. W. H. Peyton, Trustees under the 
will of William G. Kahle, Deceased, and 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, William G. 
Kahle, II, Eleanor Kahle Miller and 
Helene Kahle Ferguson, in their own 
right, and Staunton Military Academy, a 
corporation. 
Tb: The Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Gilpin Willson, in his own right and as trustee 
under the will of William G. Kable, Deceased, respectfully repres-
ents that there is now pending in the Corporation Court for the 
City of. Staunton, Virginia, a chancery cause under the short style 
of William G. Kable's Executors v. William G. Kable's Trustees, 
which suit was brought for the purpose of guidance by the court on 
behalf of the executors and trustees in the handling of the testa, 
mentary trust created under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased; 
that heretofore, to-wit, on the 25th day of June, 1937, William G. 
Kahle, II, filed a petition in said suit against Gilpin Willson, in hi~ 
individual capacity and as trustee under the will of William G. 
Kahle, deceased, alleging that he sued for his own benefit and for 
the use and benefit of his co-beneficiaries under the will of William 
G. Kahle, deceased (R. 4-14 ), and also for the benefit of Staunton 
Military Academy, a corporation; that thereafter, the said William 
G. Kahle, II, filed an amended petition for himself and for 
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2* *the same parties as set out in his original petition ( R. 42-
55). The said two petitions of the said William G. Kable, 
II, as will appear therein, charged your petitioner with specific and 
sundry acts of fraud and wrongdoing, and most flagrant breaches 
of trust in violation of his duties allegedly committed by the said 
Willson in his office as testamentary trustee under the will oi 
William G. Kable, deceased, and as officer and director of Staunton 
Military Academy, all of which said charges of .fraud, wrongdoing 
and breach of trust are specifically set forth in the said two petitions 
of the said William G. Kahle, II, in the record in this cause at 
Pages 4 to 14 and 42 to 55, inclusive, and asked to be considered 
by the court as if fully set forth in this petition. 
The prayer of the said petitions of the said William G. Kable, II, 
as shown throughout the _petition·s, mentioned specifically in several 
instances, had as its principal purpose the removal of the said 
Gilpin Willson as trustee under the will of William G. Kable, de-
ceased, "for his gross misconduct, fraud and flagrant breach of 
trust," and see~ing an accounting on behalf of the Academy, and 
for the benefit of the trust estate, from the said Gilpin Willson for 
all of the alleged profits made by him in dealing with his trust 
estate, and, in addition thereto, the reimbursement to the said trust 
estate of all monies received by the said Thomas H. Russell from 
the said William C. Rowland, co-trustee, on the theory of joint 
and several liability of co-trustees for wrongdoing, · the said sums 
sought to be recovered from the said Willson under the charges 
alleged in the petitions of the said William G. Kahle, II, aggregat-
ing, and possibly exceeding $250,000.00. 
The said Gilpin Willson, in answer to the said petitions of the 
said William G. Kahle, II, specifically denied each and every 
3* *charge of misfeasance, malfeasance or neglect of duty 
alleged, as fully set forth in detail in the record in this cause, 
Pages 14 to 38 and 56 to 72, inclusive, and asked to be considered 
by the court· as if fully set forth in this petition. 
Your petitioner further says that his stewardship in serving the 
Academy as officer and director and the trust estate as trustee was 
not only highly beneficial to the said trust estate, but greatly en-
hanced its value, and, in a large measure, that his own acts were 
principally responsible for this result. He gave this estate close 
attention because of his close friendship and association with 
William H. Kahle, previous owner of the Academy, and William 
G. Kahle, in their lifetime; that the problems after the decease of 
William G. Kahle were many, difficult and intricate; that he took 
upon himself the greater part of the burden of handling the fin-
Gilpin Willson vs. Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, et als. 3 
ancial affairs of the Academy, and that it prospered abundantly. 
This result was recognized generally, and also by the beneficiaries 
of the trust, as he received letters from Eleanor Enslow White-
head, commending him in the highest degree for his interest and 
highly successful efforts on behalf of the Academy and the Kahle 
heirs, which were herself and her three children. 
That the cause on the petitions of William G. Kahle, II, was fully 
heard in the Corporation Court for the City of Staunton by Judge 
H. W. Bertram, Judge Designate, and that in the final decree in 
that court on the matter (R. Exhibit 4, Pages 126 to 139), your 
petitioner was completely exonerated of all of the charges in the 
said Kable's petitions, excepting the following: 
That your petitioner was responsible for the payment 
of the Cooksey note. 
4* *That your petitioner be required to repay to the Aca-
demy such part of the premiums paid by it for that portion 
of the policy of insurance on Thomas H. Russell porpor-
tionate to the part of the proceeds of the policy paid to 
Margaret K. Russell, wife of Thomas H. Russell, de-
ceased, being one-fifth of the premium, with interest on 
each yearly expenditure at 6%. 
That your petitioner be held jointly and severally liable 
with the·said William C. Rowland for the said Rowland's 
(heretofore adjudicated) wrongful and fraudulent breach 
of his fiduciary duty. 
That your petitioner be removed as trustee under the 
will of William G. Kahle, deceased. 
Your petitioner being aggrieved of said decree in its findings 
against him therein, appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, his appeal being granted ( R. 2370 in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals), and on final determination of the issues. raised, 
the decree appealed from was reversed ( R. 154), and final judg-
ment entered in favor of your petitioner, the court holding in its 
opinion "that Willson' s cond11,ct has been above reproach, and that 
he had been gui!.ty of no infidelity regarding his duties as · trustee 
of the estate, or as director or officer of the corporation. The evi-
dence fails to justify his renwval as trustee." 
The litigation in which your petitioner, Gilpin ·wmson, became 
involved as trustee by reason of the petitions of William G. Kahle, 
II, et al, was protracted, beginning in June of 1937 and ending in 
the fall of 1941. An ~normus amount of time and work was re-
\,. '-··~ 
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quired to meet the various and sundry charges of fraud and mis-
dealing alleged against him; voluminous depositions were taken; 
notes of argument and briefs written on the various points involved 
and questions raised before the trial court. The printed record in 
the Court of Appeals was over 700 pages, exclusive of written 
notes and briefs, and much time employed in presenting and 
S* arguing *pleadings and questions raised in the trial court. 
Counsel of skill and ability were necessarily required in 
conducting a proper defense to the numerous unfounded and false 
allegations of fraud and misdealings charged in the said Kable's 
two petitions. Petitioner, however, believes that the expenses in-
curred and the counsel fees charged are entirely reasonable and 
proper for services such as were performed by counsel employed in 
the defense of the charges in the said Kable's petitions, and are 
commensurate with the general standard of fees in this locality £or 
legal services of such a nature. 
Your petitioner thereafter on January 20, 1940, filed his petition 
in said suit, in his own right and as testamentary trustee under 
the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, against Eleanor Enslow 
Whitehead, W. H. Steele and L. W. H. Peyton, trustees under the 
will of William G. Kahle, deceased, et al ( which petition, with 
the demurrers of the several party defendants and the decree 
thereon, constitutes the record in this case,) by which petition he 
seeks to recover from the trust estate and other defendants named 
therein the sum of $10,423.90 (R. 78) for expenses by him paid 
or contracted to be paid, the expenditure of which by him was 
necessitated in properly defending the unfounded, wrongful and 
false charges made, and the effort to remove him as testamentary 
trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased. 
Judge J. Harry May, of the Corporation Court for the City of 
Staunton, Virginia, being so situated that in his opinion it was im-
proper for him to decide the issues raised by Gilpin Willson in this 
petition, disqualified himself, and the Supreme Court of Appeals 
by proper order designated Judge A. D. Dabney, of the Corpora-
tion Court for the Citv of Charlottesville, to sit. 
The defenda~ts in said Willson petition having all de-
6* *murred to said petition, the matter was heard by Judge 
Dabney on briefs of opposing counsel, and the Judge De-
signate of said court, by decree entered in said cause on the 18th 
day of July, 1942, (R. 162), sustained each of defendants' de-
murrer's to said petition, and dismissed the said proceedings. 
THE ERROR ASSIGNED 
The sole error assigned in the petition for this appeal is the 
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action of the Designate Judge of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Staunton, Virginia, in sustaining the demurrers of the de-
fendants to his petition, and ordering the same dismissed in the 
court's decree of July 18, 1942, and the sole question presented by 
this petition is whether a testamentary trustee designated by the 
testator, whose services in such office have been shown to. be 
greatly beneficial to the trust estate, and whose removal from office 
is sought on charges of fraud, misdealing and mismanagement of 
gross and sundry species, who has successfully def ended and re-
sisted an unfounded and wrongful application to remove him as 
trustee, can recover his costs and expenses, including attorney's 
fees, from the trust estate. 
ARGUMENT 
Your petitioner, Gilpin Willson, believes and is so advised that 
the said expenditures paid and contracted to be paid by him, all of 
which he alleges are responsible and proper items, were necessarily 
incurred and expended by him for the purpose of properly defend-
ing and refuting the unfounded and false charges alleged against 
him in the said two petitions of William G. Kahle, II, in the effort 
to remove him as testamentary trustee under the will of 
7* *William G. Kahle, deceased, and that his defense of said 
charges was a proper matter to undertake for the benefit and 
protection of the trust estate, to justify and secure his continuance 
in office as trustee, carrying out the wish expressed by the testator 
in his will creating said trust, and for the benefit of said trust estate; 
and he further alleges that it is a general rule under the law of the 
land in such cases where unfounded and unjust attacks are made 
against testamentary trustees, that a trustee unjustly attacked and 
sought to be removed is not only justified, but in duty bound to de-
f end such attacks, in an endeavor to carry out the wish expressed 
by the testator in the creation of the trust, and that such defense 
is for the benefit of the trust estate, and that all necessary, reason-
able and proper expenses, including counsel fees paid or contracted 
to be paid, incurred by a trustee in defending himself from unjust 
or unwarranted attacks seeking to remove him from office are 
chargeable against the trust estate. Some courts hold that a trustee 
may pay such expenses and recoup the same in his accounting with 
the trust estate; other courts of respected authority have held that 
a trustee may pay the charges from the trust estate, and they are 
properly allowable as an expenditure for the benefit of the trust, 
and further, that a third party, such as an attorney who under-
takes the defense of a trustee who is unjustly attacked and his re-
moval as trustee sought, can, in his own person, sue and recover 
1 
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attorney's fe_es and all reasonable expenses necessitated and incurr-. 
ed in the defense· of the trustee. Courts of respected authority also 
hold that it makes no difference whether or not actual benefit is· 
disclosed in the proceedings; that it is the duty of the trustee to 
def end such unwarranted and unfounded attacks to romove 
8* him, on the theory that his continuance in of*fice alone 
without the showing of a benefit from the litigation is an 
actual benefit to the trust estate. 
. 1. A TRUSTEE IS ENTITLED TO BE REIMBURSED 
ALL THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY HIM 
BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION AS TRUSTEE 
The general rule is thus stated in Perry on. Trusts and Trustees 
( 7th Edition ) , in Section 894: 
"The general rule is that trustees shall have their costs 
either out of the trust fund, or from the cestue que trust 
personally, ( upon the principle that he should be reim-
bursed all the expenses to which he has been put without 
his own fault by reason of his being a trustee). If there 
is a fund within the control of the court, they may have 
their costs as between solicitor and client. Where there is 
no fund within control of the court, if the cestue que. trust 
bring the trustees before it to obtain a direction as to the 
rights of the parties, or the mode of administration, and 
the trustees are free from all blame or fault, they are en-
titled to costs against the cestui que trust personally, to be 
taxed as between solicitor and client. The reason involv-
ed in the rule is this: trustees have no beneficial interest 
in the trust property. They hold it for the accommodation 
and benefit of others. If they perform their duties faith-
fully, and are guilty of no unjust, improper, or oppressive 
conduct, they ought not in justice and good conscience to 
be put to any expense out of their own moneys. If, there-
fore, they are brought before the courti without blame on 
their part, they should be reimbursed all the expenses that ~ 
they incur, and allowed their costs as between solicitor 
and client for this purpose. So, if it appears to the court 
by the pleadings or otherwise that they have sustained 
charges and expenses beyond the costs of the suit, as be-
tween solicitor and client, the court will order such fur-
ther expenses properly incurred to be paid to them ; .- ~ . " 
This general rule is also th~ law in Virginia. In Lindsay v. How-
erton, (1807) 2 Hen. & M. (12 Va.) 9, the court held that an ex-
Gilpin Willson vs. Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, et als. 7 
ecutor or administrator ought to be credited in his administration 
account for fees paid to counsel, the court saying: 
9 ~ *"There can be no doubt but that the defendant has paid 
those fees on account of his intestate's estate; and, as he 
could not do without the aid of counsel, whose conduct he 
could not regulate, he should be allowed the sums he has 
paid." 
In Patterson v. Old Dominion Trust Co., 149 Va. 597, 159 S. E. 
168, the court said (page 172) that "the law is well settled that a 
trustee is vested with authority to employ counsel, if necessary, for 
the protection or preservation of the trust estate." 
And in Cochran v. Richmond & A. R. Co., (1895) 91 Va. 339, 
21 S. E. 664, the court said ( page 665) : 
"It cannot be denied that trustees, who in good faith 
engage the services of counsel to aid them in the execu-
tion of their duties, are entitled to pay them out of the 
trust fund, or to be reimbursed out of that fund for all 
expenses which they have incttrred, including reasonable 
fees to attorneys ... These trustees were not only author-
ized, but it was their duty, having accepted the trust, to do 
all that in their judgment the situation required, to pro-
tect the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust, and, act-
ing within the scope of this duty, the benefici'aries are 
bound by their action. In this case there is not the slight-
est suspicion of impropriety upon the part of either the 
trustees or their counsel. Their demand being just, its 
payment should not have been resisted, ... " 
This case was cited and followed in Berkeley & Harrison v. Green, 
( 1904) 102 Va. 373, 46 S. E. 387, 388. 
In Perry on. Trusts and Trustees, Section 910, it is said that: 
"Trustees have an inherent equitable right to be reim-
bursed all expenses which they reasonably and properly 
incur in the execution of the trust, and it is immaterial 
that there are no provisions for such expenses in the in-
strument of trust. If a person undertakes an office for an-
other in relation to property, he has a natural right to be 
reimbursed all the money necessarily expended in the 1per-
formance of the duty. And for losses that may occur to 
himself in the proper administration of the trust. Thus 
a trustee will be reimbursed all his necessary traveling ex-
penses, and all reasonable fees paid for legal advice in 
the discharge of his duties." 
8 
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*The court, in Stull v. Harvey, (1911) 112 Va. 816, 72 
S. E. 701, after quoting this section, said (page 703) : 
"It is the duty of the trustee to protect the trust estate 
from waste, invasion, or trespass, and, of course, it would 
be his duty to defend all suits brought against him with 
respect to the trust subject. In the performance of these 
duties a trustee would be justified in employing counsel 
and charging their compensation to the trust fund." 
In Scott on Trusts, Volume 2, Page 1005-1006, Section 188-4, 
it is said: 
"The trustee owes the duty to the beneficiary ... The 
trust estate should bear the expense of judicial proceedings 
relating to the administration of the trust, as for example, 
where the trustee applies. to the court for instructions as 
to his duties or power. Where the trustee properly brings 
or def ends a proceeding for the benefit of the trust estate, 
he is justified in incurring such expenses as are reasonable 
for the purpose, including the e .. i·penses of employing an 
attorney ( citing numerous authorities, including Patterson 
v. Old Dominion Trust Company, 156 Va. 763, 159 S. E. 
168), even though the trustee is unsuccessful in the litiga-
tion, he is entitled to charge the estate with necessary ex-
penses, if he was not himself at fault in causing the litiga-
tion ... Where the beneficiaries bring the proceedings for 
the removal of a trustee, the trustee can properly charge 
the estate with the expense of def ending the proceedings, 
including attorney's fees ( citing Jessup v. Smith, N. Y. 
by Judge Cardoza, and 119 N. E. 403) ." 
From the foregoing cases it is clear that under the general rule 
a trustee is entitled to employ counsel and incur expense in any 
matter in connection with a proper and reasonable administration 
of the trust estate, including the defense of an unwarranted and 
unsuccessful attempt to remove him as trustee, and that such ex-
. penses, including attorney's fees, are properly chargeable to and 
should be paid from the trust estate, and from the trend of decisions 
in Virginia it is believed that the Virginia court will approve and 
adopt this general rule. 
11 * *From an examination of Willson's petition and the rec-
ords of former proceedings embodied therein, it will be seen 
that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia considered Willson's 
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service to the trust estate the outstanding benefit it had derived 
since it was created. In its opinion ( P. 148) the Court said : 
"Only the removal of Willson as trustee is desired by 
the appellee. What is best for the trust estate? Willson 
has been connecte~with the school since 1894, a period of 
forty-six years. He is a successful merchant and banker. 
His is an intimate knowledge of the school; its needs and 
problems are well known to him. He has observed it when 
it was at a low financial status, and he has seen it prosper. 
When the school was in need of money he endorsed paper 
for it to the extent of $20,000. There is not a particle of 
evidence tending to show that he is incapable or unfit to 
act as trustee. There is none that reflects upon his chara-
cter or tends to show that he is not honest or moral. He 
has been a great asset to the trust, and the school through 
the many years of his connection. With his experience 
he will continue to be an asset." ( P. 148) 
Willson had been connected with the school since 1894, a period 
of forty-six years. Both under· Captain vVilliam H. Kahle, the fa-
ther of Colonel William G. Kahle, and under William G. Kahle, he 
was their close friend, associate and adviser; a successful business 
man and banker. It is clear that he was nominated as one of the 
trustees of Colonel Kable's estate because of the confidence and 
respect that Colonel Kahle had for his friend's ability and integrity, 
and because he felt that under his friend Willson's guidance the 
school and his family would prosper. It was definitely petitioner 
Willson's duty, having accepted the trust imposed upon him by the 
will of Colonel Kahle, to resist any unfounded effort -to remove 
him as trustee. That petitioner's continuance in office as trustee was 
a benefit to the estate was recognized by the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia in its opinion in the Willson v. Kahle case, when it 
said: 
12* *"More is required to remove a trustee appointed by 
and 
the creator of the trust than is required to remove one 
appointed by the court. In all cases the real guide is 
whether or not it is best for the trust estate that the trustee 
be removed ... Some beneficial end must be achieved by 
the removal or it will not be justified." (P. 146) 
(P. 143): "Mrs. Whitehead and others interested in 
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the school have attributed its financial success largely to 
the efforts of Gilpin Willson. The record shows that he 
was untiring in his efforts and that he has rendered faith-
ful and valuable services ... Under his leadership and good 
business judgment the school has prospered ... and, (P. 
148), with his experience he will continue to be an asset.'' 
The expenses for which reimbursement is sought are reasonable 
and were incurred solely by petitioner in opposing to a successful 
conclusion the unfounded allegations and unwarranted suit to re-
move him as trustee, and solely for the benefit of the trust estate, 
and which suit he was in duty bound under the law to defend, and 
to uphold the wishes of the creator of the trust, and such expenses 
should be decreed a lien upon the trust estate and ordered paid 
therefrom. 
II. A TRUSTEE WHO SUCCESSFULLY RESISTS AN 
APPLICATION FOR HIS REMOVAL IS ENTITLED TO 
CHARGE THE TRUST ESTATE WITH HIS COSTS 
AND EXPENSES, INCLUDING ATTORNEYS FEES. 
No reported decisions have been. found in Virginia involving 
the right of a trustee to be reimbursed for expenses incurred or con-
tracted for in defending himself in a proceeding where his removal 
as trustee has been sought. In every case found in other jurisdic-
tions, however, where that specific question has been raised, it has 
been held that the trustee is entitled to charge the trust estate with 
the expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by him in success-
fully resisting his removal as trustee, especially where, as here, he 
was named trustee by the creator of the trust. 
13* *In Bogert on Trusts and Trustees ( 1935) it is said, in 
Section 525, that "if the attempt to remove the trustee fails, 
it is proper to order payment of costs out of the trust estate." To 
the same effect see Perry on Trusts and Trustees, Section 910. The 
same rule is stated in 65 Corpus Juris, Trusts, Section 490, in the 
following language: 
"Where a trustee successfully resists an application to 
remove him the costs and expenses should be paid out of 
the trust estate, and not be charged to the trustee." 
This gerier':',l rule was also laid down in In Re Titcomb, (N. Y. 
1913) 80 Misc. 612, 142 N. Y. S. 1030, where the court said: 
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"The only theory upon which allowance can be made to 
an executor or trustee for counsel fees paid by him in re-
sisting an effort to remove him from office is that the ex-
penditure was made in the course of administration, and 
was made for the benefit of the estate. 
"That the office is valuable to the encumbent and that 
his personal interests are concerned in maintaining it is 
of secondary significance if it be shown by the exent that 
the officer was justly entitled to retain his office. If it be 
found that he rightfully resisted removal, it must fol-
low that his resistance was made not only in the exercise 
of a personal right, but in the pursuit of a duty, and any 
outlay made in the discharge of an obligation to the estate 
must be regarded as an expense which the estate shou:d 
bear. The allowance is not to be made merely because the 
party seeking it has succeeded in fighting removal. 
"The test must be applied to the situation of an accused 
officer at the time of the commencement of the proceed-
ing. If, then, there was no ground for the attack upon 
him, his disbursement made in a successful endeavor to 
show that no such ground existed should be allowed as 
an incident to his discharge . of a legal duty to the estate. 
But, if at the commencement of the proceeding he was 
subject to criticism such as would justify his removal, and 
pending the proceeding he has so dealt with the estate that 
the conditions upon which the criticism depended no long-
er exist, he should be denied indemnity for his outlays. 
This is illustrated by the case in which an executor whos~ 
circumstances are such that they do not afford safety to 
the fund in his charge escapes removal by giving the bond 
permitted by the statute. In such instances reimbursement 
for counsel fees incurred in the removal proceeding should 
doubtless be refused." 
14* *In In Re Jones, ( 1911) 143 App. Div. 692, 128 N. Y. 
S. 215, it appears that Mr. Jones, trustee under a testamen-
tary trust, pusuant to written authorization by the beneficiaries, had 
invested trust funds in western states, some of which investments 
turned out unfortunately. One of the beneficiaries, who had been 
a minor when the authorization was signed, instituted a proceeding 
five years after reaching her majority, to remove Mr. Jones as 
trustee. Mr. Jones retained an attorney, Mr. Salisbury, who assisted 
him in successfully resisting removal. The court said in part: 
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"I think Mr. Jones was justified in resisting the effort 
to remove him ... Assaulted as he was in this proceeding 
to be ousted from a position to which he had been named. 
by the testator, it was necessary for him to defend him-
self. As stated, he was willing to give a bond to protect 
the petitioner at the outset of the proceeding, but that was 
not satisfactory, and all that was accomplished after the 
termination of the long litigation was to require him to' 
give this bond and he continued in the trusteeship." 
After that proceeding was terminated the life tenant also com-
menced a proceeding to require the trustee to account or to remove 
him, whiG,h proceeding was pending when Mr. Jones died. The same 
attorney had not been paid during Mr. Jones' lifetime for his ser-
vices in connection with either proceeding. After Mr. Jones' death 
the executrix of his estate paid the attorney his fees and sought re-
imbursement from the trust. This claim had been disallowed by 
the Surrogate's Court, which, however, was reversed on appe 
the court saying: 
"It seems to me she should be allowed this sum which 
she paid. As stated, the proceeding was to remove Mr. 
Jones as trustee, and he did not unreasonably resist the 
attack made upon him in filing an answer and presenting 
his proofs. He succeeded on the main proposition in that 
he was not removed. I realize that he was individually 
15* primarily liable to *Mr. Salisbury. That is always so 
with an executor or trustee. That fact, however, does not 
absolve the estate from reimbursing him for the amount 
he has expended, providing only the disbursement is a 
proper one; and when necessary a lien may be maintained 
upon the estate. Matter of Smith, 111 App. Div. 23, 97 
N. Y. S. 171. Nor does the fact that the payment was not 
made by Mr. Jones in his Ii fetime militate against its val-
idity. ,.i\tl atter of Blair, 67 App. Div. 116, 120, 73 N. Y 
s. 675." 
In Jessup v. Smith, (1918) 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 it 
appears that Smith and Randolph were co-trustees under the will 
of Samuel J. Tilden, deceased, with power to select a third trust 
to fill a vacancy caused by death. They were unable to agree upon a 
third trustee, and also differed in respect of other problems of ad-
ministration, and the orderly and efficient execution of the trust 
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was threatened. Smith's co-trustee, Randolph, and some of the 
beneficiaries under the will, began a proceeding for the removal of 
Smith, alleging lack of harmony between the trustees which was 
injuring the estate and charged that Smith was guilty of ineffi-
ciency and misconduct. Smith retained the present plaintiff, Jessup, 
as his attorney, informing Jessup that he (Smith) was poor and 
unable to pay counsel fees, and that Jessup would have to look to 
the estate for payment. The finding was that Jessup agreed to accept 
such retainer and to render his professional services in the premises 
on the faith of the trust estate, with knowledge of the poverty of 
Smith, and his inability personally to pay for such services. Jessup 
successfully opposed the application for the removal of Smith, and 
at the same time made a cross-application for the appointment of 
a third trustee, which was granted. 
Jessup, as plaintiff, then began this action, joining as defendants 
all persons interested in the estate, and praying that the value ot 
his services be declared a charge upon the trust, which con-
16* sisted of money and securities. The trial court *found that 
the services had been rendered and were just and reasonable, 
but held that the services were beneficial to Smith, personally, and 
not to the estate. Judgment was therefore granted dismissing the 
complaint, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, by a div-
ided court, upon the ground that the contract of retainer bound 
J essup's client, Smith, personally, and that the client must pay the 
counsel fees himself, and seek reimbursement from the estate upon 
the settlement of his accounts. This judgment was reversed by the 
Court of Appeals of New York, which held that plaintiff, Jessup, 
.had a lien. upon the trust estate, saying, through Judge Cardozo: 
"We reach a different conclusion. Undoubtedly the gen-
eral rule is as the Appellate Division has declared it. B 
there are exceptions as settled as the rule itself. A trustee 
who pays his own money for services beneficial to the trust 
has a lien for reimbursement. But if he is unable or un-
willing to incur liability himself, the law does not leave 
him helpless. In such circumstances he 'has the power, if 
other funds fail, to create a charge, equivalent to his own 
lien for reimbursement, in favor of another by whom 
the services are rendered. ' . . . . This is exactly what the 
trustee assumed to do. He was unable to pay; he explain-
ed the situation to the plaintiff; he was exonerated from 
personal liability; and the acceptance of the retainer was, 
by express agreement, on the credit of the estate." 
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The court then went on to say: 
"The question remains whether the services were bene-
ficial in the preservation of the trust. We have no doubt 
that they were. Mr. Smith had b·een named in the will as 
trustee. He owed a duty to the estate to stand his ground 
against unjust attack. He resisted the attempt to wrest the 
administration of the trust from one selected by the test-
ator and. to place it in strange hands. He did more. By 
his cross-application he procured the appointment of a 
third trustee, and broke a deadlock which threatened the 
safety of the estate. Plainly, such'. services, if paid for by 
the trustee personally, would justify reimbursement on 
his accounting before the surrogate. . . . . There must, 
therefore, be some other remedy where such payment is 
impossible. If that were not so, there would be no safety 
either for an indigent trustee or for the estate committed 
to his care. The law is too far sighted to invite such con-
sequences." ( Italics supplied). 
17* *In· McKennel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 
(1927) 223 N. Y. S. 598, the court said: 
"The controversy between the co-trustees arose from 
a mutual well-intentioned desire to protect and benefit 
the estate to which they each owed a duty. It cannot be said 
that Van Derveer was not acting for what he honestly 
believed to be the interest of the estate, when he urged 
upon his co-trustees the purchase of better ·interest bear-
ing securities. 
"If his honest efforts in this regard precitated a pro-
ceeding to remove him, he was none the less acting for 
the benefit of the estate in resisting his removal, even if 
it later might develop that the judgment of his co-trustees 
was better than his own. He was seemingly doing what 
he honestly believed was his duty, and he should not be 
penalized by being required to personaily pay attorneys, 
who, in good faith, represented him on such proceedings." 
(Italics supplied). 
In In Re Pelgram's Estate, (N. Y. 1933)-146 Misc. 750, 262 N. 
Y. S. 848, a petition was filed by an attorney for a determination 
by the court of his compensation as attorney for A. E. Ommen, one 
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of the trustees of the Estate of Eliza M. Pelgram, deceased, who 
resisted proceedings to remove Mrs. Fleming ( testatrix' s daugh-
ter) as a co-trustee. It appears that while the trust was being ad-
ministered by Mrs. Fleming and Mr. Ommen a proceeding in 
lunacy was initiated by the husband of Mrs. Fleming, as a result of 
which she was adjudged insane and committed to a private insti-
tution. The husband then applied to the court for a decree revok-
ing the appointment of Mrs. Fleming as trustee and for the appoint-
ment of a successor. Mr. Ommen thereupon engaged petitioner to 
resist this proceeding to remove Mrs. Fleming. The court held that 
petitioner was entitled to be paid his counsel fees out of the trust 
estate, saying: 
"If in truth Caroline M. Fleming was not an incom-
petent, she was not only entitled to, but was required to, 
act in every matter arising in the trust administration, ex-
cept possibly purely ministerial matters. Her co-trustee · 
18* was unable to act in the *trust, at least in any matter 
requiring discreton, wthout her concurrence. . . . The com-
mitment of Caroline M. Fleming as in insane person did 
not, of course, terminate her trusteeship. It has been held 
that a trustee is under a duty to apply to the appropriate 
court for the removal of a co-trustee who has become in-
competent. . . There should be no doubt of the power of 
a co-trustee, convinced of the sanity of his fellow fidu-
ciary, to resst what he believes to be an unwarranted as-
sault upon the status of his fellow. Certainly no question 
would be made that it would be the co-trustee's duty so 
to resist if, for instance, the fiduciary sought to be re-
moved were one named by a testator and expressly requir-
ed to join in all trust proceedings. While here the sug-
gested facts do not exist ( Caroline M. Fleming being a 
successor trustee named by the court) and hence no ex-
press duty devolved upon the co-trustee, Ommen, to resist 
the proceedings for removal, there is still no doubt of his 
right to resist the removal and the consequent effect upon 
the trust, if in good faith he concluded that the removal 
proceedings were unwarranted. 
These considerations lead to the inquiry whether there 
existed a basis upon which in good faith Alfred E. Om-
men could determine· that his duty required him to resist 
the removal proceedings. . . . 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
... It suffices to us that there is shown enough to have 
warranted Alfred E. Ommen ( even if mistakenly) in be-
lieving that his duty to the trust required him to resist 
the proceedings for removal. . . He determined to resist 
the removal proceedings and his good faith in reaching 
that determination is established satisfactorily. 
The arrangement entered into with the petitioner by the 
trustee clearly shows that both trustee and petitioner con-
tracted on the basis of estate liability for services. This 
was a permissible and enforceable agreement. .. 
. . . The foregoing discussion suffices to show that the 
estate is liable for the services where beneficial to the es-
tate. 
On this question of benefit it is suggested, among other 
things, by petitioner, that the resistance to the removal 
proceedings had a net result of effecting savings in trus-
tees' commissions, because during the pendency of the 
whole body of litigation only a single trustee was in of-
fice and hence only a single commission was payable. This 
is not such a benefit as will furnish basis for an allowance. 
The present trustee and the other objecting parties in 
this proceeding assert that the services were of no benefit 
19* to the estate because in truth Caroline *M. Fleming was 
insane, her commitment was proper, she should have been 
removed as a trustee, and hence that the resistance to her 
removal was a waste of effort and allowance therefor 
would be a waste of estate funds ... 
The first stated position of the objectants begs the 
whole question. To be benelcial, it need not be shown 
that net tangible monetary advantage was realized or 
that money loss was avoided. The administration of 
trust property does not permit so simplified a test of 'ben-
efit.' The word applies to every aspect of administration 
which sound judgment would approve. If in the carrying 
on of such an administration legal services are required 
either in defense or in attack, the fiduciary may contract 
for or may pay and receive allowance for reasonable 
foes. 
Both sides of the controversy refer to and cite in sup-
port of their respective positions the case of Jessup v. 
Smith, 223 N. Y. 203, 119 N. E. 403 ... 
The test of benefit so stated by the Court of Appeals 
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obviously permits a finding of 'benefit' to the estate in the 
resistance to the removal of a co-trustee. The point is 
urged by objectants that the administration of the trust 
could continue unhampered while the contest raged, and 
hence that Alfred E. Ommen had no need to intervene in 
the interests· of the trust, and hence that there exists no 
basis for compensation of an attorney acting for him. This 
view ignores the real character of the title and powers of 
co-trustees. In legal effect they are one . . . and hence 
the same principles must apply as if the attack were made 
on Alfred E. Ommen himself. Having found that the 
removal of the co-trustee was contested in good faith, it 
follows that the trust estate is chargeable with the cost of 
the legal proceedings conducted up to the point where 
further contest would be unreasonable." 
On the authority of this case petitioner's co-trustees would have 
been justified, and it might be considered to have been their duty, 
to assist petitioner in his endeavor to resist the proceedings to re-
move him as trustee, and if these co-trustees had done so, and had 
incurred expense or employed additional counsel to assist petitioner, 
the trust estate would have been liable for the expenses and counsel 
fees thus incurred by petitioner's co-trustees. 
The cases of Jessup v. Smith and In Re Pelgram's Estate 
20* *are also authority to sustain the proposition that where legal 
services are rendered by an attorney to a trustee in success-
fully defending such trustee in a proceeding seeking his remov<,1.l, 
there is a lien against the trust estate for such services. The present 
proceeding is, of course, instituted by the trustee. But such coun-
sel fees and expenses could have been recovered if the trustee had 
not assumed them by the attorney instituting a proceeding himself. 
The same reasoning was involved in Campbell v. Barber et al., 
( 1904) 46 Misc. 185, 93 N. Y. Supp. 182, where the court said: 
"It would be illogical to the point of absurdity to re-
quire the plaintiff to bring his action against the trustee 
with whom he made the contract, and then to relegate that 
trustee for her own recoupment to an action against her-
self and her co-trustees as trustees and as individuals for 
the purpose of determining the accounts stretching over a 
period of many years." 
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Tuckerman v. Currier, (1912) 54 Colo. 25,·was an action by re-
siduary legatees of an estate against present and former executors, 
charging numerous act$ of maladministration and breach of trust 
against the persons who acted as executors and performed the duties 
of trustees. It charged fraud, mismanagement and misconduct, and 
prayed removal of present executors and trustees. The lower court 
exonerated the executors from any fault and any alleged breach 
of trust. On appeal the court said ( pages 44-45) : 
21* 
"It is quite probable that had the life beneficiaries re-
quested the resignation of the executors, and not coupled 
with it a demand for the return of a large sum of money, 
most of which at least -was .properly paid out by them, 
that they-as their predecessors had done-would have 
resigned and turned the management over to others ; but 
when the validity of certain portions of the will, including 
that upon which their appointments were based, is attack-
ed, and when it is sought to hold them personally liable 
for moneys expended in the defense of these matters, in 
the prosecution and defense of other suits, and in pay-
ment of their salaries, it is hardly probable that the mind 
of any individual is so constructed that he would be wil-
ling, under such circumstances, to voluntarily relinquish 
his claim to such appointment, con*fess the error of his 
actions ( conceded by the court to have been in good 
faith), and also pay to the life beneficiaties a large sum 
of money equal ·to that expended by him in these matters, 
including that received as his salary for the time spent 
during a series of years in the performance of such du-
ties .... 
It is alleged in the pleadings that some of the counsel 
fees were excessive. It is also alleged that other moneys 
paid to former executors were not justifiable, and that 
other fees paid in the defense of certain litigation against 
them were not justified or expended in good faith ... The 
appellants are the duly and lawfully appointed subsequent 
~xecutors of the will. This justifies them in incurring 
any necessary and legitimate expenses in attempting to 
have sustained the validity of the entire will,· their ap-
pointments thereunder, as well as to in good faith def end 
their course of procedure when attacked while in office. 
They have a right to an allowance out of the estate funds 
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in a reasonable amount necessarily expended in such mat-
ters." 
In Bloomer's Appeal,, (1876) 83 Pa. 45, an appeal had been 
filed by Caroline Bloomer from the decree of the court removing 
her from the management of a trust, declared by herself in favor 
of her sister, Cornelia Sproul, and the sister's children. It appears 
that James S. Craft died leaving a will giving all his estate to his 
daughter, Caroline Bloomer, who became executrix and voluntarily 
resolved to make an equal division of the estate between herself, 
her brother and her sister. With respect to the sister she prepared 
a trust indenture naming herself as trustee, and embraced in this 
trust an undivided half of several tracts of land, over which Mrs. 
Bloomer reserved personal control. Subsequently a bill in equity 
was filed by Mrs. Sproul asking that Mrs. Bloomer be removed as 
trustee because ( 1) she was living without the jurisdiction of the 
court, (2) she was unfit to manage the trust by reason of her sex, 
lack of judgment and fickle temper, and ( 3) of her vindictive feel-
ings toward complainant. The lower court made a decree discharg-
ing Mrs. Bloomer from the duties of the trust because she was a 
non-resident, and appointed a trustee in her stead, and directed her 
to pay the costs of the suit. 
22* *On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the lower court in 
its appointment of a new trustee except as to the lands which 
were held in common, they to be left in control of Mrs. Bloomer. 
The Court said (page 56) : 
"The imposition of the costs on the appellant, even in 
view of the equities of the case as they were adjudged by 
the master and the Common Pleas, was by the application 
of a rule unduly harsh. There had been no breach of 
trust, no waste, mismanagement, or misappropriation of 
the trust funds, and no such misconduct as to make the 
suit necessary to protect the interests of the appellees. 
The appellant had the right to def end herself against the 
attempt to oust her from the control of the common prop-
erty, and under all the circumstances surrounding the 
parties, the costs should have been directed to be paid 
oµt of the trust fund." 
In Gray v. Brattleboro Trust Company, (1923) 97 Vt. 270, 1.22 
Atl. 670, plaintiffs filed a bill for an accounting by defendants of 
funds awarded as alimony in her suit for divorce and for removal 
\_ 
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of the defendant as trustee. The Chancellor found that the pay-
ments made by defendant were within the provisions of the trust, 
and approved the trustee's account. The bill was dismissed, the 
balance of the funds in the hands of the defendant as trustee, after 
deducting an allowance for services and a further sum paid for 
attorney's fees in the defense of the action, was ordered paid in 
equal shares to the plaintiffs, the court, on appeal, saying ( page 
672): 
"It is urged that costs should not have been allowed the 
defendant, as the plaintiffs have prevailed to the extent 
of establishing the right to an accounting. Weston v. 
Cushing, 45 Vt. 531, is relied upon in support of this 
claim. But there the plaintiff prevailed upon the main 
issue in the case, though not to the full extent of his 
claim, yet to a greater extent than was admitted by the 
defendants. On this ground he was allowed to recover 
his costs. The general rule is that when a trustee who has 
acted honestly and in good faith comes into court to ren-
der his account he is entitled to his costs. Chamberlin v. 
23* Estey, 55 Vt. 378. In the instant case it was in *evi-
dence that the defendant had never been asked to account, 
that it had at all times been ready and willing to do so, 
that its records relating to the trust had at all times been 
at the disposal of the complainants for examination and 
had been inspected and full copies thereof made by a rep-
resentative of Mrs. Gray, and that no complaint or sug-
gestion of dissatisfaction had ever been received prior to 
the bringing of the bill. Coupled with the fact that the 
defendant was not found liable beyond what it admitted 
in its answer, these facts amply warranted the decree as 
to costs.'' 
In Hurley's Estate, ( 1889) 7 Pa. Co. 21, the testator by his will 
had appointed Messrs. Shivers, Hopper and Pancoast as trustees of 
his estate, but the trustees did not act in harmony. Messrs. Shivers 
and Hopper filed a petition alleging that Mr. Pancoast was misman-
aging and wasting the estate, and asking for his discharge, which 
the court, after hearing, refused to do, whereupon the two other 
trustees upon their petition were discharged. The court allowed 
counsel fees for the services of counsel representing Mr. Pancoast, 
saying, at page 23: 
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"If the dispute among the trustees was entirely per-
~onal to themselves, and related to issues upon which the 
beneficiaries of the trust could look with indifference, the 
ruling of the judge would be unassailable that the princi-
pals to a litigation which was indulged in as a luxury 
should bear its expense. But the cestui que trusts divested 
this controversy, so far as the accountant was concerned, 
of the personal character which it may have assumed at 
the outset by their endorsement of his action. Hence, 
when he contested the petition of the co-trustees praying 
for his removal on the ground .of mismanagement, he was 
doing something more than def ending his reputation; he 
was upholding the conduct of the estate on the lines which 
had been marked out by the equitable owners themselves. 
The policy which, with their concurrence, he had adopted 
received the qualified approval of the court, and he was 
retained in his position .. and as a consequence the co-
trustees resigned their office. . . The evidence develops a 
stronger case than that of Morris's Estate, 44 Leg. Int. 
58 ... Yet in Morris's Estate the fees and expenses of the 
successful litigant were charged against the trust fund, on 
the ground that in defending his status as trustee, he was 
defending the trust of which he was custodian." 
24* In Lycan v. Miller, (1894) 56 Mo. App. 79, the benefi-
ciary of a trust instituted two actions against the trustees, 
the first being for trust funds and the second for the removal of 
the trustees for improper conduct. Both actions were unfounded. 
The court held that the trustees were entitled to credits in their 
accounts for reasonable counsel fees expended by them in defense 
of these actions, saying (page 85): 
"As there was no substantial evidence before the court 
that the trustees had mismanaged or wasted the trust es-
tate, nor of any fraudulent conduct on their part which 
would have authorized their removal, the court was war-
ranted in allowing them reasonable counsel fees in defend-
ing the two successive actions brought against them by 
the plaintiffs." 
The same general rule is followed with respect to other fiduciar-
ies, such as assignees and executors, and the courts allow them 
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costs, including attorneys fees, from the estates which they ad-
minister when they successfully resist proceedings in which their 
removal is sought. Thus in In Re CaJdwell's Bank, ( 1893) 89 . 
Iowa 533, 56 N. W. 672, the court said (page 675) : 
"The facts in regard to the fees claimed by S. I. 
King and Roadifer appear to be substantially as follows: 
An application was made to the court for the removal of 
Stephen King as assignee. It was resisted by him, S. I. 
King and Roadifer, acting as his attorneys, and, after a 
hearing, was dismissed. There is no suggestion in the 
record that the assignee acted in bad faith in the matter, 
nor that the application was well-founded; while the ac-
tion of the court in dismissing it tends to show that it 
was without merit. The services rendered by the attor-
neys were worth the amounts claimed. Since the services 
were rendered to def end the right acquired by the assignee 
through the assignment, from an unwarranted attack 
made without fault on his part, we find the compensation 
therefor should be allowed from the fund in his hands 
as expenses incurred in protecting the interests of the es-
tate, 2 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 910; .. " 
The same rule is followed in Texas, where, in Ogden v. Shrop-
shire & Adkins, (Tex 1931) 37 S. W. (2d) 249, the court said 
(page 253): 
25* *"Generally speaking, the propriety for allowance of 
attorneys fees to an executor or administrator depends 
upon whether the expense was incurred in a proper ad-
ministration of the estate. 
A strict legal application of this rule would deny such 
allowance in any suit where the propriety of the official 
acts of the executor or administrator or his further right 
to administer the estate are drawn in question ; for in such 
action the executor or administrator appears in the role 
of a private litigant defending his own acts or right to 
retain his appointment. . . 
The relation of an executor or trustee, designated by 
the owner to administer his property or to perform ser-
vices with regard to it, diiers in one essential respect from 
that of an administrator or other officer appointed by a 
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court. In the former case, the person appointed 'under-. 
takes an office for another in relation to his property,' and 
his right to reimbursement for all reasonable expenses or 
losses incurred, in the proper administration of the estate, 
a~e allowed him upon broad equitable principles. See 
Perry on Trusts, Sec. 910. 
Consequently, it has been held that attorneys fees will 
be allowed in a removal proceeding, where it appears that 
the executor or trustee was blameless and the suit was 
unfounded or vexatious. See Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 
Vol. 28, page 1091." 
And in In Re Boyer, ( 1907) 54 Misc. 182, 105 N. Y. S. 857, 
which involved the judicial settlement of the accounts of the ex-
ecutors of an estate, the court said : 
"The objection to the $250 paid to Mr. Ross as counsel 
fees is based solely upon the ground that it is not a prop-
er charge against the estate; the reasonableness of the 
amount being conceded. It appears that this was money 
expended by the executors in the successful resistance of 
c1 motion to remove them in their official capacity. Where 
an unjust attack is made upon an executor, he is author-
ized to recoup from the estate the necessary expenditure 
to which he has been put in justifying his conduct, and 
therefore this item is allowed." 
In Bates v. Revell, ( 1911) 116 Md. 691, 82 Atl. 986, it appeared 
that Octavia Bates had died leaving a will disposing of a large 
estate. Letters testamentary were granted to appellee as execu-
tor, he being named in the will. Appellant attacked the will and 
· also asked the removal of appellee as executor, serious 
26* charges *being made. against the executor in the petition. In 
his answer the appellee denied all the charges whjch reflect-
ed upon his honesty and ·fitness to act as executor. The Orphan's 
Court dismissed the petition for removal of appellee as executor, 
but directed him to file certain inventories with the court. The 
court then directed the executpr to pay out of the funds of the es-
tate to Mr. Horwitz, who acted as the executor's counsel, the sum 
of $500 for services rendered in resisting the effort of the appellant 
to remove him as executor, which orders were affirmed on appeal. 
Counsel fees have been allowed executors and trustees even if 
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judgment were rendered against them to a minor extent provided 
they had acted in good faith. Thus in Ellis v. Kelsey, ( 1925) 
241 N. Y. 374, 150 N. E. 148, the court said: 
"The plaintiff has insisted that the executor and the 
trustee should have stepped aside, and permitted her to 
litigate the question of her legitimacy with the defendants, 
and that the executor and trustee were not justified in 
employing counsel. This cannot be, when she is insisting 
that their actions were taken in bad faith and has sought 
to charge them, and thus far has succeeded in charging 
them with 6% interest as a penalty, and has deprived 
them of their fees and commissions because of that bad 
faith. Under such charges the executor and trustee were 
justified in employing counsel to protect their interests, 
especially when the plaintiff, by her previous proceedings 
and the actions and conduct of herself and mother, had 
caused many of the complications ... The referee accord-
ingly allowed certain items of compensation to the execu-
tor and the trustee for lawyer's fees. We think these 
were reasonable, and that the penalty judgment should 
not have interfered with his report in this particular.'' 
In Turner v. Ryan, (Iowa 1937) 272 N. W. 60, an application 
was filed by the cestui que trust in which the legality and pro-
priety of certain exp~nditures of the trust funds were brought in 
question, and wherein the applicant asked that the trustee be requir-
ed to make a report and that certain expenditures be surcharged 
against the trustee and the trustee discharged and some one ap-
pointed as his successor. The court said (P. 68): 
27* *"Practically all of the evidence introduced and much 
of the time taken in the trial had a. bearing on the issue 
of whether or not he should be removed as trustee. It 
is not only the right of a testamentary trustee or executor, 
but it is the duty of such trustee or executor upon whom 
a responsible obligation has been placed by the testatrix, 
to resist efforts made to thwart the intent of the deced-
ent, and on this issue alone the sum of $350 awarded by 
the court as attorney's fees would not be considered ex-
cessive. While there is nothing in the record to show 
what was in the mind of the trial court in making this 
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allowance of attorney's fees, we must assume, in the ab-
sence of anything to the contrary, that the trial court 
eliminated all services in connection with the items that 
were surcharged against the trustee, . . . ,, 
Likewise, a guardian, who acts in good faith and with reasonable 
discretion in resisting an application for his removal, may be al-
lowed the expenses incurred in connection therewith as against the 
estate of the ward, regardless of the result of the proceeding. 
Dearborn v. Batten, 64 N. H. 568, 15 Atl. 149; 28 Corpus litris, 
Guardia.n & Ward, Sec. 167. 
III. ON THE SAME THEORY A DIRECTOR, WHO HAS 
BEEN VINDICATED OF MISCONDUCT CHARGED 
AGAINST HIM IN A STOCKHOLDER'S DERIV A-
TIVE SUIT, IS ENTITLED TO REMBURSE-
MENT OF HIS EXPENSES, INCLUDING 
ATTORNEYS FEES, INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING HIMSELF IN 
SUCH A SUIT. 
It has been the universal practice for corporations to pay the 
expenses, including attorneys fees, of directors and officers who 
successfully defended themselves against charges of fraud or mis-
conduct alleged in stockholders' derivative suits. Thus in Figge v. 
Bergenthal, ( 1906) 130 Wis. 594, 109 N. W. 581, the court said 
(page 592): 
"Respecting the payment of attorneys fees out of cor-
porate funds in the defense of this action little need be 
said. Clearly, if no case is made against defendants it is 
not improper or unjust that the corporation should pay 
for the defense of the action. It follows from what has 
been said that ... the corporate funds were lawfully used 
in the defense of this action." 
28* *One of the most recent cases in which this question was 
fully considered is S olimine v. Hollander, ( 1941) 19 Atl. ( 2d) 344, 
decided by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey. In that case a 
derivative stockholders suit had been instituted against the directors 
of a corporation, the corporation being also named as a defendant, 
and counsel for the directors applied for an order reserving to the 
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defendant directors the right to apply for counsel fees against the 
corporation defendant. The question which the court had for de-
cision was: 
Are corporate directors entitled to indemnification or 
reimbursement from the corporation for their reasonable 
expenses necessarily incurred by them in defending a 
stockholder's derivative suit in which an accounting was 
sought against them because of alleged dereliction of duty 
and in which suit they were vindicated?" 
The individual directors had been charged in the bill of com-
plaint with negligence, mismanagement, diversion of assets, and 
fraud, and the bill sought an acc·ounting from them both for dam-
ages alleged to have been sustained by the corporation and profits 
and business opportunities alleged to have been illegally diverted 
from it. 
After pointing out that in such a case the corporation must as-
sume a · neutral position which would forbid it from granting any 
financial aid to the individual defendants during the course of the 
litigation and in advance of a determination in their favor, and that 
the individual defendants were not entitled to their costs and coun-
. sel fees except only in the event that their defense was sustained 
and it w~s adjudged that they had committed no breach of trust, 
duty or fidelity, the court said: 
"In several cases the courts have sought to establish an 
additional test or requirement for the pay111ent of litiga-
tion expenses to directors even where the latter have been 
successful in their defense. Some of these cases require 
29* a showing that *the defense resulted in some benefit to 
the corporation or that some interest of the corporation 
was threatened. In the recent case of New York Dock 
Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 844, 
the court declared that if a director can show upon an 
application to the court for reimbursement or when called 
upon to refund corporate money already taken by him by 
way of reimbursement, that in maintaining successfully 
his own defense in the stockholder's suit he has conserved 
some substantial corporate interest or has brought some 
benefit to the· corporation, the court _may direct or confirm 
his reimbursement. I do not agree that there is any added 
burden cast upon the directors as expressed in the McCol-
Gilpin Willson· vs. Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, et als. 27 
lum case although as presently appears, the instant case 
meets that further requirement. As I read the McCollum 
opinion, I am led to the view that it is not of much as-
sistance in considering the question before me. The Mc-
Collum suit was brought by the company seeking a de-
claratory judgment which would adjudge that it, the com-
pany, was not legally obligated to pay or indemnify the 
defendant directors against their expenses in an earlier 
derivative stockholder's action. The defendant directors 
relied upon an implied legal obligation and upon the ad-
ded claim that their defense had substantially benefitted 
the company. The point of the decision seems to be that 
the referee, who heard the case, viewed a director's liabil-
ity to suit as one of the assumed hazards of his office. 
Notwithstanding this the court expressed the view that 
there might be cases in which because the directors suc-
cessfully def ended themselves that there might exist a 
'legal obligation' resting on the corporation in the wider 
sense of that phrase and that in such a situation the cor-
poration may pay the reasonable expenses of its directors. 
I do not consider that liability to charges of misconduct 
in office as one of the hazards inhering in the office of a 
director of a company and that such hazard is impliedly 
assumed in the acceptance of that office. That is no more 
true in the case of a director, who is essentially a trustee, 
than in the instance of an executor or testamentary trus-
tee. When it is sought to surcharge a trustee of the latter 
class for alleged negligence, wastage, mismanagement, or 
fraud or where his removal is sought for these or other 
acts of misconduct and he prevails on the merits, the ex-
penses of his successful resistance are invariably paid out 
of the estate being administered, and this is done without 
inquiry into the question of whether or not his defense 
resulted in ·some benefit to the trust. Such benefit is nec-
essarily present in the circumstances that in def ending the 
action against him the executor or testamentary trustee is 
effectuating the testator's intent that the estate be adminis-
tered by the hands to which ir has been confided. 
* * * * * * * 
30* *In the case at bar the charges ~gainst the directors 
and officers were of such nature that had they been sub-
stantiated the defendants might have been removed from 
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office. The directors and officers here not only had a right 
but were under a duty to stand their ground against all 
unjust attack and to resist all attempt to wrest the cor-
porate trust estate from those hands to which the stock-
holders had previously committed it. In defending them-
selves they demonstrated to the investing public the hon-
esty of the corporate management and thus they not alone 
served their own interests but also performed a duty 
which they owed to the beneficiaries of the trust-the 
stockholders. At least one of the counsel for the com-
plaining stockholders in this cause was aware of this fact 
of benefit. In opposing the application to tax him with 
counsel fees in favor of the successful directors, he urged 
that the litigation had beriefitted the company and its 
stockholders in that it demonstrated the excellence and 
honesty of the services rendered by the directors and that, 
therefore, the directors' counsel should be paid out of 
the corporate treasury. Other counsel for complaining 
stockholders did not dissent from this view. While I find 
that the company was benefited, I am not to be under-
stood as holding that the fact of benefit to the company is 
an element of the directors' right to reimbursement or 
indemnification under such circumstances as are here 
present. However, with respect to such fact of benefit 
and in all other respects the instant case is indistinguish-
able in principle from that of the Jessup case. 
I am also mindful of the policy which dictates that di-
rectors, like executors and other trustees, should be en-
couraged to resist unjust charges in the confidence that 
ultimately, if their innocense be judicially established, 
they will be reimbursed for their necessary expenses of 
defense. Such a rule enables the director of limited 
means to enlist the professional service and aid of com-
petent counsel who will be willing to undertake the de-
fense upon the assurance that, if successful, payment 
would be forthcoming from the corporate treasury. The 
withholding of such assurance might well have the effect 
of denying the financially disabled director the opportun-
ity of adequate representation in the suit against him. 
But what is more important than this is the fact that the 
right to reimbursement is a circumstance that would ac-
tuate and induce responsible business men to accept the 
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post of directors, the emoluments of which would other-
wise never be commensurate with the risk or loss involved 
in paying out of their own pocket the costs involved in 
def ending their conduct. The right of reimbursement 
carries with it the added virtue that it is likely to dis-
31 * courage in large measure stockholders' *litigation of the 
strike variety with which the courts are not unfamiliar. 
Such litigation is occasionally brought in the expectation 
that the accused directors and officers will pay something 
to escape not so much the risk of surcharge or removal 
as the substantial costs involved in adequate defense, par-
ticularly if the litigation is likely to be a prolonged one. 
These considerations and others like them are undoubtedly 
responsible for the many instances in which corporations 
have in recent years amended their by-laws so as to of-
fer their directors contractual indemnity against the cost 
of unjustified suits. See Washington, 40 Columbia Law 
Review at page 452 ... 
* * * * * * * 
I, therefore, hold that the directors and officers who 
have successfully defended this suit on the merits and 
who have demonstrated honesty and loyalty to their trust 
are entitled to be reimbursed by the corporate defendant 
for their reasonable expenses and counsel fees either 
already e~pended or incurred in connection with this 
cause ... '' 
Because of the numerous stockholders suits which have been 
brought against directors of corporations in recent years, most of 
them without any foundation, corporations are realizing that di-
rectors are entitled to adequate protection against such suits when 
they are exonerated, as with such protection the corporations are 
enabled to secure and retain the services of competent directors. 
As a result more than 200 corporations, which file proxy statements 
with the Securities & Exchange Commission, have amended or 
have taken steps to amend their by-laws- so as to definitely and spe-
cifically provide indemnification for directors in connection with 
such suits. Among such corporations are the following: Radio-
Keith Orpheum; North America Company; Bristol-Myers Com-
pany; Lee Rubber & Tire Corporation; Electric Boat Company; 
Socony-Vacuum Company; American Power & Light Company ; 
Gimbel Brothers; Intertype Corporation; Curtis-\tVright; Postal 
\. 
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Telegraph; McKesson & Robbins; Virginia Public Service Com-
pany; United States Rubber Company; Transcontinental & West-
ern Ai~, Inc., and many others. 
32* *CONCLUSION AND PETITIONER'S PRAYER 
For the reasons stated herein and on the authorities herein cited, 
petitioner prays that an appeal may be allowed; that the decree of 
the Corporation Court for the City of Staunton of July 18, 1942, 
sustaining the demurrers of the several defendants herein com-
plained of may be reviewed and reversed; that a writ of supersedeas 
may be awarded him. 
GILPIN WILLSON 
By Counsel 
October 26, 1942 
We, Wayt B. Timberlake, Jr. and Joseph I. Nachman, counsel 
for the defendants in this petition, do hereby this day acknowledge 
receipt of a copy of said petition. 
W. B. TIMBERLAKE, JR. 
Attorney for Eleanor Enslow White-
head, W. H. Steele and L. W. H. 
Peyton, Trustees under the will of 
William G. Kahle, deceased, and 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, Elean-
or Kahle Miller and Helene Kahle 
Ferguson, in their own right, and 
Staunton Military Academy, a cor-
poration. 
JOS. I. NACHMAN 
Attorney for William G. Kahle, II 
STATEMENTS 
I. Appellant adopts this petition as his opening brief. 
II. Counsel for petitioner desires to state orally the 
reasons for reviewing the decree complained of. 
III. I, J. vVesley Taylor, certify that on the 26th day 
of October, 1942, a copy of the foregoing petition was 
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by me delivered ·to Wayt B. Timberlake, Jr., counsel in 
this cause for Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W. H. Steele 
and L. W. H. Peyton, Trustees under the will of William 
G. Kahle, deceased, and Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, 
Eleanor Kahle Miller and Helene Kahle Ferguson, in 
33* their own right, and Staunton Military Academy a *cor-
poration, and a copy of said petition was also by me this 
day delivered to Joseph I. Nachman, counsel in this cause 
for William G. Kahle, II, in the Corporation Court for 
the City of Staunton, and that the said Wayt B. Timber-
lake, Jr. and Joseph I. Nachman, attorneys, were advised 
that this petition will be filed with The Honorable Henry 
W. Holt, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals ~f 
Virginia, on October 26, 1942, at his office in the Masonic 
Temple, in the City of Staunton, Virginia, at which time 
and place counsel will request permission to state orally 
the reasons for reviewing the decree complained of. 
J. WESLEY TAYLOR 
Attorney for Gilpin Willson 
CERTIFICATE 
I, J. Wesley Taylor, of Staunton, Virginia, an attorney practic-
ing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,. hereby certify 
that in my opinion there is error in the decree of July 18, 1942, 
entered in this cause by the Corporation Court for the City of 
Staunton, as set out in the foregoing petition, and that the same 
should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Received 
October 26th, 1942. 
W. W. SMALES, 
Deputy Clerk. 
J. WESLEY TAYLOR. 
Appeal and supersedeas awarded. Bond $500.00. 
November 9, 1942. 
HENRY W. HOLT. 
Received 11/9/42. 
M.B.W. 
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RECORD 
page 1 ~ VIRGINIA: CORPORATION COURT FOR THE 
CITY OF STAUNTON: 
William G. Kahle's Executors 
v. 
William G. Kahle's Trustees 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
Petition of Gilpin Willson in his own right and as trustee 
under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, filed again-
st Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W. H. Steele and L. W. 
H. Peyton, Trustees under the will of William G. Kahle, 
deceased, and Eleanor Enslow Wpitehead, William G. 
Kahle II, Eleanor Kahle Miller and Helene Kahle Fer-
guson in their own right, and Staunton Military Aca-
demy, a corporation 
VIRGINIA, 
CITY OF STAUNTON,TO-WIT: 
PLEAS BEFORE THE CORPORATION COURT 
FOR THE CITY OF STAUNTON AT THE COURT 
HOUSE THEREOF ON THE 18TH DAY OF 
JULY, 1942 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 20th 
day of January, 1942, came the petitioner, Gilpin Willson in his 
own right and as trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, de-
ceased, and filed in the clerk's office his petition against the de-
fendants, Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W. H. Steele and L. W. H. 
Peyton, Trustees under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, 
and Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, William G. Kahle II, Eleanor 
Kahle Miller and Helene Kahle Ferguson in their owu right, and 
Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, which petition is in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
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page 2 ~ VIRGINIA, 
IN THE CORPORATION COURT FOR THE CITY 
OF STAUNTON 
Gilpin Willson, in his own right and as Trustee 
under the will of William G. Kahle, Deceased 
v. PETITION 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W. H. Steele and L. W. H. 
Peyton, Trustees under the will of William G. Kahle, 
Deceased, and Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, William G. 
Kahle, II, Eleanor Kahle Miller and Helene Kahle Fer-
guson, in their own right, and Staunton Military Aca-
demy, a corporation 
To: The Honorable Floridus S. Crosby, Judge of said Court: 
Your petitioner, Gilpin Willson, in, his own right and as co-
trustee under the will of W"illiam G. Kahle, deceased, respectfully 
shows unto the court that there is now pending in this court a 
certain chancery suit under the short style of William G. Kable's 
Executors v. William G. Kable's Trustees, which suit sought the 
guidance of the court on behalf of the Executors in the administra-
tio~ of the estate and the guidance of the trustees in the handling 
of the testamentary trust created in the will of the said William G. 
Kahle, deceased. 
As will appear from the record in .said cause, William G. Kahle 
died on July 5, 1920, seized of a considerable estate which he dis-
posed of by his last will and codicil thereto attached, which will 
was duly probated and is of record in the Clerk's Office of this 
court in Will Book 5 at Page 273, Petitioner's Exhibit 1 and pray-
ed to be read as part of this petition, a copy thereof be-
page 3 ~ ing herewith filed, and a certified copy thereof is also 
filed with the papers in said chancery suit. The principal 
asset of the estate of the said William G. Kahle, deceased, consisted 
of the entire capital stock of Staunton Military Academy, a corp-
oration, which the said William G. Kahle operated prior to his 
death; that at the time of his death, his estate, and the Staunton 
Military Academy, a corporation, were rather heavily in debt, the 
said indebtedness, that of the Staunton Military Military Aca-
demy, a corporation, the private indebtedness of Col. Kahle and 
a tax liability due to the Federal Government aggregating approxi-
mately $356,000.00; that the principal beneficiaries and heirs-at-
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law of the said deceased were his widow, Eieanor Enslow Kahle, 
now Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, and three infant children, 
William H. Kahle, now (by legal chance of name) William G. 
Kahle, II, Helene Kahle, now Helene Kahle Ferguson, and Eleanor 
Kahle, now Eleanor Kahle Miller; the said three infant children 
have now each attained their majority. 
That by the last will and testament of the said William G. Kahle, 
deceased, your petitioner, Gilpin Willson, together with Thomas 
H. Russell and William G. Rowland, were designated and later 
qualified as his Executors; that in order to secure the perpetuation 
of the school and to provide safe and adequate support for his 
family, the said decedent, by his will, gave the entire capital stock 
of said corporation to the following trustees : Eleanor Enslow 
Kahle, decedent's widow, Thomas H. Russell, decedent's 
page 4 ~ brother-in-law, Gilpin Willson, your petitioner, and de-
cedent's close· friend, W. C. Rowland and W. H. Steele, 
authorizing and empowering them to continue the operation of the 
school for the use and benefit of the widow and children, under 
the provisions and conditions of the said trust, with the right to 
elect themselves directors of the Staunton Military Academy, In-
corporated, as set out in the will. The said trustees accepting said 
trust did so elect themselves as directors of said corporation, and 
have served continuously as trustees and directors, with the excep-
tion that William A. Pratt succeeded Thomas H. Russell upon 
his death, as trustee and director, and upon the death of William A. 
Pratt he was succeeded in March of 1937 by S. D. Timberlake, 
Jr. as trustee and director, and upon the death of S. D. Timberlake, 
Jr., he was succeeded in November of 1940 by L. W. H. Peyton 
as trustee and director. Gilpin Willson resigned as director shortly 
after the appointment of S. D. Timberlake as trustee and director. 
Your petitioner further shows that on the of June, 1937, 
William G. Kahle, II, filed a petition in said suit, styled William 
G. Kable's Executors v. William G. Kable's Trustees, alleging 
that he sued for his own benefit and the use and benefit of his co-
beneficiaries under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and also 
for the use and benefit of Staunton Military Academy, a corpora-
tion, the ,said petition being against Gilpin Willson, both in his in-
dividual capacity and in his capacity as trustee under the will of 
William G. Kahle, deceased, the said petition being of record in 
the said suit and prayed to be read as part of this petition, in the 
words and figures following: 
page 5 ~ PETITION OF WILLIAM G. KABLE,II 
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To the Honorable Florid us S. Crosby, Judge of the said Court: 
Your petitioner, William G. Kahle, II, who sues for his own 
benefit and for the use and benefit of his co-beneficiaries under the 
will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and also for the use and benefit 
of the Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, respectfully re-
presents. 
That there is now pending before this Honorable Court a certain 
chancery suit under the short style of William G. Kable's Executors 
vs. William G. Kable's Trustees, which suit had for its principal 
purpose, the administration of the estate of ,vmiam G. Kahle, 
deceased, under the guidance of the court, as will fully appear from 
an °i:Qspection of the record in the said cause, all of which is re-
f erred to and adopted as a part of this petition as though set out at 
length herein. 
As will appear from the record in the said cause, William G. 
Kahle (the father of your petitioner) died on July 5, 1920, seized 
of a valuable estate which he disposed of by his last will and a 
codicil thereto attached. The said will was duly probated in the 
Oerk's Office of this Court, and a certified copy thereof is on file 
with papers in this cause. The principal beneficiaries, and the 
heirs-at-law of the deceased were his widow, Eleanor Enslow 
Kahle ( now Mrs. L. J. Whitehead), and three infant children, 
your Petitioner, and his two sisters, Helene Kahle and Eleanor 
Kahle Miller, all of whom have now attained their major-
rity. 
page 6J The principal portion of the decedent's estate con..: 
sisted of the entire capital stock of the Staunton Military 
Academy, a corporation, which the decedent had operated prior 
to his death as a military school in Staunton, Virginia. 
The said William G. Kahle, by his last will, appointed Gilpin 
Willson, Sr., (the defendant herein), Thomas H. Russell ·(his 
brother-in-law) and William C. Rowland, as his Executors, and in 
order to secure the perpetuation of the school and to provide safe 
and adequate support for his family, gave the entire capital stock 
of the said corporation to certain named Trustees, authorizing 
and empowering them to continue the operation of the school for 
the use and benefit of his widow and children, and gave to the said 
Trustees the voting power of the said stock, with the privilege to 
them if they saw fit, to elect themselves as Directors of the cor-
poration known as Staunton Military Academy. The Trustees 
named by the will were at the start W. H. Steele, Eleanor Enslow 
Kahle (now Whitehead), William C. Rowland, Thomas H. Russell' 
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and Gilpin Willson,Sr. These persons have served continuously 
from the beginning of the trust, with the exception that William 
A. Pratt succeeded to Thomas H. Russell upon the latter's death, 
and upon the death of the said William A. Pratt, he in turn was 
succeeded by S. D. Timberlake, Jr. With the changes above men-
tioned, the Trustees and Directors are the same as appointed by 
the will of the decedent. 
page 7 ~ Immediately upon the death of the said William G. 
Kahle, the Trustees named by the will exercised the 
privilege conferred upon them by the said will, by electing them-
selves as Directors of the Staunton Military Academy, and in that 
capacity and in their capacity of Trustees, they have since managed 
and directed the affairs of the corporation. 
At the time of the death of William G. Kahle, his widow was 
a very young woman, entirely without business training or ex-
prience and though named as one of the Trustees under the will, 
and elected as one of the Directors of the corporation, took very 
little interest or part in the management of its affairs. Shortly 
after the death of her husband she removed to Richmond with 
her three small children, and by reason of her absence, as well as 
her lack of business training, she has been compelled to leave the 
management of her husband's estate and the Staunton Military 
Academy largely to her co-trustees and co-directors, and to rely 
upon their judgment and integrity for the protection of the inter;. 
ests of the school as well as the interests of herself and her child-
ren. 
Your petitioner further represents that since the death of 
William G. Kahle, practically seventeen years, Gilpin Willson, Sr., 
has held and still holds the three-fold fiduciary capacity of Exe-
cutor under the will of the said William G. Kahle, Testamentary 
Trustee under the said will, and a Director of the Staunton Mili-
tary Academy, in each position, as well as in all of them, owing 
the duty of preserving and protecting the best interests 
page 8 ~ of the estate of the decedent. Your petitioner has recently 
learned that the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., has during the 
entire time of the existence of the trust been guilty of a most fla-
grant breach of trust and violation of his duties to the estate for 
which he is acting as a fiduciary, in that he has during all that 
period sold drugs, paints, athletic supplies and other merchandise 
out of the drug store of which he is a co-owner to the Staunton 
Military Academy, to the extent of aproximately $90,000.00. In 
addition to this practically all the banking of the school has been 
done at the National Valley Bank, of which the said Gilpin Will-
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son, Sr., is a vice president and director; practically all the insu-
rance upon the trust property has been placed with the W. J. Perry 
Corporation, of which the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., is a stockholder, 
and as your petitioner is informed, a director; practically all the 
printing has been placed with The McClure Company, of which 
the said defendant was a stockholder and director, though your 
petitioner in informed that he has recently trans£ erred this stock 
interest to his son, Gilpin Willson, Jr., all cleaning of uniforms 
and school supplies has been placed with Woodward's Cleaning 
and Dyeing Works, Inc., of which the said defendant was, as 
your petitioner believes, a stockholder and director, though also 
in this case your petitioner is informed that he has transferred his 
stock interest to his son, Gilpin Willson, Jr. All of this business 
was placed, and sales made to the school, without any competitive 
bidding or consideration as to whether or not goods or 
page 9.~ services of a similar character and quality, could have 
been obtained from others at a more reasonable price, 
and without any consideration by the Board of Directors. Your 
petitioner further charges that in a great many instances the sales 
of drugs, paints, athletic supplies, etc. sold by the defendant to the 
trust, were at exorbitant prices and far exceeding the retail value 
·of the product, taking into consideration its quality. In short, it 
seems to ·have been the policy and practice of the Directors, parti-
cularly this defendant, to place all business which the school had 
to offer, in the hands of persons, firms or corporations in which 
the said defendant or his co-trustees were financially interested. So 
far does this seem to have been carried out that the employees 
of the school charged with the duties of making these several pur-
chases or of arranging for the rendition of the services that may 
have been required, seemed to understand, inferentially if not ex-
pressly that their positions would be more secure if they placed 
the business with firms in which the Trustees, to whom they were 
indebted for their employment were financially interested. The 
business done by the above mentioned firms, which resulted in a 
profit to the defendant, was exceedingly large, and since the be-
ginning of the trust, has amounted to many thousands or perhaps 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
The said Gilpin Willson, Sr., has also been guilty of a breach 
of trust in this situation. William C. Rowland, also one of the 
fiduciaries, has since the beginning of the trust, sold to 
page 10~ his trust, military uniforms to the extent of approxi-
mately $1,200,000.00. A secret agreement existed be-
tween the said Rowland and Thomas H. Russell, Superintendent 
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of the school and also an Executor, Trustee and Director, where-
by the said Rowland paid, and the said Russell received a secret 
commission or bonus of 6% of the gross sales made to the school 
by Rowland. This situation was entirely unknown to all the other 
members who acted as Trustees and Directors, except this defen-
dant, who by his own admission not only knew what was going 
on and offered no· objection, but actually approved of the transac-
tion, and even when suit was brought by the beneficiaries of the 
trust against William C. Rowland seeking to compel him to account 
for the unlawful profit which he had made out of tlie sale of uni-
forms to the school, and for -his. removal as a Trustee, this def en-
dant demonstrated his hostility toward the beneficiaries by saying, 
in effect, that he was unalterably opposed to the bringing of such 
a suit, which, your petitioner charges, in itself is a most flagrant 
breach of trust and sufficient to justify his removal as a Trustee 
under the will. 
The said defendant has also demonstrated his hostility to the 
beneficiaries, and his utter incompatibaility with the other members 
of the group of Trustees and of the Board of Directors upon 
several occasions. At the annual meeting held in July, 1936, this 
defendant led the fight to prevent the re-election of William H. 
Steele, one of the original Trustees, as a member of the Board, and · 
the said Steele was not then re-elected. At a subsequent meeting, 
when a majority of the Board, over the violent opposition of this 
defendant, re-elected him as Treasurer, from which posi-
page 11 ~ tion he has been ousted, this def end ant openly stated 
that he would never sit on the Board of Directors with 
William H .. Steele. 
Subsequently, upon the death of William A. Pratt, Mrs. White-
head, exercising the privilege conferred upon her by the will, 
appointed S. D. Timberlake, Jr., as successor to the said William 
A. Pratt. This defendant, for no other cause known to your peti-
tioner than sheer malice, lead a single handed court fight seeking 
to prevent the said S. D. Timberlake, Jr., from serving as a mem-
ber of the Board of Directors and as a Trustee under the will, 
charging him with unfitness to fill such a position, and asserting 
that he ( this defendant) would never serve on the Board if Mr. 
Timberlake was appointed, entirely disregarding the views and 
wishes of the beneficiaries, that Mr. Timberlake serve. 
Since Mr. Timberlake's appointment, the defendant has taken 
the attitude of attending meetings of the Board, but has very little, 
if anything to say, the only inference to be drawn from his con-
duct being that he does not approve of the membership of the 
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Board, or the views of its majority, and "if the game can't be play-
ed his way, he won't play at all." 
With this malice in his heart the defendant, evidently, in anti-
cipation of this suit, and in an effort to arouse sympathy in his 
behalf, caused a statement to be printed in the Evening Leader of 
JW1e 10,1937, said statement being attached hereto marked "Exhibit 
A", to the effect that he had resigned effective at the next annual 
meeting (July, 1937) as President and Director of the Staunton 
Military Academy, giving an account of "his steward-
page 12~ ship" of the Academy, claiming credit to himself for 
everything that . had been accomplished, and ignoring 
entirely the efforts and services of his four co-trustees and co-
directors, in spite of the fact that the time that the school was 
under his leadership it lost a total of $220,575,74, while under the 
Presidency of Col. Thos. H. Russell, it made a total of $813,927.44. 
Your petitioner cannot permit the glaring misstatements in the 
said statement contained, and suppression of facts, which might 
put this defendant in an unforable position to go unchallenged. 
The "account of stewardship" states "the first blow came when 
the Augusta National Bank called us for $20,000.00. S. M. A. 
had no money, so I borrowed on my own name, $10,000.00 from 
the National Valley Bank, and Mr. Rowland borrowed on his name 
$10,000.00 in Philadelphia. Neither of us owing any stock, with 
this money, we took up tlie note." The truth about this situation is 
that William G. Kahle was a · stockholder and director of the 
Augusta National Bank. He thought the world and all of this 
Bank as it had loaned him the money which gave him his start 
in building up the Staunton Military Academy. The School's 
account and his own personal account had been kept for years at 
the Augusta National Bank at the time of William G. Kable's 
death he owed. the bank $25,000.00, represented by three notes, 
one for $5,0000.00 and two for $10,000.00 each. Immediately 
upon his death, largely at the instigation of this defendant, the 
School's bank account was removed to the National Valley Bank, 
where this defendant was a stockholder, officer and dir-
ector, and Thomas H. Russell, one of his co-fiduciaries, 
page 13 ~ was made a member of the Board of Directors of that 
· Bank. William G. Kable's stock in the Augusta National 
Bank was, by the executors of his Estate, sold at public auction. 
In spite of all these facts the Augusta National Bank never, at any 
time, made any demand for the payment of the notes which it held, 
and permitted them to be renewed from time to time, upon the en-
dorsement of the Executors, without making any demand for pay-
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ment either in whole or in part. Some of these notes were paid 
for time to time, and the last one for $10,000.00 remained in the 
hands of the Augusta National Bank until 1924, when it was paid. 
The defendant also stated that "the government sent us a bill 
for $43,500.00 on July 25 and stated that it had to be paid August 
1, I borrowed on my own name $38,500.00 to pay this bill, "but 
he very carefully conceals the fact that S. M. A. had placed a 
blanket morgage upon all of its properties and facilities to secure 
a bond issue of $100,000.00, the money from which was to be used 
for the purpose of paying this bill and for general operating ex-
penses of the institution. Before the bond issue could be legally 
floated it was necessary to get a decree of court approving same, 
and as the Corporation Court had adjourned its July term, and 
would not convene again until September, the bonds could not be 
sold in time to raise the necessary funds by August J. In order to 
expedite the transaction this defendant did borrow $38,500.00 as 
stated, but he took all of the $100,000.00 in bonds as security for 
his endorsement until the proper decree of court could be obtained, 
the bonds_ sold, at which time he was reimbursed and the note 
paid. 
page 14~ With regard to the statement that Woodward & Com-
pany was wound up with no compensation to this defen-
dant, the defendant seeks to convey the impression that he has 
received no compensation for his services rendered the school. 
Aside from the wrongful and illegal profit which the defendant 
has made upon his sales to S. M. A. from his drug store, and the 
profits which he made upon his stock holdings in the other firms 
herein above mentioned, this defendant has been paid for his 
seventeen years service a total of $50,158.75, not counting his share 
of 5% commission paid to the Executors of William G. Kable's 
Estate. 
Your petitioner further charges that on numerous occasions the 
said ,defendant sold .to his trust, bonds of a character not contem-
plated by· the statute in such cases made and provided, which said 
sale of bonds has resulted in a loss to the trust in an amount of 
something over $25,000.00, not including interest upon the default-
ing investments. 
Your petitioner is advised and believes, and so charges that the 
said Gilpin Willson,Sr., for his gross mis-conduct hereinbefore 
set out, should forthwith and promptly be removed as a Trustee 
under the will of William G. Kahle, and your petitioner further 
charges that he is entitled to a full and complete accounting from 
the said Willson, for your petitioner's use and benefit, and for the 
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use and benefit of his co-beneficiaries, as well as for the use and 
benefit of the Staunton Military Academy, for all profits made or 
derived by the said Willson from his dealings with the trust estate, 
as well as for the losses which the estate sustained by reason of the 
wrongful bond transactions hereinbefore mentioned, and interest 
upon the several items. 
page 15 ~ Wherefore, being without remedy, save in this Honor-
able Court, your petitioner prays that he be permitted to 
file this his petition in the above style chancery cause, and that 
the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., might be made a party defendant 
thereto both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as Trustee 
as aforesaid, and required to answer the same, but answer under 
oath is hereby waived; that proper process issue; that all proper ac-
counts may be directed and all proper inquiries made into the trans-
actions of the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., with his trust estate; that the 
said Gilpin Willson, Sr., be removed from his office as one of the 
Trustees under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and that 
he be required to account in this cause for all profits derived and 
received by him from his dealings with the Staunton Military Aca-
demy since the death of William G. Kahle, as well as to make good 
the extent of the losses sustained upon the bond transactions herein-
before mentioned ; and that ·an such further, other and general 
relief may be granted to your petitioner as this cause may require 
and to equity may seem just, and your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
JOS I. NACHMAN, Attorney. 
William G. Kahle II,who 
sues, etc 
By Counsel 
Your petitioner shows that he by counsel on filed in 
said chancery suit his answer with certain exhibits part thereof to 
the petition of William G. Kahle, II, in the words and figures fol-
lowing viz: 
page 16~ ANSWER AND EXHIBIT OF GILPIN WILLSON. -
The answer of Gilpin Willson, defendant to a certain petition 
filed in the above entitled cause by Wm. G. Kahle II, formerly 
Wm. H. Kahle Jr., suing for his own benefit and for the use and 
benefit of his co-beneficiaries under the will of Wm. G. Kahle, 
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dee' d, and also for the use of Staunton Military Academy, a 
corporation. · 
This defendant, without waiving any objection to the said peti-
tion, for answer thereto, or to so much thereof as it is material he 
should answer, says: 
It is true that Wm. G. Kahle, II, the petitioner, who formerly 
was called Wm. H. Kahle, Jr., was and is one of the beneficiaries 
of a trust established by the last will and testament of Wm. G. 
Kahle, dee' d, as will appear from the record of this cause. The 
testamentary trustees were Thos. H. Russell, now deceased, Wm. 
C. Rowland, Mrs. Eleanor E. Kahle, now Mrs. Eleanor E. White-
head, Wm. H. Steele and the defendant. Thos. H. Russell died 
in 1933 and Wm. A. Pratt was substituted in his sead; Wm. A. 
Pratt died in January, 1937, and S. D. Timberlake was substituted 
in his stead. 
The trust estate consists of all of the shares of the capital stock 
of Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, which shares the 
trustees vote. The only duty of the trustees aside from voting said 
stock at corporate meetings is to distribute to the beneficiaries of 
· the trust such dividends as the Board of directors of Staunton 
Military Academy may declare and said corporation pay to the 
Trustees for distribution by the latter to Mrs. Eleanor 
page 17 ~ E. Whitehead and the three living children of the mar-
riage of Wm. G. Kahle and Eleanor E. Kahle, the peti-
tioner being one of the children. The petitioner's interest in the 
trust is his right during the life of himself and his mother to re-
ceive one-ninth of such dividends, and if he survives his mother, 
upon her death to take, as one of the children who survive their 
mother, a proportionately equal interest in said shares of stock. 
As- appears from the record of this cause, Thos. H. Russell, 
Wm. C. Rowland and the defendant were appointed and duly quali-
fied as executors of the last will and testament o"f Wm. G. Kahle, 
and completed the administration of the estate more than twelve 
years ago. 
The defendant says that the petitioner Wm. G. Kahle, II, is not 
a stockholder of Staunton Military Academy; no stockholder of 
Staunton Military Academy-each trustee being such-has request-
ed it to proceed against this defendant for any supposed dereliction 
of duty as director of the corporation. And the defendant says 
that the petitioner is without title to any relief and that the peti-
tioner's charges against the defendant of alleged breaches of trust 
as director are' irrelevant, impertinent and scandalous. Yet the 
defendant prefers n?w to show their falsity despite the absence of 
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any title in the petitioner, and he is also constrained to this course 
by the fact-which the defendant says is true-that the petitioner, 
Wm. G. Kahle, on June 25, 1937, either immediately before or 
after filing said petition on that day, which filing was without 
notice to th€ defendant, and before any judicial proceedings what-
ever was had thereon, presented to a reporter of the Staunton 
Evening Leader and of the Staunton News-Leader, daily news-
papers of wide circulation published in the City of Staun-
page 18.~ ton, a copy of the petition, requesting that wide publi-
city be given thereto, and said Staunton Evening Leader 
on the afternoon of June 25, 1937, and said News-Leader on the 
morning of June 26, 1937, agreeably to such request, published the 
~arges against this defendant contained in said petition, which 
charges, the defendant says, are false and highly defamatory. 
This defendant for more than forty-three years last past· has 
been a· director of Staunton Military Academy, duly elected at 
ani:iual meetings of stockholders, until June 30, 1937, when his re-
signation as· director theretofore made became effective. Since the 
death of Wm. G. Kahle the aforesaid testamentary trustees have 
voted the stock of the said corporation at annual meetings and the 
defendant's election as director, as appears from the minutes of 
stockholders' meetings, has been by vote of the trustees. 
The defendant denies that as a trustee under the will of Wm. 
G. Kahle, dec'd, and as a director of Staunton Military Academy, 
he has been guilty of any breach of trust or failure to regard and 
to perform: his duties, and says that each and every charge in said 
petition against this defendant of failure or dereliction of duty on 
this defendant's part is utterly false. And the defendant says that 
the petitioner, at the time he filed his petition, well knew the falsity 
of each such charge. · 
The petitioner, intentionally or by inadvertence, has failed dir-
ectly to make, but indirectly and by implication has made such 
charges, introducing the recital thereof with the averment that 
the petitioner has learned thereof. The defendant denies that the 
petitioner has ever learned of such charges and denies that such 
facts exist or have existed. 
page 19~ The defendant denies that he is or ever has been a 
stockholder, director or officer of, or in any respect has 
had any connection direct or indirect with W., J. Perry Corpora-
tion, a corporation conducting the insurance business in the City 
of Staunton, The McClure Company, Inc., a corporation engaged 
in the business of printing in the City of Staunton, and Wood-
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ward's Cleaning and Dyeing Works, Inc., a corporation conducted 
a cleaning and dyeing business in the City of Staunton. 
The defendant says that before the creation and during the ex-
istence of the trust above ref erred to he has been a stockholder 
and director of The National Valley Bank of Staunton, and during 
part, if not all, of that time he has been a vice president of said 
Bank. During the existence of said trust by due action of the cor-
porate authorities the monies of the Staunton Military Academy 
have been deposited with, for the past ten years its loans have been 
obtained from, and the Academy's securities have been kept in de-
posit boxes in The National Valley Bank of Staunton, which Bank 
is the oldest and largest banking institution in the City of Staunton. 
The petitioner does not venture to charge that any profit whatever 
was had by the defendant from this banking connection, but in-
ten'ds by his reference to that Bank in some manner not pointed 
out to besmirch the Bank and this defendant. 
The defendant is a member' of a partnership, Willson Bros., 
which partnership since the year 1892 has conducted business in 
the City of Staunton, being druggists and selling paints, oils and 
other merchandise at retail. For some years past the defendant's 
interest in that partnership has been one-fourth; prior thereto it 
was one-half. 
page 20 ~ During its entire history since the year 1894 Staun-
ton Military Academy has dealt with Willson Bros., first 
when the Academy was conducted by the late Capt .. Wm. H. Kahle, 
then during Wm. G. Kable's connection as a stockholder with the 
Academy, which certainly began as early as 1907, and after his 
death during the existence of. the tesamentary trust aforesaid, 
Willson Bros., druggists, have filled prescriptions for drugs and 
medical preparations for the cadets of Staunton Military Academy 
when and as such prescriptions were given by the physician in 
attendance, and have sold Staunton Military Academy paints and 
oils, when and as needed by it. 
The defendant says that Staunton Military Academy required 
for years every cadet as he enrolls to deposit with the Academy 
a fixed sum for drugs and medicines to cover the cost of such 
supplies if and when furnished to the enrolled cadet. Willson 
Bros. in every instance have charged for prescriptions to cadets 
entirely reasonable prices, being the same given by Willson Bros. 
and other local druggists to hospitals, and said prices were less 
than the prices ordinarily charged at retail for like prescriptions. 
Staunton Military Academy has charged to each cadet and paid 
to itself out of the deposit aforesaid the. price so charged for such 
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prescriptions. But vVillson Bros., the defendant says, uniformly 
has charged and received from the cadet for whom such prescrip-
tion was obtained the gross price thereof; Willson Bros., have re-
ceived from Staunton Military Academy the gross price less ten 
per cent thereof; Staunton Military Academy itself has taken for 
its corporate purposes the ten per cent so allowed. 
page 21 ~ The defendant says that Willson Bros., have ·charged 
and the Staunton Military Academy has paid far less than 
retail prices for paints and oils which Willson Bros. have sold to 
it. Upoq all paints sold Willson Bros. have allowed and Staunton 
Military Academy has received a discount of ten per cent upon the 
retail price. Inasmuch as Willson Bros. bought from the manufac-
turer at a discount of only ten and six per cent., the advantage of 
the Academy is manifest. 
The defendant says that Willson Bros. charged and received from 
Staunton Military Academy for oils which Willson Bros. furnished 
that corporation a price which gave to Willson Bros. an increase 
of less than ten per cent upon cost, which increase the defendant 
says was and is much less than the ordinary and overhead cost 
necessarily charged by retailers. 
In addition to these discounts and low prices, Willson Bros. until 
comparatively recent years, when the financial situation of the 
Academy enabled it to pay promptly, always have given liberal 
credit terms to the Academy, both because of the friendly relations 
existing between the partners of that firm, on the one hand, and 
the late Wm. H. Kahle and Wm. G. Kahle, on the other, and be-
cause of their willingness to accommodate themselves to the neces-
sities of a customer. 
For many years Willson Bros. have been exclusive agents of A.G. 
Spaulding & Bro. for the sale of their sporting goods, that is, base-
ball, football and basketball equipment made and sold by Spauld-
ing & Bro. used in other games. The goods and equipment made 
and sold by Spaulding & Bro. are standard with both 
page 22 ~ professional and amateur sports, and the athletic depart-
ment of Staunton Military Academy, in common with 
practically all colleges and the better class schools, have used their 
goods and equipment. The Staunton Military Academy also has 
been accustomed to sell to its cadets standard goods and equipment 
furnished by Spaulding & Bro. The athletic department of Staun-
ton Military Academy has been accustomed to order and has order-
ed its supplies directly from Spaulding & Bro. at catalogue prices; 
the goods so ordered were debited by Spaulding & Bro. to Willson 
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Bros., who thus became responsible therefor, attending to the de-
livery of the goods and paid for them, receiving discounts from 
catalogue prices of ten per cent on some articles, seven and one-
half on others, and of two per cent on others. Willson Bros., as 
agent for Spaulding & Bro. procured from that concern and sold 
to the Academy such athletic supplies as the Academy ordered for 
resale to its cadets. Willson Bros., received like discounts and 
charged the Academy the catalogue price of such supplies, and this 
amount the Academy sold such supplies to its cadets always at a 
profit upon the purchase price paid by the Academy to Willson 
Bros., which profit in some cases was as much as one hundred per 
cent above the price charged by Willson Bros. As an instance, 
Willson Bros., sold to the Academy at twenty-five cents each cer-
tain articles for which Willson Bros., paid Spaulding & Bro., by 
the gross twenty-two and one-half cents each; the Academy, then, 
through its commissary department, resold these articles to cadets 
at the price of fifty cents each. 
page 23 ~ Staunton Military Academy during the testamentary 
trust has had its own officials, not the defendant, charged 
with the purchase of supplies for itself and its cadets. It has had 
its purchasing agent. In order to bring all disbursements as far as 
practicable under one authority, on July 14, 1931., the Board of 
Directors forbade any expenditures for hospital purposes, for the 
mess hall, for food, for pay rolls and for .materials and articles pro-
cured by the purchasing agent except upon invoices audited and 
approved by the treasurer. A copy of the Board's resolution to 
that effect is herewith filed, marked "Defendant's Exhibit No. l," 
and prayed to be taken and read as a part of this answer. · It has 
required requisitions for supplies to be made through other of-
ficials. These various officials of the corporation, whose duty it was 
to see to it that the corporation purchased its supplies of good 
quality at reasonable and fair prices, were reputable men, who ·did 
their duty, and who in purchasing supplies, the petitioner to the 
contrary notwithstanding, followed the dictates of their own judg-
ment. And the defendant has given no directions to and has exerted 
no influence upon such officials in his own interest. 
The defendant says that the charge of petitioner that the em-
ployees of the school, whose duty it was to make purchases or to 
have services rendered, seemed to understand that their positions 
would be more secure if they placed the business with the firms in 
which the trustees were financially interested is false, and unworthy 
of further remark. 
Gilpin Willson vs. Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, et als. 47 
page 24 ~ The dealings of Willson Bros., with Staunton Military 
Academy were in good faith; the goods sold to Staunton 
Military Academy and to its cadets were made by reputable manu-
facturers and were of the best quality; the sale of such goods were 
open, fair, honest and at extremely reasonable prices. And the de-
fendant is advised and says that µnder the law it was entirely prop-
er that Staunton Military Academy should so deal with the firm of 
Willson Bros., or with the defendant. 
The defendant further says, here repeating his denial that he has 
been connected with or. interested in The McClure Company, Inc., 
either directly or indirectly, that the greater part of the printing 
used by Staunton Military Academy during the existence of the 
testamentary trust, namely, printing its catalogues, has been done 
by Stone Printing Company at Roanoke, or by a New York house, 
as the one or the other was cheaper; the McClure Company has not 
done that work. The Board of Directors, not the defendant alone, 
directed the placing of such work. Such small printing as was done 
for the Academy was had from various printers in Staunton or 
elsewhere, as lower prices and more satisfactory work might be 
obtained. The McClure Company printed the Academy "Year 
Book," but Staunton Military Academy was not concerned :finan-
cially with this printing. The "Year Book" was a venture of the 
cadets of the Academy, who were assisted by one or more of the 
Academy's instructors. There was no liability whatever _upon the 
Academy in the matter. The McClure Company looked alone to 
the cadets ordering it for printing the "Year Book," and collected 
what it could from them; the defendant is informed by The Mc-
Clure Company and says that it still has owing to it for 
page 25 ~ work a bill of $2300.00. which it cannot collect. With 
further reference to petitioner's charge concerning W. J. 
Perry Corporation, insurance agents; with which corporation the 
defendapt repeats he had and has no connection whatever, directly 
or indirectly: The defendant says that the policies of insurance 
placed with that agency were had at the uniform rates charged by 
each insurance company represented by agents in the City of Staun-
ton without rebate or discount; that the services of that insurance 
company always were useful and satisfactory; and, incidentally, 
that the losses by fire and casualty upon the property of the Acad-
emy insured through that agency were large and were adjusted and 
paid promptly and to the satisfaction of the Academy. The plac-
ing of insurance with that agency was 'Yith the Board of Directors, 
not with this defendant alone, and was proper. 
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With reference to petitioner's charge concerning Woodward's 
Cleaning and Dyeing Works, Inc., with which corporation the de-
fendant repeats he has never been connected in any manner, di-
rectly or indirectly: For such work as has been given by the Acad-
emy, or by its cadets to that corporation the Academy received low 
prices, and proper discounts. With this business the defendant has 
had no connection, that being a matter entirely with other constitut-
ed officials of the Academy. 
The defendant denies in each particular that the Board of Direct-
ors, and especially this defendant, of Staunton Military Academy 
have been guilty of any failure to observe and protect the interests 
of the corporation, and denies that any financial interest of the de-
fendant has been served or was intended to serve by any such 
transaction. 
page 26 ~ The defendant is advised and says that under the law 
as a trustee he is not charged with the duty of pleasing 
petitioner, a beneficiary of the trust or submitting his judgment to 
the desires of any beneficiary. His duty as director and officer of 
the corporation was to conserve the interests of the corporation. 
The defendant says that this he has done, and with the result, the 
defendant says, that the petitioner here, out of dividends earned 
by the corporation dfrected by this defendant and his co-directors, 
has been furnished his support and maintenance. 
The defendant does not understand, but nevertheless denies the 
charge, what petitioner intends by the averment that on numerous 
occasions the defendant has sold to his trust "bonds of a character 
not contemplated by the statute in such case made and provided, 
which said sale of bonds resulted in a loss to the trust in an amount 
of something over $25,000.00, not including interest upon the de-
faulting investment." The testamentary trust of W 111. G. Kahle has 
and has had no funds for investment and has purchased none. It has 
no concern except indirectly with purchase of bonds and investments 
of Staunton Military Academy, a corporation. At such times as 
the Academy had surplus funds for investment, that corporation 
purchased such bonds as to its officers and Board of Directors seem-
ed proper, and in this matter that was no restriction upon them but, 
as in the case of officers and di-records of any business corpora-
tion, the exercise of good business judgment. The Academy was 
not and its officers and Board of Directors were not required by any 
statute or rule of law to invest its surplus funds as a fiduciary is 
permitted by statute to invest. 
page 27 ~ The defendant says that the corporate authorities of 
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Staunton Military Academy, since the creation of the 
testamentary trust, have purchased approximately $300,000.00 of 
bonds, the greater part of which afterwards were sold. During the 
entire time, including the panic period of 1929-1931, and the sub-
sequent depression there was a loss upon such investments of prob-
ably $12,953.00. Upon many of such investments the Academy 
realized a substantial profit. After the panic of 1929 and during 
the depression there was a loss upon certain bonds secured by real 
estate issued by National Consolidated Mortgage Company, by 
Mortgage Company of Maryland, Maryland Income bonds, and 
National Bond Company, and upon bonds secured by assignment 
of rents to accrue under leases made by the Post Office Department 
of the United States of America, nown as Brooklyn Post Office 
bonds. The defendant did not purchase these bonds, but all of them 
when purchased were proper investments of the funds of Staunton 
Military Academy, for a long period after purchase might have been 
sold at better than cost, and losses occurred because of country-
wide financial conditions. 
Until July 18, 1932, the President of the Academy, Thos. H. 
Russell, with the cooperation of the Treasurer, Wm. H. Steele, in-
vested surplus funds and reserves in interest bearing securities, gen-
erally after consultation with one or more directors. On that day 
the Board of Directors adopted a resolution directing all sums set 
aside to surplus or reserve other than such part as in the judgment 
of the Directors should be held available to meet authorized ex-
penditures to be invested in interest bearing securities of 
page 28 ~ such character as from time to time might be approved 
by the Board of Directors, and in order to the seasonal 
investment of such funds and that the members of the Board might 
be kept informed the Treasurer was required to report at each 
meeting of the Board the amount of money on hand available for 
such investment, and at any time when requested by any director 
to furnish like information to the several directors. It was express-
ly provided that no security should be purchased out of such funds 
or investment made thereof until the investments as proposed 
should be submitted to each director for his written approval, and 
such approval by all directors was to be noted by the Treasurer on 
the record of such investment and the written approval filed and 
preserved by the Treasurer. A copy of the said resolution is here-
with filed marked "Defendant's Exhibit No. 2,'' and is prayed to 
be taken and read as a part of this answer. 
The defendant, in his capacity as an officer of Staunton Military 
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Academy and with the approval of the Board, purchased certain 
bonds for the Academy in July, 1933-the purchases next named 
were the only purchases of bonds which he has ever made-to the 
amount of $54,071.25. A copy of the resolution of the Board of 
Directors in that matter adopted July 18, 1933, is herewith exhibit-
ed, marked "Defendant's Exhibit No. 3," and is -prayed to be taken 
and read as a part of this answer. 
Among the bonds so purchased were $20,000.00 of bonds of the 
United States of America, and $5,000.00 of Federal Land Bank 
bonds. All of the bonds purchased by him excepting 
page 29 ~ United States bonds have been sold; the sale resulted in a 
profit to the Academy of $4,102.50. Each such bond was 
sold at a substantial advance. 
The defendant's purchase of these bonds, made in strict conform-
ity with the above mentioned resolution, was reported to the court 
in a petition filed in this cause by the testamentary trustees at the 
October term, 1933, which petition remains in the record. The 
trustees showed to the court that the Board of Directors had dis-
cussed the question of investing sums available for a reserve to meet 
losses and said: "The Directors have been of opinion that in in-
vesting the surplus and reserve funds of the Academy business con-
ditions required any securities purchased to be such as were readily 
marketable and at the same time reasonably safe. In their business 
judgment it did not seem wise to purchase state or municipal bonds 
because of the low interest yield, so long as other reasonably safe 
investments acceptable for business purposes might be had. 
"With these views the Chairman .of the Board ( this defendant), 
consulted Roger W. Babson, a nationally known economist with a 
high reputation in such matters, as to investments for the Academy, 
regard being had to security, moderate interest rates and market-
ability, who furnished the Chairman a· list of such investments, 
which list the Chairman then submitted to the several directors. The 
list was submitted (by petitioner's mother, Mrs. Eleanor E. White-
head, a director) to officers of the First and Merchants National 
Bank of Richmond for their judgment, who concurred in the Bab-
son recommendations, and for their comment (by Wm. C. Rowland, 
a director and trustee) to the judgment of officials of 
page 30 ~ The Provident Life and Trust .Company and the Provi-
dent Trust Company, both Philadelphia corporations of 
like standing, these officials being directly concerned in investments 
made by their institutions, and the securities named in the list seem-
ed to them to be proper. 
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"The directors ordered this list, with the ratings of the securities 
named, to be spread at large in the minutes, and directed $73,000.00 
to be invested at market prices in such of the securities named as 
the President might think advisable. 
"In view of the present financial conditions, your petitioners sub-
mit this matter to the judgment of the court and hereinafter ask its 
approval or disapproval of their action." 
The petitioners prayed in part that the petitioners' action with 
reference to the investment of funds might be considered by the 
court and if proper, ratified and approved, but if improper, that the 
court might direct securities purchased under that resolution to be 
marketed promtply. 
On October 17, 1933, as appears by the record of this cause, 
the court adjudged and decreed "that the action of the directors in 
procuring from a recognized financial authority a list of securities 
suitable for investment, regard being had to their marketability, 
their security, and the moderate rate of interest afforded, the inves-
tigation made by the directors as to said securities, and their action 
in investigating therein be and the same is ratified and approv-
ed.'' 
page 31 ~ The same petition showed that Wm. H. Kahle (who is 
the petitioner, now called Wm. G. Kahle), the second 
child of Wm. G. Kahle and a beneficiary of the trust created under 
his will, had become of age on June 4, 1933. By an order entered 
along with said decree the said Win. H. Kahle was admitted in his 
own right as a party defendant to this cause. 
The averments of the petitioner with reference to the matters and 
things set forth in the defendant's letter resigning his office as 
President and director of Staunton Military Academy, which letter 
is referred to and exhibited with the petition, are irrelevant and 
immaterial. Nevertheless the defendant here reiterates the state-
ments he made in said letter and says that each of such statements 
is true and he specifically denies the several averments with refer-
ence thereto made by the petitioner. 
The petitioner, ref erring to stock of The Augusta National Bank 
of Staunton, owned by Wm. G. Kahle, a~leges that it was sold by 
the Executors at public auction, as if that were harmful to the pe-
titioner or against his interest. The shares of stock in question, 
sixty in number, at Wm. G. Kable's death were held as collateral 
security by Staunton National Bank for indebtedness far exceeding 
the total value of the stock. A sale of course was necessary in or-
der to pay debts. 
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The petitioner states that the defendant conceals the fact that 
Staunton Military Academy issued $100,000.00 of bonds and says, 
"Before the bond issue could be legally floated it was necessary to 
get a decree of court approving same, and as the Corporation Court 
had adjourned its July term, and would not convene 
page 32 ~ again until September, the bonds could not be sold in 
time to raise the necessary fund by August 1st.'' 
The record of this cause shows that on February 24, 1923, the 
testamentary trustees filed their petition showing that the tentative 
report of an inspector of the United States Internal Revenue De-
partment recommended the assessment of additional income taxes 
against the Staunton Military Academy of an amount exceeding 
$55,000.00 and an additional assessment against Wm. G. Kahle of 
nearly $9,000.00, that the corporation was not in position to pay, 
without borrowing, its additional income tax, and that of Wm. G. 
Kahle, which latter it was obliged to pay, and that it could not ob-
tain the necessary amount on open notes without security; that the 
directors of Staunton Military Academy had held a meeting re-
solving to issue the bonds and calling a stockholders' meeting to 
encumber the Academy's real estate; and that the stockholders' 
meeting had been held at which it was resolved to issue bonds to 
the extent of $100,000.00 and to encumber the property of the cor-
poration to secure their payment. On February 24, 1923, the court 
entered its decree upon this petition approving the action of the 
directors and stockholders, and directing that. when the deed of 
trust had been executed the corporation and its officers might use 
any and all of the bonds issued thereunder for the corporate pur-
poses mentioned, as well as by way of advancements to the Execu-
tors of Wm. G. Kahle, dee' d. 
The petitioner's averment concerning the necessity of obtaining 
the court's approval and the delay because of there being no August 
Term whereby the Corporation Court would not convene until 
September is fiction. 
page 33 ~ As appears from the records in the office of the Clerk 
of this court, the deed of trust in question was dated 
May 15, 1923, and was recorded August 1, 1923. 
On October 30, 1923, the trustees filed their petition showing 
that all statutory formalities had been gone through with and the 
deed of trust executed and recorded in the office of the Clerk of 
this court; that a part only of said bonds has been issued, careful 
note thereof being made on the books of the Academy, and that the 
petitioners had fully and properly carried out the provisions of the 
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decree. On the same day the Court entered its decree in this cause 
ratifying and approving the action of the trustees. 
There was no sale for said bonds. Certainly the banks of Staun-
ton could not purchase them. The defendant is informed, believes 
and says that Wm. H. Steele purchased $5,000.00 par value of 
them, but aside from this none was sold. The remainder of the 
issue were placed in the hands of the National Valley Bank of 
Staunton for safekeeping and were duly returned by it upon re-
quest. On October 14, 1924, the said deed of trust was released, 
the deed of release being recorded in the aforesaid Clerk's Office 
on October 21, 1924. 
It will be seen that the record and as well the deed of trust of 
recqrd in the office of the Clerk of this court show the falsity of the 
petitioner's averments in that respect. 
The petitioner, Wm. G. Kahle, II, became of age on June 4, 1933, 
and was admitted as a party defendant to this cause in October of 
that year. He was and is without business education and 
page 34 ~ experience. During his minority and to the time of filing 
his petition, he has had the benefit of the services of the 
testamentary trustees and of the Board of Directors and officers of 
the corporation. The dividends paid by the corporation to the trus-
tees and by them to the beneficiaries of the trust since the death 
of Wm. G. Kahle have been nearly $235,000.00; liabilities of the 
Academy and of Wm. G. Kahle of over $362,000.00 have been met 
and paid out of the conduct of the school operated by the Academy, 
with the assistance of this defendant, and the very stock which is 
the trust estate thereby has been saved to the trustees; improve-
ments and additions to the plant and property of Staunton Miliary 
Academy have been made and paid for to an extent of over $600,-
000.00. 
Although the petitioner has had no part in the accomplishments 
of the directors of Staunton Military Academy and of the trustees 
under the will of Wm. G. Kahle, dec'd, excepting to receive benefits 
therefrom, he has seen fit since coming of age in June, 1933, to 
file along with his sister, a co-beneficiary, a petition assailing the 
character, honesty and reputation of his uncle, Thos. H. Russell, 
one of the testamentary trustees of Wm. G. Kahle, President and 
director of Staunton Military Academy to the time of his death 
in May, 1933, and the probity and honesty of Wm. C. Rowland, 
a testamentary trustee and a director of Staunton Military Acade-
my from the establishment of the trust, which matter is yet pend-
ing in this court, and by his petition now filed he has assailed with 
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the utmost recklessness and disregard of fact the character and repu-
taition of this defendant. And the defendant says, as to the attack 
upon himself, that neither the youth nor ignorance nor inexperience 
of the petitioner can excuse him. 
page 35 ~ And the defendant again expressly denies each and 
every charge of wrongdoing or neglect of duty made in 
the said petition, and says that the same are and each of them is 
false. 
And having fully answered the defendant prays hence to be dis-
missed with his costs in this behalf expended, including therein all 
costs of his defense against· said petition. 




page 36~ DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 
MEETING OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS July 14, 1931. 
On motion, duly seconded, in order that the disbursements may be 
brought as much as is practicable under one authority, the follow-
ing resolution was unanimously adopted: 
BE IT RESOLVED: 
First: Expenditures for hospital purposes and in and about the 
hospital shall not be made until the same be approved in writing 
by the treasurer, and payment therefor shall be upon invoices, audit-
ed and approved by the treasurer. 
Second : Purchases for the mess hall shall be made only upon 
the written approval of the treasurer and expenditures for the mess 
hall including those for food and for pay roll shall be upon written 
invoices audited and approved by the treasurer. 
page 37~ DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 2 
MEETING OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS, JULY 18, 1932. 
The following resolution was offered, duly seconded and adopted 
by unanimous vote : 
BE IT RESOLVED: 
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First : All sums set aside to surplus or reserves other than such 
part thereof as is in the judgment of the Directors should be held 
available to meet authorized expenditures, shall be invested and, as 
far as is reasonably practicable, held invested in interest bearing 
securities of such character as from time to time may be approved 
by the Board of Directors. 
Second : In order to the seasonable investment of such funds 
and that the members of the Board may be kept informed, the 
treasurer will report to each meeting of the Board of Directors, 
the amount of money on hand available for such investment, and 
at any time when requested by any director will furnish like in-
formation to the several directors. 
Third : No security shall be purchased out of such funds or in-
vestment made thereof until the investment as proposed be sub-
mitted to each director and with his written approval; and such ap-
proval by all directors shall be noted by the Treasurer in the rec-
ord of such investment and the written approval filed and preserved 
by the Treasurer. 
page 38~ DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 3 
MEETING OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS,. JULY 18, 1933. 
Gilpin Willson, Chairman of the Executive Committee reported 
to the meeting that the Academy has the sum of $73,000.00 prop-
erly available for investment under the terms of the resolution of 
the· Board of Directors adopted at the meeting held July 18th, 
1932. 
The Chairman of the Board reported that he had consulted Roger 
W. Babson, a nationally known economist with a high reputation in 
such matters, as to investments for the funds of institutions such 
as the Academy, regard being had to security, moderate interest 
rates and marketability, and that a list of such ·investments, referr-
ed to hereafter, had been furnished to him and submitted to the 
other directors. 
Mrs. Whitehead stated that she had submitted the said list to 
officers of the First & Merchants National Bank of Richmond for 
their judgment and that they concurred in the Babson recommenda-
tions. 
Mr. Rowland stated that he had submitted the list for their com-
ment to the judgment of certain officials of .the Provident Life & 
Trust Company at Philadelphia and to the director of the Provident 
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Trust Company of Philadelphia, officials directly concerned in in-
vestments made by those institutions and that the securities named 
in the list seemed to them proper. 
Following is a copy of said list, the letters opposite each item 
not having been upon the original list but representing the grade of 
security in the opinion of the persons named above: 

















AA 5,000 A. T. & T. Debenture 5% 1960 
3,000 Hudson & Manhattan 1st Ref. S's 1957 
3,000 Chicago, Burl. & Quincy Cen. 4's 1958 
3,000 Louisville & Nashville 4's 1940 
3,000 No. Pacific General Liens 3% 2040 
3,000 Pennsylvania Railroad General S's 1968 
3,000 American Smelting & Refining S's c 1947 
3,000 General Baking Debentures 5 ~ 1940 
3,000 Gulf Oil Debentures S's 1937 
3,000 Union Oil of California Deb. S's 1945 
3,000 Chicago Union Station 1st 4.0's 1963 
5,000 Federal Land Bank · 43/i's 1958 
3,000 Kansas City Terminals 1st 4's 1960 
3,000 Term. Ry. of St. Louis Gen Ref 4's 1953 
3,000 National Dairy Products Deb. 5J4's 1948 
3,000 Southern Pacific 1st Refunding 4's 1855 
3,000 Western Maryland 1st 4's 1952 
( The characters underscored were added by persons inspecting 
the above list and were not on the original) . 
On motion, duly seconded, it was unanimously resolved that the 
President invest the said $73,000 in such of the securities shown in 
said list as to him may seem advisable, at market prices, and that 
payment therefor be made by the Treasurer. 
Your petitioner, Gilpin Willson, further shows that on the pe-
tition of William G. Kahle, II, and his answer thereto, that exten-
sive depositions were taken and exhibits offered on behalf of both 
the petitioner, Kahle, and himself, all of which are filed with the 
papers in said chancery suit, and without the further proceedings 
later had then made a rather voluminous record. And that in the 
said Kable's deposition taken in support of his petition, the said 
Keble being called by the defendant, Willson, as an adverse witness, 
gave the following evidence in narrative form favorable to the de-
fendant, Willson: that his occupation at the time was an apprentice 
to the Business Manager of Staunton Military Academy, 
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page 40 ~ which position he held for approximately two and one-
half years; that he had attended many schools but had 
never graduated from any; that he had very little business educa-
tion; if any; that he had worked at the trade of a professional 
singer and dancer in the beer gardens of the City of New York, 
before he came to his then position with the Staunton Military 
Academy; that he had been with the Academy since July l, 1936; 
that at the school he had what he called a "hand me down" job, 
which was equivalent to a messenger between the office of Major 
Steele, the Treasurer, and the President's office, or sometimes help-
ing in the canteen, etc. ; that the Board of Directors of the Acad-
emy employed him after he came from the beer gardens of New 
York because they feared he would bring a suit; that although he 
was no bookkeeper, that he thought he had put fear into the hearts 
of the Board of Directors from his observation of the books of 
Staunton Military Academy, in which he thought he had found 
quite a number of questionable figures; that he had requested of 
Major W. H. Steele, the Treasurer, that he be permitted to ex-
amine the books of the corporation, the minute books, as well as 
the other books; the request being granted, he had examined the 
books and the court records ; that in such examinations as he made, 
he talked with and questioned Major Steele concerning certain items 
he found in the books; that his salary was $100.00 per month 
while he was employed at Staunton Military Academy; that he had 
never done anything other than singing and dancing in the beer 
gardens in New York, and other odd jobs; that he furnished the 
data to his counsel for filing his petition; he also gave a 
page 41 ~ copy of the petition to a reporter of the Staunton papers, 
asking that it be given wide publicity; that he knew at 
the time of the death of his father, Col. William G. Kahle, that he 
was tremendously indebted to almost every bank in Staunton, and 
that the Staunton Military Academy was tremendously involved 
with vVoodward's, a mercantile firm; that he knew that his mother, 
he and his sisters had received enormous amounts of dividends from 
the operation of the school ; and in connection with the various al-
legations in the said Kable's petition that the defendant, Willson, 
had, during the entire existence of the trust, been guilty of the most 
flagrant breaches of trust and violations of his duties to the estate, 
the said Kahle testified in relation to practically each and every 
charge thereof as to the profits made by the said Willson in his 
alleged dealing with the trust estate, that his information was based 
primarily upon the fact that he observed checks, etc., of the Staun-
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ton Military Academy going to the various concerns, but did not 
know or investigate for what purposes, whether they were legal, 
proper, or not; that in many instances, the allegation of fraud and 
misconduct against Willson was made on the slightest hearsay, in-
formation that one would pick up on the street without knowing 
from whence it came, and, in a number of instances, that he had 
learned since the filing of the petition that the charge was without 
foundation, and false. 
And after this evidence, and other evidence for the petitioner, 
principally the evidence of William H. Steele, and after full and 
complete examination of the defendant and the petitioner 
page 42 ~ having informe<i the court that he rested, the said Wil-
liam G. Kahle, II, through his counsel, on the ..... day 
of. ............. , 19 ... , filed an amended petition in said suit, 
which is of record and prayed to be made a part of this petition, 
whereby he reiterated and again charged every charge contained 
in his first petition, although he had previously admitted that many 
of them were without proof, and that some he had learned since 
the filing of his first petition to be false, and, in addition, charged 
the defendant, Willson, with other misconduct and breaches of 
trust in dealing with the trust estate, in that he, Willson, had au-
thorized and directed a loan to one Cooksey, resulting in a loss to 
the estate of $150.00 principal; that the said defendant, Willson, 
had, with others, as Director of Staunton Military Academy, voted 
himself certain salaries as a member of the Executive Committee 
created by the Board of Directors, and as President of the Academy 
from 1933 until his resignation in July, 1937, and that said salaries 
in excess of $200.00 a year provided for the trustee under Col. 
Kable's will, amounted to $46,758.75, for which sum he asked an 
accounting; and further, that Wiilson was jointly and severally 
liable with William C. Rowland as a co-trustee for the liability that 
this court in another petition in this case had found upon Rowland, 
of the commissions paid by Rowland in his dealing with the estate 
in the sale of uniforms manufactured by Rowland and sold to 
Staunton Military Academy, on which the said Rowland had allow-
ed Col. Thos. H. Russell a secret commission of 6%, which liability 
amounted to, with accrued simple interest thereon, some $117,000.-
00; which petition is a matter of record in said suit, and is in the 
words and figures following: 
page 43 ~ AMENDED PETITION OF 
WILLIAM G. KABLE, II 
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To the Honorable Floridus S. Crosby, Judge of the sai~ Court: 
Your petitioner, William G. Kahle, II, who sues for his own 
benefit and for the use and benefit of his co-beneficiaries under 
the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and also for the use and 
benefit of the Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, . respect-
fully represents. · 
That there is now pending before this Honorable Court a cer-
tain chancery suit under the short style of William G. Kable's Exe-
cutors vs. William G. Kable's Trustees, which suit had for its 
principal purpose, the administration of the estate of William G. 
Kahle, deceased, under the guidance of the Court or will fully 
appear from an- inspection of the record in the said cause, all oi 
which is referred to and adopted as a part of this petition as though 
set out at length herein. 
As will appear from the record in the said cause, William G. 
Kahle ( the father of your petitioner) died on July 5, 1920, seized 
of a valuable estate which he disposed of by his last will and a 
codicil thereto attached. The said will was duly probated in the 
Clerk's Office of this Court; and a certified copy thereof is on file 
with papers in this cause. The principal beneficiaries, and the 
heirs-at-law of the deceased were his widow, Eleanor Enslow 
Kahle ( now Mrs. L. J. Whitehead) and three infant children, you~ 
Petitioner and his two sisters, Helene Kahle and Eleanor Kahle 
Miller, all of whom have now attained their majority. 
page 44~ The principal portion of the decedent's estate con-
sisted of the entire capital stock of the Staunton Mili-
tary Academy, a corporation, which the decedent had operated 
prior to his death as a military school in Staunton, Virginia. 
The said William G. Kahle, by his last will, appointed Gilpin 
Wilson, Sr., (the defendant herein), Thomas H. Russell (his 
brother-in-law) and William C. Rowland, as his -Executors and in 
order to secure the perpetuation of the school and to provide safe 
and adequate support for his family, gave the entire capital stock 
of/ the said corporation to certain named Trustees, authorizing 
and empowering them to continue the operation of the school for 
the use and benefit of his widow and children, and gave to the 
said Trustees the voting power of the said stock, with the privilege 
to them if they ·saw fit, to elect themselves as Directors of the 
corporation known as Staunton Military Academy. The Trustees 
named by the will were at the start W. H. Steele, Eleanor En-
slow Kahle (now Whitehead), William C. Rowland, Thomas H. 
Russell and Gilpin Willson, Sr. These persons have served con-
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tinuously from the beginning of the trust, with the exception that 
William A. Pratt suceceded to Thomas H. Russell upon the latter's 
death, and upon the death of the said William A. Pratt he in turn 
was succeeded by S. D. Timberlake, Jr. With the changes above 
mentioned, the Trustees and Directors are the same as appointed 
by the will of the decedent. 
Immediately upon the death of the said William G. Kahle, the 
Trustees named by the will exercised the privilege con-
page 45J f erred upon them by the said will, by electing them-
selves as Directors of the Staunton Military Academy, 
and in that capacity and in their capacity of Trustees, they have 
since managed and directed the affairs of the corporation. 
At the time of the death of vVilliam G. Kahle; his widow was 
a very young woman entirely without business training or exper-
ience and though named as one of the Trustees under the will, and 
elected as one of the Directors of the corporation, took very little 
interest or part in the management of its affairs. Shortly after 
the death of her husband she removed to Richmond with her three 
small children, and by reason of her absence, as well as her lack 
of business training, she has been compelled to leave the manage-
ment of her husband's estate and the Staunton Military Academy 
largely to her co-trustees and co-directors, and to rety upon their 
judgment and integrity for the protection of the interests of the 
school as well as the interests of herself and her children. 
Your petitioner further represents that since the death of Will-
iam G. Kahle, practically seventeen years, Gilpin Willson, Sr., has 
held and still holds the three-fold fiduciary capacity of Executor 
under the will of the said, William G. Kable, Testamentary trustee 
under the said will and a Director of the Staunton Military Aca-
demy, in each position, as well as in all of them, owing the duty 
of preserving and protecting the best interests of the estate of the 
decedent. Your petitioner has recently learned that the said Gilpin 
Witlson, Sr., has during the entire time of the existence of the 
trust been guilty of a most flagrant breach of trust 
page 4~ ~ and violation of his duties to the estate for which he is 
acting as a fiduciary, in that he has during all that per-
iod should drugs, paints, athletic supplies and other merchandise 
out of the drug store of which he is co-owner. to the. Staunton 
Military Academy, to the exent of approximately $90,000.00. In 
addition to this practically all the banking of the school has been 
done at the National Valley Bank, of which the said Gilpin Will-
son, Sr., is a vice president and director; practically all the insur-
ance upon the trust property has been placed with the W. J. Perry 
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Corporation, of which the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., is a stockholder, 
and as your petitioner is informed, a director; practically all of · 
the printing has been placed with the McClure Company, of which 
the said defendant was a stockholder and director, though your 
petitioner is informed that he has recently transferred this stock 
interest to his son Gilpin Willson, Jr.; all cleaning of uniforms 
and school supplies has been placed with Woodward's Cleaning 
and Dyeing ·works, Inc., of which the said defendant was, as your 
petitioner believes, a stockholder and director, though also in this 
case your petitioner is informed that he has transferred his stock 
interest to his son, Gilpin Willson, Jr. All of this business was 
placed, andl sales made to the school, without any competitive 
bidding or consideration as to whether or not goods or services of 
a similar character and quality, could have been obtained from 
others at a more reasonable price, and without any consideration 
by the Board of Directors. Your petitioner further charges that 
in a great many instances the sales of drugs, paints, athletic supp-
lies, etc., sold by the defendant to the trust, were at exo-
page 47~ rbitant prices and far exceeded the retail value of the 
product, taking into consideration its quality. In short, 
it seems to have been the policy and practice of the Directors, parti-
cularly this defendant, to place all business which the school had 
to offer, in the hands of persons firms or corporations in which 
the said defendant or his co-trustees were financially interested. 
So far does this seem to have been charged with the duties of 
making these several purchases or of arranging for the · rendition 
of the services that may have been required, seemed to under-
stand, inferentially if not expressly, that their positions would be 
more secure if they placed the business with firms in which the 
Trustees, to whom they were indebted for their employment, were 
financially interested. The business done by the above mentioned 
firms, which resulted in a profit to the defendant, were exceedingly 
large, and since the beginning of the trust has amounted to many 
thousands or perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars . 
. The said Gilpin Willson, Sr., has also been guilty of a breach 
of trust in this situation; vVilliam C. Rowland, one of the trustees 
and one of the directors, has since the beginning of the trust, sold 
to his trust, military uniforms to the extent of approximately 
$1,200,000.00. A secret agreement existed between the said Row-
land and Thomas H. Russell, Superintendent of the school and 
also an Executor, Trustee and Director, whereby the said Row-
land paid, and the said Russell received a secret commission or 
bonus bf 6% of the gross sales made to the school by Rowland. 
62 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
This situation was entirely unknown to all the other members who 
. acted as Trustees and Directors, except this defendant, who by 
his own admissions not only knew what was going on 
page 48} and offered no objection, but actually approved of the 
transaction, and even when suit was brought by the bene-
ficiaries of the trust against William C. Rowland seeking to com-
pel him to account for the· unlawful profits which he had made 
out of the sale of uniforms to the school, and for his removal as 
a Trustee, this defendant demonstrated his- hostility toward the 
beneficiaries by saying, in effect, that he was unalterably opposed 
to the bringing of such a suit which, your petitioner charges, in 
itself is a most flagrant breach of trust and sufficient to justify 
his removal as a Trustee under the will. 
Your petitioner is advised and believes that the said Gilpin Will-
. son, Sr., by reason of his knowledge of the commission paid by 
Rowland to Russell, and his utter failure to take any action look-
ing toward a discontinuance of such practice, the~eby permitting 
the said Rowland to sell his own goods to the Staunton Military 
Academy, through his agent and co-trustee and co-director, with-
out competitive bidding, and at his own prices, is equally and 
jointly and severally liable with the said Rowland for his ( Row-
land's) improper dealings with said Staunton Military Academy. 
The said defendant has also demonstrated his hostility to the 
beneficiaries, and his utter incompatibality with the other members 
of the group of Trustees and of the Board of Directors upon the 
several occasions. At the annual meeting held in July, 1936, this 
defendant led the fight to prevent the re-election of William H. 
Steele, one of the original Trustees, as a member of the 
page 49.} Board, and the said Steele was not then re-elected. At 
a subsequent meeting, when a majority of the Board, 
over the violent opposition of this defendant, re-elected him as 
Treasurer, from which position he had been outsted, this defendant 
openly stated that he would never sit on the Board of Directors 
with William H. Steele. 
Subsequently upon the death of William A. Pratt, Mrs. White-
head, exercising the privilege conferred upon her by the will, 
appointed S. D. Timberlake, Jr., as successor to the said Will-
iam A. Pratt. This defendant, for no other cause known to your 
petitioner than sheer malice, led a single-handed court fight seek-
ing to prevent the said S. D. Timberlake, Jr., from serving as a 
member of the Board of Directors and as a Trustee under the will, 
charging him with unfitness to fill such a position, and asserting 
that he (this defendant) would never serve on the Board H Mr. 
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Timberlake was appointed, entirely disregarding the views and 
wishes of the beneµciaries that Mr. Timberlake serve. · 
Since Mr. Timberlake's appointment, the defendant has taken 
the attitude of attending meetings of the Board, but has very little, 
if anything, to ·say, the only inference to be drawn from his con-
duct being that he does not approve of the membership of the 
Board, of the views of its majority, and "if the game can't be 
played his way, he won't play at all." 
With this malice in his heart, the defendant, evidently, in 
anticipation of this suit, and in an effort to arouse sym-
page 50 ~ pathy in his behalf, caused a statement to be printed in the 
Evening Leader of June 10, 1937, said statement being 
attached to the original petition marked "Exhibit A," to the. effect 
that he had resigned, effective at the next annual meeting -(July, 
1937) as President and Director of the Staunton Military Aca-
demy, giving an account of "his stewardship" of the Academy, 
claiming credit to himself for everything that had been accomp-
lished, and ignoring entirely the efforts and services of his four 
co-trustees and co-directors, in spite of the fact that the time that 
the school was under his leadership it lost a total of $220,575.74, 
while under the Presidency of Col. Thos. H. Russell, it made a 
total of $813,927.44. 
Your petitioner cannot permit the glaring mis-statements in the 
said statement contained, and suppression of facts which might 
put this defendant in an unfavorable position, to go unchallenged. 
The "account of stewardship" states "the first blow came when 
the Augusta National Bank called us for $20,000.00. S. M. A. 
had no money, so I borrowed on my own name, $10,000.00 from 
the National Valley Bank and Mr. Rowland borrowed on his name 
$10,000.00 in Philadelphia. Neither of us owning any stock, with 
this money, we took up the note." The truth about this situation 
is that William G. Kahle was a stockholder and director of the 
Augusta National Bank. He thought the world and all of this 
Bank as it had loaned him the money which gave him his start 
in building up the Staunton Military Academy. The School's 
account and his own personal account had been kept for years at 
the Augusta National Bank. At the time of William G. Kable's 
death he owed the bank $25,000.00 represented by 
page 51 ~ three notes, one for $5,000.00 and two for $10,000.00 
each. Immediately upon his death, largely at the instiga-
tion of this defendant, the School's bank account was removed to 
the National Valley Bank, where this defendant was a stock-
holder, officer and director, and Thomas H. Russell, one of his 
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co-fiduciaries, was made a member of the Board of Directors of 
that Bank. William G. Kable's stock in the Augusta National Bank 
was, by the Executors of his estate, sold at public auction. In spite 
of all these facts the Augusta National Bank never, at any time, 
made any demand for the payment of the notes which it held, and 
permitted them to be renewed from time to time upon the endorse-
ments,: of the Executors, without making any demand for pay-
ment either in whole or in part. Some of these notes were paid 
from time to time, and the last one for $10,000.00 remained in 
the hands of the Augusta National Bank until 1924, when it was 
paid. 
The defendant also stated that "the government sent us a bill 
for $43,500.00 on July 25 and stated that it had to be paid Aug-
ust 1. I borrowed on my own name $38,500.00 to pay this bill," 
but he very carefully conceals the fact that S. M. A. had placed 
a blanket morgage upon all of its properties and facilities to secure 
a bond issue of $100,000.00, the money from which was to be used 
for the purpose of paying this bill and for general operating ex-
penses of the institution. Before the bond issue could be legally 
floated it was necessary to get a decree of Court approv-
page 52} ing same, and as the Corporation Court adjourned its 
July term and would not convene again until September, 
the bonds could not be sold in time to raise the necessary funds by 
August 1. In order to expedite the transaction this defendant did 
borrow $38,500.00 as stated but he took all of the $100,000.00 
in bonds as security for his endorsement until the proper decree 
of court could be obtained, the bonds sold, at which time he was 
reimbursed and the note paid. 
With regard to the statement that Woodward & Company was 
wound up with no compensation to this defendant, the defendant 
seeks to convey the impression that he has received no compensa-
tion for his services rendered the school. Aside from the wrong-
ful and illegal profit which the defendant has made upon his sales 
to S. M. A. from his drug store, and the profits which he made 
upon his stock holdings in other firms hereinabove mentioned, this 
defendant has been paid for his seventeen years service a total 
of $50,158.75, not counting his share of 5% commission paid to 
the Executors of William G. Kable's Estate. 
Your petitioner charges that while the will of William G. Kahle 
specified the compensation to be paid to the persons managing his 
estate at Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per year each, that in 
order to get around this provision, early in the trust, an executive 
committee was formed consisting of this defendant, Thomas H. 
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Russell and W. H. Steele, voting themselves a salary of Twenty-
five Hundred Dollars ($2,50().00) per annum each. This execu-
tive committee was in existence from 1920 to 1933 and for each 
year thereof this defendant received said Twenty-five 
page 53 ~ Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) yearly salary with the ex-
ceptions of those years that a flat ten or fifteen per cent 
reduction was taken by the entire personnel of the academy in or-
der to curtail expenses. In the year 1930 or '31, the Directors 
voted themselves an additional salary of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) per year each. At the annual meeting held in July, 
1933, this defendant was elected President of the Corporation and 
continued to so serve until the annual meeting held in July, 1937, 
when he resigned as a Director. During each of these years a sal-
ary ranging as qigh as Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) per 
annum was voted to the said defendant for his services as Pres-
ident. Your petitioner charges and avers that it was improper 
and illegal for the said defendant, due to his trusteeship, to receive 
any compensation for his services as Executive Committeeman, 
Trustee, Director or President, other than that specified in the will, 
and that the said defendant holds the entire sum so received by 
him for the use and benefit of those designated in this petition. 
During the seventeen year period the sum so received by the said 
defendant, exclusive of the Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per 
year fixed by the will, amounts to $48,758.75. 
Your petitioner further charges that on numerous occasions the 
said defendant sold to his trust, bonds of a character not contem-
plated by the statute in such cases made and provided, which said 
sale of bonds has resulted in a loss to the trust in an amount of 
something over Twenty-five Thonsand Dollars ($25,000.00), not 
including interest upon the defaulting investments. That is to say 
that the said defendant, without the knowledge of his 
page 54 ~ co-fiduciaries sold his own personal bonds to the trust 
or the Staunton Military Academy, certain of which 
bonds, amounting in the aggregate of approximately Twenty Thous-
and Dollars ($20,000.00), exclusive of interest, have defaulted, 
and are practically worthless, resulting in an enormous loss to the 
institution. 
Your petitioner further charges that the said defendant without 
any formal authorization by the board of directors instructed the 
Treasurer of the Staunton Military Academy to loan to one A. T. 
Cooksey the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00), on 
the personal note of the said A. T. Cooksey, without requiring any 
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security therefor, the said defendant initialing the said note for the 
purpose of showing his authorization. The original note was re-
newed on October 1, 1936, and the interest paid at that time. This 
note was curtailed on January 18, 1937, by a payment of Fifty 
Dollars ( $50.00) but the residue of the said note is worthless, and 
is a total loss to the institution. 
As has been heretofore pointed out, William G. Kahle died on 
July 4, 1920, and within a few days the Trustees named in his 
will took charge of the Staunton Military Academy. Your peti-
tioner charges that on September 27, 1920, at a meeting of the 
Executive Committee, a resolution was adopted that the life of the 
President (Thomas H. Russell) be insured for the sum of Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00). This insurance was effected and 
the entire premium to keep said policy in force was paid by the 
Staunton Military Academy. Your petitioner shows that 
page 55 ~ in spite of the fact that the funds of the trust were used 
to maintain this policy of insurance, that 20% of the 
face amount of the insurance, or ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) 
was made payable to Mrs. Thomas H. Russell as beneficiary. Your 
petitioner charges, the said Thomas H. Russell having died in 1933, 
that this action was nothing short of a gift to Mrs. Russell of the 
trust property which the defendant was charged with preserving. 
Your petitioner is advised and believes, and so charges, that the 
said defendant, Gilpin Willson, Sr., for his gross misconduct here-
inbefore set out should be forthwith and promptly removed as a 
trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and your pe-
titioner further charges that he is entitled to a full and complete 
accounting from the said Willson, for your petitioner's use and 
benefit and for the benefit of his co-beneficiaries, as well as for 
the use and benefit of the Staunton Military Academy, for all bene-
fits or emoluments made or derived by the said defendant from his 
dealings with the trust estate, as well as for the losses which the 
said estate sustained by reason qf his improper dealings therewith 
as hereinbefore set out, as well as for the sums he permitted Wil-
liam C. Rowland to make out of ~is (Rowland's) illegal dealings, 
and interest upon the several items. 
Wherefore, being without remedy, save in this Court, your peti-
tioner prays that he be permitted to file this, his amendmend petition, 
in the above style Chancery cause and that the said Gilpin Willson, 
Sr., be inade a party defendant thereto both in his individual ca-
pacity and in his capacity as Trustee as aforesaid, and 
page 56~ required to answer the same, but answer under oath is 
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hereby waived; that proper process issue; that all proper 
accounts may be directed and all proper inquiries made into the 
transactions of the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., with the trust estate; 
that the said Gilpin Willson, Sr., be removed from his office as one 
of the Trustees under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and 
that he be required to account in this cause for all profits or emolu-
ments made and derived by him from his dealings with the Staun-
ton Military Academy, or the trust created under the will of Wil-
liam G. Kahle, deceased, since the death of the said William G. 
Kahle, as well as to make good the losses sustained by reason of 
his improper transactions therewith upon the several items herein-
before set out; that judgment also be entered against Gilpin Will-
son, Sr., for such amount as may ultimately be found to be due 
and owing from William C. Rowland to the Staunton Military 
Academy and/or the trust estate, for the said Rowland's improper 
dealings therewith, said judgment to be discharged, however, upon 
payment either by Rowland or Willson; and that all such further, 
other and general relief may be granted to your petitioner as this 
cause may require and to Equity seems just. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
JOS. I. NACHMAN, Attorney. 
WILLIAM G. KABLE II 
By Counsel 
which said petition the defendant, Willson, answered, his answer 
being filed in said court on the 9th day of February, 1939, and is 
in the words and figures following: 
page 57 r ANSWER AND EXHIBIT OF FEBRUARY 
9, 1939. 
The answer of Gilpin Willson, defendant, to a certain amended 
petition filed at the first September Rules, 1938 in the above en-
titled cause by Wm. G. Kahle, II, formerly Wm. H. Kahle, Jr., 
suing for his own benefit and for the use and benefit of his co-
beneficiaries under the will of Wm. G. Kahle, dec'd, and also for 
the use and benefit of the Staunton Military Academy, a corpora-
tion:· 
This defendant, without waiving his demurrer to said amended 
petition and reserving to himself the benefit of all just exceptions to 
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the same, for answer thereto, or to so much thereof as it is mater-
ial he should answer, says: 
The defendant denies that the petitioner has been authorized to 
sue for the use and benefit of his co-beneficiaries under the will of 
Wm. G. Kahle, dec'd., and that he has been authorized by Staunton 
Military Academy, a corporation, to sue for the benefit of that cor-
poration. 
The defendant says that heretofore the same petitioner has filed 
his petition in this cause against this defendant, which petition on 
July 27, 1937, this defendant fully answered. Thereafter volum-
inous depositions were taken on behalf of the petitioner and of the 
defendant respectively, and before the filing of said amended peti-
tion, as appears upon the face of the said depositions, the petitioner 
on behalf of the defendant have been returned to and filed in the 
Clerk's office of this court. In said depositions the 
page 58 ~ charges af the petitioner that the defendant was a stock-
holder, a vice president and director, or any of them, of 
W. J. Perry Corporation, a corporation, of the McClure Company, 
Inc., a corporation, and of Woodward's Cleaning and Dyeing 
\i\Torks, Inc., a corporation, are disproved and the petitioner Wm. 
G. Kahle, II under oath has admitted that the charges were without 
foundation. In said depositions the charges against this defendant 
of misdoings in his dealings with Staunton Military Academy are, 
as the defendant is advised and says, completely disproved. Never-
theless in the amended petition now filed the said Wm. G. Kahle, 
II, repeats verbatim each of said charges. And the defendant, de-
nying each charge against him set forth in said amended petition 
prays that his answer to the said original petition of Wm. G. Kahle, 
II, against this defendant be taken and read as a part of this an-
swer, as if each allegation and charge against the defendant in the 
amended petition which is a repetition in words or in substance of 
allegations and charges made against this defendant in the original 
petition were here specifically denied as is in his said answer to the 
original petition fully' set forth. 
It is true that the testamentary trustees of Wm. G. Kahle, dec'd, 
were Thos. H. Russell, now deceased, Wm. C. Rowland, Mrs. 
Eleanor E. Kahle, now Whitehead, Wm. H. Steele and Gilpin Will-
son; that Wm. A. Pratt afterwards was substituted in the room 
and stead of Thos. H. Russell then lately deceased, and S. D. Tim-
berlake, Jr., afterwards was substituted in the room and stead of 
Wm. A. Pratt then lately deceased. 
The defendant denies that upon the death of Wm. G. Kahle the 
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trustees named by the will elected themselves directors 
page 59 ~ of the Staunton Military Academy. On the contrary on 
July 5, 1920, when Wm. G. Kahle died, the defendant 
was a director of said corporation, an office he had filled for very 
many years; and the officers of said corporation were Wm. G. 
Kahle, president, Thos. H. Russell, vice president and secretary, and 
Wm. H. Steele, treasurer; the directors were Wm. G. Kahle, Thos. 
H. Russell, W. H. Steele, T. G. Russell and the defendant, Gilpin 
Willson. Upon the death of said Kahle, Thos. H. Russell suc-
ceeded him as president. At a meeting of the Board of Directors 
held on July 14, 1920, at which were present Steele, Willson and 
Thos. H. Russell, W. C. Rowland was elected a director to succeed 
Wm. G. Kahle. There was no meeting of stockholders until the 
annual meeting held on July 12, 1921, at which meeting and at the 
annual meeting held July, 1922, said directors were re-elected. At 
the annual meeting held July, 1923, said directors other than T. G. 
Russell were re-elect~d and in his stead Eleanor E. Kahle was elect-
ed director. 
It is not true that this defendant in the capacity of trustee has 
managed, directed or conducted the affairs of the corporation; on 
the contrary this defendant in the sole capacity of director and 
afterwards also as a corporate officer has taken part in the manage-
ment and direction of the affairs of the corporation. As a testa-
mentary trustee his only acts have been along with his co-trustees 
to vote the stock of said corporation at stockholders' meetings. 
The defendant denies that in any matter concerning the man-
agement of Staunton Military Academy, and in exercising the of-
fice of director and officer of said Academy he has acted 
page 60~ either as executor of Wm. G. Kahle, dec'd, or as testa-
mentary trustee under the will of Wm. G. Kahle ; denies 
that he has been guilty of any breach of trust or of any violation 
of duty, whether as trustee under the will of Wm. G. Kahle, dec'd, 
or as executor under the will of Wm. G. Kahle, dee' d, or as director 
or officer of Staunton Military Academy; denies that he ever has 
been, or is interested in any way financially as stockholder, officer 
or otherwise, in the corporations mentioned in said amended peti-
tion, W. J. Perry Corporation, McClure Company, Inc., and Wood-
ward's Cleaning and Dyeing Works, Inc., says that the petitioner 
knew c1;nd knows that his averments and charges with reference 
thereto are wholly unfounded and false; and denies each and every 
averment and charge of the said petition that he has been guilty of 
any unfair dealing, and that he has received any illegal profit what-
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ever in any connection or capacity; denies that he has been guilty 
of any breach of trust with reference to the transaction of Wm. C. 
Rowland and of Thos. H. Russell; denies that there was a secret 
agreement between the said Rowland and the said Russell and that 
the said Russell received a secret commission or bonus on sales to 
the Academy made by Rowland, and denies that under the law the 
defendant is liable to the petitioner, to the Staunton Military Acad-
emy, to the testamentary trust, or to any of them for any amount 
whatever upon any state of facts with reference to sales to the 
Academy and commissions paid to said Russell which may be held 
to impose a liability upon said Rowland. 
Defendant denies that it was improper or illegal for the defend-
ant to ask at the hands of and receive from Staunton Military 
Academy compensation for his services as director 
page 61 ~ as member of the executive committee of the Board of 
Directors and as an officer of Staunton Military Acade-
my. 
The defendant denies that the will of Wm. G. Kahle, dee' d dealt 
with or provided for any compensation to the directors or officers 
of Staunton Military Academy, whether or not such directors or 
officers happened to be the persons. designated by the testator as 
· testamentary trustees, 'and denies that the said will controlled, or 
can be construed to control, the Staunton Military Academy, a 
corporation, the corporate officers or the directors, or the corporate 
business. 
The defendant denies that the formation by the Board of Direct-
ors of an executive committee was with the intent to avoid any 
provision of the will or the provision that the testamentary trustees 
should receive $200. per year by way of compensation. 
It is true that the executive committee was constituted by the 
of Directors of the corporation in the year 1920 after the death of 
Wm. G. Kahle, and that said executive committee of the Board of 
Directors continued for many years, that the defendant was a mem-
ber of said executive committee and that the defendant received a 
yearly salary as such. 
It is true that in the year 1930 the Board of Directors, or the 
stockholders in meeting-the defendant does not have access to 
the corporate records of Staunton Military Academy and can not 
say definitely-voted a salary of $1,000 per year to each d_irector, 
but the defendant says that said salary was upon a certain condi-
tion. It is· true that at the annual meeting of the stockholders in 
July, 1933, the defendant was elected president of the corporation 
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and as such served until July, 1937, and that in each year 
page 62 ~ of his services as president he received salary therefor. 
But the defendant denies that it was improper or illegal 
for the defendant to receive such compensation and denies that the 
petitioner or the trust estate under Wm. G. Kable's will has any 
right, title or interest in or to any part thereof. 
The defendant denies that at any time he sold to or purchased 
for the Staunton Military Academy any bonds which it was im-
proper for Staunton Military Academy to purchase, and denies that 
he has occasioned either personally or as an officer or director of 
said Academy any loss whatever to said Academy; the defendant 
says that all purchases of bonds by said Academy with which he 
was in any manner connected were made with the full knowledge 
and consent, or the acquiescence with knowledge, of the Board of 
Directors and of the other officer of said corporation, and were 
proper investments. 
The defendant denies any liability whatever on account of the 
alleged A. T. Cooksey transaction. 
The defendant says that the insurance on the life of Thos. H. 
Russell, alleged in the petition, was by the corporate authorities of 
Staunton Military Academy, was a proper exercise of their func-
tions as such, and the result of this exercise of their legal authority 
was the receipt by the corporation of $40,000 from said insurance 
policy. 
The defendant denies each and every charge, whether of mis-
feasance, malfeasance, or neglect of duty, and each charge impos-
ing any liability upon him made in said amended petition not here-:-
tofore denied. 
Further answering said amended petition, the defendant says: 
page 63 ~ Over twenty years before Wm. G. Kahle died, and at 
a time when Wm. G. Kahle had no interest in any stock 
of said corporation, the defendant was elected and served as direct-
or of Staunton Military Academy. After Wm. G. Kahle became 
a stockholder of the Academy, and until his death, the defendant 
was elected and was a director of the Academy. On July 5, 1920, 
when Kahle died and for some years prior thereto the Board of 
Directors of Staunton Military Academy consisted of Wm. G. 
Kahle, Thos. H. Russell, Wm. H. Steele, T. G. Russell and Gilpin 
Willson. The officers of said corporation at that time were Kahle, 
President, Thos. H. Russell, vice president and secretary, and 
Steele treasurer. Thos. H. Russell was principal of the school. 
Thos. H. Russell and T. G. Russell had married sisters of Wm. G. 
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Kahle and were members of his family. For other fifteen years 
the defendant had been a close friend of Wm. G. Kahle and was 
well acquainted with both his and Staunton Military Academy's 
business affairs and :financial condition. 
On July 14, 1920, two weeks after Wm. G. Kable's death, the 
Board of Directors of Staunton Military Academy, of which the 
defendant was a member, met and elected Wm. C. Row land as 
director for Wm. G. Kable's unexpired term, and the defendant 
vice-president, Thos. H. Russell, former vice president having suc-
ceeded Kahle as president. At the annual stockholders' meeting 
held on July 12, 1921, and at the annual stockholders' meeting 
held in July, 1922, these officers and five directors were 
page 64~ re-elected. At the annual meeting held in July, ni1923, 
Eleanor E. Kahle, widow of Wm. G. Kahle and then 
entitled under Kable's will to all dividends declared by the Staun-
ton Military Academy, was elected to succeed T. G. Russell, but the 
same officers and the remaining four directors, including the de-
fendant, were re-elected. Each year until his resignation in 1937 
the defendant annually was re-elected director; until the death of 
Thos. H. Russell was elected vice president; and upon Russell's 
death succeeded him as president and thereafter was re-elected as 
such. 
The active business management of the corporation, carried on 
by Wm. G. Kahle until the time of his death, then fell upon Tl10s. 
H. Russell as president and the defendant. The Corporation's bus-
iness affairs were greatly involved, its indebtedness, the financial 
demands upon it and its liabilities were very great, and, Wm. C. 
Howland being a non-resident of the state and Thos. H. Russell 
being principal of the school conducted by the Academy, this work 
fell upon and was in large part done by the defendant. 
At a subsequent meeting of the Board of Directors it constituted 
an executive committee consisting of the defendant Gilpin Willson, 
Thos. H. Russell and Wm. H. Steele, and the Board of Directors 
fixed the compensation of each member of the executive committee 
at $2500. per annum. The testamentary trustees reported this ac-
tion of the Board pf Directors to the court in this cause, and on 
November 11, 1920, the court entered its decree in the words and 
figures following: 
page 65 ~ "Upon consideration whereof the Court doth adjudge, 
order and decree : . . . 
"Sixth: It appearing to the Court that the executive committee 
of the Board of Directors of Staunton Military Academy consists 
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of Gilpin Willson, Thos. H. Russell and vV m. H. Steele, all of 
whom are of the testamentary trustees of Wm. G. Kahle, deceased, 
and of whom Thos. H. Russell and Gilpin Willson are Executors, 
and that the said Thos. H. Russell and Gilpin Willson, on account 
of the positions of trust so held by them, are embarrassed in fixing 
the compensation to be paid to the members of said Executive Com-
mittee by Staunton Military Academy by way of compensation for 
their services in conducting the affairs of said corporation as such 
executive committee; that the duties of said Executive Committee 
are such and business of said corporation is of such magnitude as 
to require constant attention and service from said Executive Com-
mittee, and that it is proper in this cause, that the Court consider 
and determine the propriety of the members of said Executive 
Committee accepting compensation for their services as such, as 
well as the amount which properly they may so receive; that the 
said Gilpin Willson, Thos. H. Russell and Wm. H. Steele, mem-
bers of such Executive Committee may with propriety receive for 
their services as such members a sum not· exceeding $2500.00 each 
annually, to be paid by the corporation so long as such services are 
rendered, the decree of the court in this respect being intended 
merely to determine the propriety of said executive committee di-
recting such payment to its members, and the amounts at which 
such payment shall be fixed for the current year, and not to pre-
scribe what action shall be taken by said Executive Com-
page 66 ~mittee or to limit its discretion in the conduct of the af-
fairs of said corporation." 
A certified copy of so much of said decree as refers to said ac-
tion is herewith filed as an exhibit marked "Exhibit Decree," and 
is prayed to be taken and read as a part of this answer. The rec-
ord of this cause remaining in this court is here referred to and is 
prayed to be read and considered in this connection. 
The defendant says that the petitioner at that time was a party 
defendant to this cause, was represented by his mother and natural 
guardian, Eleanor E. Kahle, a beneficiary under the trust and a 
party defendant both as a testamentary trustee and in her own 
right, and was represented by his guardian ad litem by whom he 
answered and who answered for him, and by said decree it was ad-
judicated that the defendant as a member of such executive com-
mittee might with propriety receive for his services as such mem-
ber of the executive committee a sum not exceeding $2500. an-
nually to be. paid by the corporation "so long as such services are 
rendered," and that the members of said executive committee acted 
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with propriety in accepting compensation for their services as such. 
From the time of the entry of said decree and so long as said ex-
ecutive committee continued and the defendant was a member 
thereof the said decree remained firm, valid and final; the petition-
er was and is bound thereby and may not complain thereof or con-
cerning the c01i1pensation voted to and had by the defendant as a 
member of such executive committee. 
And the said executive committee afterwards was continued with 
the assent and vote, as testamentary trustee and as di-
page 67 ~ rector of Eleanor Enslow Kahle, afterwards Eleanor En-
slow Whitehead, a testamentary trustee and at times a di-
rector, who during the continuance of said executive committee was 
the sole beneficiary of all dividends paid by Staunton Military Acad-
emy and received from it by the testamentary trustee excepting such 
part of said dividends as_ was received for the payment of compen-
sation to the trustees. And the petitioner, without respect to the 
legal right of the defendant to have and receive such compensa-
tion, may not complain, both by reason of his lack of any interest 
and by reason of the active assent and acquiescence of the said 
beneficiary of the trust. 
In November, 1930, the Board of Directors resolved to pay each 
director an annual salary of $1,000., provided that the net annual 
profits of Staunton Military Academy exceeded the sum of $50,-
000., and the testamentary trustees so reported to the court in this 
cause. 
The capital stock of the corporation was of the par value of 
$7,230. Its surplus as of June 30, 1920 at Kable's death was 
$223,822.82, making an aggregate worth of $231,052.82. As of 
June 30, 1930, its general surplus had been increased by the sum 
of $277,380.81, and in addition thereto there was laid by a "re-
serve for contingencies'' of $200,000. The general surplus and the 
reserve, accumulated after Wm. G. Kable's death, amounted to 
$477,380.81, which amount, in addition to dividends of many 
thousands of dollars annually or more often paid to the trustees, the 
corporation had earned under the oversight of the Board of Direct-
ors. This was the financial status of the Academy when the res-
olution was adopted. · 
page 68 ~ On December 4, 1930, the court entered its decree as 
follows: 
" ... It appearing from the said petition and from a certified 
extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Board of Directors 
of Staunton Military Academy held on November 10, 1930, ex-
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hibited with said petition, that the said Board had resolved to pay 
to each of the directors an annual salary of $1000.00 so long as 
the annual net income of the corporation before payment of federal 
and state income truces is in excess of $50,000. and to increase by 
the sum of $500. annually the compensation paid to the chairman 
of the Executive Committee of said Board, and it further appear-
ing to the Court from the said petition as well as from the reports 
of audit of the accounts of said corporation that no compensation 
to this time has been paid to the said directors as such their ser-
vices to the Academy, except in the case of the Ex.ecutive Com-
mittee, having been gratuitous, the Court is of the opinion and doth 
adjudge, order and decree that in view of the financial result to the 
corporation of the services of said directors and of the results which 
may be expected from a continuance of such services it is proper 
that the compensation so awarded be paid subject to the conditions 
expressed in said resolution, although the said directors are also 
trustees under the will of Wm. G. Kahle~ dec'd." 
A certified copy of this decree is herewith exhibited, marked 
"Exhibit, Decree, December 4, 1930." 
The sole beneficiary of dividends declared by the corporation 
at the time of this action of the Board and the 
page 69 ~ entry of this decree was Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, who 
participated in the action of the Board of Directors, and 
was a party in her own right to the cause, to which cause the pe-
titioner was also a party. 
And the defendant says that the matter of said compensation to 
the directors was thus adjudicated and the said decree remains 
firm and stable. 
Aside from said adjudications: 
The will of Wm. G. Kahle declared that this testamentary trus-
tees voting the shares of said stock at any stockholders' meeting 
"may vote the same in their own favor if they deem it proper for 
the various officers of said corporation, and themselves may act as 
directors or officers, or both, of said corporation, if otherwise com-
petent, my intention being that their interest as trustee shall not 
render them incompetent personally to fill the offices of said cor-
poration." The intention of the testator, as thus emphatically dis-
closed, was that in their capacity of officers and directors his testa-
mentary trustees by reason of their interest as voting trustees 
should not be affected or made incompetent to act solely and en-
tirely with reference to the corporation by reason of their interest 
as trustees, and under the will the acts of said directors who were 
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also testamentary trustees were solely in their capacity as directors, 
and they were not affected in any respect by their capacity as 
trustees. 
Even if the testator had not used this express language and had 
not in so many words declared his intention, under the law the 
said directors, who happened also to be testamentary 
page 70 ~ trustees, were entitled to compensation for their services 
to the corporation. The will imposed upon them no ob-
ligation to serve. It is a manifest absurdity that persons designat-
ed by the testator as trustees to vote his stock should as directors 
and officers of a corporation carry on a corporate business of such 
magnitude, at the paltry compensation of $200. per annum given 
to them by his will for their services in voting his stock ; no rule 
of law required such services of the testamentary trustees, or dis-
qualified the defendant as director upon his acceptance of the of-
fice of testamentary trustee, or forbade his continuance in that of-
fice thereafter, or forbade his receiving just and proper compensa-
tion for his services as director and officer. And said compensation 
to the defendant was reasonable in every respect. 
The defendant says that upon his succession to the presidency 
upon the death of Thos. H. Russell, to which position until his 
resignation he was re-elected annually by the stockholders, he re-
ceived a salary as president for which salary he discharged all the 
duties of said office to his corporation; that he was rightly and 
legally entitled to compensation therefor; and that said salary was 
entirely reasonable in amount and properly paid. 
With reference to the A. T. Cooksey note, because of which the 
petitioner charges a liability upon the defendant : 
It appears from the cross-examination of Wm. H. Steele by the 
defendant's attorney in his deposition taken upon the original pe-
tition (Wm. H. Steele's clepo. pp 194-199) and from the 
page 71 ~ audit for the year 1935-6, p. 3 which is filed as an ex-
hibit, that Wm. H. Steele, Treasurer, prior to that time 
had advanced A. T. Cooksey, an instructor, out of the petty cash in 
his custody in return for Cooksey's check, the sum of $225.00; 
that Cooksey in 1934 gave the treasurer his note in substitution for 
this check, and that this note was . renewed throughout 1935 and 
up into 1936. In their report dated June 30, 1935, at page three 
_the auditors commented adversely upon this and other advance- · 
ments to employees by the treasurer. At the end of a scholastic 
year Cooksey was about to leave for the summer and the defendant 
then approved his renewing his note, which evidenced money lent 
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to him by the treasurer and was a renewal of the note taken by the 
treasurer and therefore repeatedly renewed with only the treasurer's 
assent. Afterwards Cooksey paid $50. on account of the note 
leaving a balance uncollected on account of the note of $150. This 
attempt upon the part of the petitioner to impose upon the defend-
ant liability for money advanced by the treasurer without any ac-
tion by the Board of Directors characterizes itself. The defendant 
is in no wise liable therefor. 
With reference to the dealings of Wm. C. Rowland and Thos. 
H. Russell, liability for which the petitioner charges against the 
defendant: 
By a written agreement which is filed with the record in the 
matter of Wm. G. Kable, II vs. W. C. Rowland, between W. C. 
Rowland, Thos. H. Russell and Wm. G. Kable, president of Staun-
ton Military Academy and owner of all of its capital stock, Row-
land was to pay to Thos. H. Russell six per cent of the cost to 
the Academy of uniforms furnished to the Academy by 
page 72 ~ Rowland. Afterwards this agreement, according to the 
petitioner's information and belief, was assigned to a 
corporation, Wm. C. Rowland, Inc. Under its term year after 
year until Wm. G. Kable's death Rowland or Rowland, Inc., fur-
nished all uniforms to the Academy and paid to Thos. H. Russell 
a commission thereon-these transactions being with the full know-
ledge and upon the definite agreement of the owner of all the cap-
ital stock and the president of the Academy. The defendant knew 
of this arrangement; the defendant says that Mrs. Eleanor E. 
Kable at the time of Wm. G. Kable's death knew of the arrange-
ment and as the defendant is informed, believes and says, Wm. H. 
Steele, director and treasurer of the Academy, also knew of the 
arrangement. No change was made after Kable's death until at 
or shortly before Thos. H. Russell's death. The matter of pur-
chases of uniforms was with the president of the school, Thos. H. 
Russell; the matter of payment was with the treasurer, Wm. H. 
Steele. The uniform business during some years after Kable's 
death was a source of great profit to the school and in some years 
enabled it to show a profit instead of a loss. The defendant says 
that the dealings of Rowland and Rowland, Inc., with the Acade-
my were fair, open and to the best of defendant's knowledge and 
belief in every respect honest. 
The defendant says that as a trustee under the will of Wm. G. 
Kahle he in no wise is responsible for any dereliction of duty or 
default on the part of any of his on-trustees and that any loss oc-
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casioned by any co-trustee to the Academy by any act 
page 73 r on the part of such trustee was without the defendant's 
knowledge, was a matter in which the defendant had no 
part and was without collusion of any kind by the defendant; that 
as director of said corporation he has not been guilty of any neg-
ligence or of collusion and that there is no liability upon the de-
fendant for any act of said Rowland or of said Russell. And the 
defendant says that he is not liable therefor. 
The defendant here again denies each and every charge against 
him of dereliction of duty as a trustee or as director, or as officer; 
denies that he is liable in any respect to any amount whatever to 
the petitioner or to any person concerned therein. 
And having fully answered the defendant prays hence to be 
dismissed with his reasonable costs in · this behalf expended. 
J. M. PERRY, Counsel. 
GILPIN WILLSON, 
By Counsel. 
page 74r Your petitioner, Willson, shows that he pleaded in 
abatement and demurred to the second petition of Will-
iam G. Kahle, II, and the matter was argued at length before the 
trial court, and the trial court by a decree of November 7, 1938, 
part of the record in this chancery suit, overruled the demurrer. 
Later, there was a petition for a rehearing on the demurrer, which 
was also argued at length, and which the trial court, by opinion 
dated January 10, 1939, likewise overruled, with leave to defend-
ant, Willson, to answer or plead to said amended petition. There-
after, the defendant, 'Willson, filed three special pleas and also 
answered, with exhibits thereto, all of which bear date of Feb-
ruary 9, 1939, and are part of the record in this suit and prayed 
to be read in connection with this petition. Thereafter, certain 
pleas were filed and replications thereto. Thereafter, there was 
another opinion of the trial court on the said pleas, as of date of 
May 9, 1939, also part of the record and prayed to be read as part 
of this petition. Thereafter, certain other proceedings were had, 
and rather extensive additional evidence taken, principaallly on 
behalf of the petitioner, Kahle, and the said defendant alleges that 
he in his evidence had shown to the court, supported fully by facts 
and circumstances, that he had been associated with Staunton 
Military Academy since back in 1894, at which time the school, 
operated by Captian William H. Kahle, the father of Col. William 
G. Kahle, went broke. It was then reorganized by William H. 
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Kahle, (grandfather of William G. Kahle, II) Reeves 
page 75} Catt, J. A. Fauver, Joe Kirby and Gilpin Willson, with 
a very small capitalization, $7230.00; that your petitioner 
has been associated with the school continuously ever since as a 
director or an officer, both under Captain William H. Kahle and 
Col. William G. Kahle, and after the death of William G. Kahle 
in 1920, also as a testamentary trustee. Petitioner further shows 
that while the school made progress and increased in assets, that 
under Col. William G. Kable's direction as president and ·owner 
it also incurred large liabilities, and when Col. William G. Kahle 
died in July of 1920, the school and Col. Kable's estate were in-
debted for more than the school and his other personal assets would 
bring; the indebtedness of the school and Col. Kahle' s estate was 
around $363,000.00. To carry the school on as a progressive busi-
ness venture required the solving of many problems, and petitioner 
says that he, because of his inherent interest in the school, his close 
friendship with Col. Kahle, and his father before him, took upon 
himself the greater part of the burden of handling the financial 
arrangements ; the school continued to prosper and prospered abun-
dantly; and that years before this suit was started, all of the in-
debtedness of the school had been paid, and that the estate had 
been enhanced in value to the extent of $650,000.00 by acquisition 
of additional lands, building of improvements thereon and main-
tenance and care thereof; and that before this suit was started, 
that the school had paid in dividends to the beneficiaries of the 
trust under Col. Kable's will a sum in excess of $234,000.00, all 
of which petitioner alleges and believes was brought about sub-
stantially through his efforts, with the assistance of 
page 76} other officers and directors of the school. Petitioner 
states that he has always considered as one of his most 
pressing duties and obligations the welfare of the Staunton Mili-
tary Academy, and, in all of his dealings with it and for it, has 
looked to the best interests and welfare of the school and the bene-
ficiaries of the trust under Col. Kable's will; and that during the 
period of time that has elapsed since he became testamentary 
trustee, that he had received letters from the principal beneficiary 
of the trust, Eleanor Enslow Kahle, commending him in the highest 
degree for his interest and efforts on behalf of the school and the 
Kahle heirs; that his evidence geven in defense of the allegations 
of fraud and. misdealing with the trust estate on the two petitions 
of William G. Kahle, II, completely refuted the charges made 
therein; and the trial court in its final opinion in this case, which 
is carried into a decree and a matter of record in this cause, and 
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the decree entered thereon of May 18, 1940, both of which are 
filed as exhibits with this petition, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 3 and 
4, completely absolved him, the defendant Willson, of any liability, 
responsibility or wrongdoing in connection with any of the allega-
tions in Kable's two petitions, excepting the three: one, the balance 
of the liability under the Cooksey note of $150.00; two, the repay-
ment to Staunton Military Academy of 20% of the premiums 
paid on the insurance taken out by the Academy on Thomas H. 
Russell, with interest on each expenditure at 6%; and three, that 
he, Willson, was jointly and severally liable with William C. Row-
land on the liability found against him, the said Rowland, 
page 77 ~ by this court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, Record No. 2117, in the case of 
William C. Rowland V. William H. Kahle, et. al., the extent of 
the liability therein being approximately $117,000.00, and the said 
petitioner, Willson, was, by the said final decree of the lower court 
just hereinbefore referred to, ordered removed as testamentary 
trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased. And the 
said Willson further shows that he was aggrieved by said judgment 
and appealed said case to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia, in which said appeal cross-error was al-filed by the petitioner, 
Kahle; that an appeal from the decision of the Corporation Court 
in said cause was granted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, which said appeal came on to be heard in the appealate 
court, which court, on June 9, 1941, rendered its decision, the same 
being reported in 15 S. E. 2d, pages 56 through 62, and is the 
record of said appellate court No. 2370, under the style of Gilpin 
Willson, Sr. v. William G. Kahle, II, et. al; that the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia in its opinion in said case reversed the 
Corporation Court for the City of Staunton and entered final 
judgment in favor of appellant, Willson, and held him not liable 
in any respect on any of the allegations in the petitions of William 
G. Kable,II, et al, but, in fact, held that his entire actions as test-
amentary trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, had 
been greatly beneficial to the trust estate and, in effect, that his 
stewardship had justified the faith and confidence that decedent 
placed in him when he named him in his will as one of the test-
amentary trustees; a copy of said. opinion is here filed marked 
Petitioner's Exhibit No. 
Your petitioner alleges that while the petitioner, William G. 
G. Kahle, II, shows that he sues for his own benefit 
page78 ~ and for his co-beneficiaries under the will of William G. 
Kahle and Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, 
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that, although Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, after 
said petition was filed, passed a resolution declining to adopt or 
have anything to do with the prosecution of the said Kable's peti-
tion, that during the pendency of the litigation set up by said peti-
tions, he is informed and advised and believes that Staunton Mili-
tary Academy, through its then Board of Directors, the personnel 
of which had changed and consisted of Kahle, the petitioner, Mrs. 
Whitehead, two brothers-in-law of petitioner Kahle, the husbands 
of his sisters, beneficiaries of the trust, passed another resolution, 
which is shown on the minute books of said corporation, in which 
resolution they set aside for the use and benefit of the said William 
G. Kahle, II, any and all recovery that might be had out of his 
said petitions against the said Willson, thereby ratifying and 
approving the said petitions, and adopting and setting aside for 
the use and benefit of petitioner Kahle any monies recovered as a 
result of the allegations in said Kable's petitions. 
Your petitioner further shows unto the court that as a result 
of the filing in said suit of the said petitions of the said William G. 
Kable,11, in suing in his own right and for the use and benefit of 
his co-beneficiaries, etc., and Staunton Military Academy, a cor-
poration, that he was put to considerable embarrassment, trouble 
and expense; that the record in said chancery suit of Kable's Exe-
cutors v. Kable's Trustees, and in the various papers filed therein, 
show that the liability sought to be attached to him by 
page 79 ~ the said Kables, and those who would profit by a favor-
able decision of his suit, extended into hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, which would have reduced him, the said 
Willson, to the status of a pauper; that he was compelled to 
aggresively defend said suit; that he employed the services of able 
counsel, and expended considerable costs and lawyers' fees; that 
the costs that he had incurred, which have not been repaid him, 
the principal items amount to the following: 
Paid to R. Gray Williams and his associate, 
J. Solon Kuykendall of Winchester, counsel 
fees $4,000.00 
Paid out-of-pocket expenses of Williams and 
Kuykendall 234.84 
Paid for printing of briefs by Byrd Printing 
Company, Richmond, less cost recovered by 
appellant 146.25 
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Attorney's fees contracted by Willson to be 
paid to J. Martin Perry, Attorney, of Staun-
ton, who handled the burden of the suit and 
· the appeal 6,000.00 
Paid out-of-pocket expenses to J. Martin 
Perry 42.81 
Aggregate amount, not including sundry 
miscellaneous items $10,423.90 
Petitioner alleges that all of these costs were occasioned him as 
a result of the unfounded and false allegations set out in the said 
petitions of William G. Kahle, II, suing for himself, his co-
beneficiaries under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and 
Staunton Military Academy against petitioner, Willson, and that 
he believes and is so advised that under the law of the land, the 
said Trust Estate and the beneficiaries thereunder, the recipients 
of the benefits. of said trust, and Staunton Military Academy. In-
corporated, are liable to him for the repayment of all sums of 
monies and expenses which he has paid in and about his defense 
thereto, and also for all proper and reasonable ex-
page 80~ penses contracted for by him in his defense; that the 
said costs hereinabove set out paid and contracted to be 
paid by him in his defense are reasonable and proper, considering 
the time employed, the nature of the litigation, and the work shown 
to have been done by the record in said suit, and that he should 
recover from the trust estate and Staunton Military Academy, In-
corporated, the full amount thereof. 
WHEREFORE, being without remedy save in this court, your 
petitioner prays that the full record of the case of Kable's Exe-
cutors, etc., v. Kable's Trustees, so far as it is applicable and prop~r, 
and the full record, so far as it is applicable and pro11er, of the 
said case of Gilpin Willson, Sr., v. W. G. Kahle, Il, et al., in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at Richmond, Record No. 
2370, be read and considered ,by the court as part of this petition; 
that he, your petitioner, be permitted to file this his petition in the 
above styled chancery cause, and that the said Eleanor Enslow 
Whitehead, William G. Kahle, II, Eleanor Kahle Miller and Helene 
Kahle Ferguson, in their own right, and Staunton Military Aca-
demy, a corporation, be made parties defendant hereto and required 
to answer this petition, but answer under oath is hereby waived ; 
that proper process issue; and that all proper accounts be directed 
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and inquiries made; and that it be decreed that your petitioner, 
Gilpin Willson, be reimbursed ·out of the trust estate created under 
the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, the full amount of his 
expenditures and those sums contracted by him to be paid, in and 
about his defense of the false and fraudulent allegations 
page 81 } made against him as testamentary trustee under the will 
of William G. Kahle, deceased, and as officer and director 
of Staunton Military Academy, Incorporated; and that all such 
other, further and general relief may be granted your petitioner as 
this cause may require and to equity may seem just; and your 
petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
WESLEY TAYLOR 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
STATE OF VIRGINIA: 




I, Christina E. Bowman, a Notary Public in and for the County 
of Augusta, in the State of Virginia, do testify that this day per-
sonally appeared before me, GILPIN WILLSON, who made oath 
that he is cognizant of the matters and things set out in the fore-
going petition, and that they are true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
Subscribed and sworn. to before me this 19th day of January, 1942. 
My commission expires on the 28th day of April 1945. 
CHRISTINA E. BOWMAN 
Notary Public 
page 82} EXHIBIT WILL OF WM. G. KABLE, DEC'D. 
I, William G. Kahle, being of sound mind and disposing mem-
ory, do make this my last will and testament, and do hereby re-
voke and annul any and all wills and codicils thereto by me at any 
time heretofore made: 
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts be paid as soon after my 
decease as conveniently may be. 
SECOND : I give, devise and bequeath unto my wife Eleanor 
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Enslow Kahle, absolutely, all the rest and residue of my estate, real, 
personal and mixed and wheresoever situated except my shares of 
the capital stock of the Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, 
which are hereinafter otherwise disposed of. 
THIRD : I give and bequeath unto Eleanor Enslow Kahle, 
Thos. H. Russell, Gilpin Willson, W. C. Rowland and W. H. 
Steele, and to their successor or successors in office, all of my shares 
of the capital stock of the Staunton Military Academy, to be held, 
used and disposed of upon the trust following, and none other, that 
is to say : ( 1) They shall hold and so vote the said shares of stock 
at any and all meetings .of the stockholders of the said corporation, 
during the continuance of this trust, and so manage it, so far as 
stockholders may affect the same, as to cause the said corporation 
to employ the said Thos. H. Russell as Principal of the Staunton 
Military Academy, a school conducted by said corporation, at a 
reasonable salary, so long as the said Russell shall live and be able 
or desire to be so employed and shall conduct himself and the aff~irs 
of said office in a proper manner-although as to this last 
page 83 ~ I have no apprehension whatever-the reasonable salary 
to be paid to him for his services to be fixed in the 
manner hereinafter stated, provided, however, that such reasonable 
salary shall never exceed the sum of $10,000.00 per year-this 
being named as a maximum limit and it by no means being intended 
that such salary shall reach that limit unless it be so fixed in the 
manner hereinafter stated; and to employ in some proper capacity 
in said school T. G. Russell, so long as said T. G. Russell shall live 
and be able and desire to be so employed and shall conduct himself 
and the affairs of his employment- in a proper manner-in which 
respect I have no apprehension whatever-the said T .. Russell 
to be paid a reasonable salary for his services, the same to be fixed 
in the manner hereinafter stated. Upon their annual election to 
the position in the employ of the Staunton Military Academy, 
hereinbefore mentioned, such salaries shall be paid to Thos. H. 
Russell and T. G. Russell, respectively, as shall be ascertained to 
be chosen by the said Thos. H. Russell and T. G. Russell and the 
other by my said wife, or in default of her designating any person, 
then by said Trustees other than Thos. H. Russell. In the event 
of disagreement between the appraisers thus chosen, that two shall 
select a third competent and disinterested person to act as umpire 
between them. The decision of any two of said appraisers, or of 
the two appraisers designated by the said Russells and my wife, or 
the remaining Trustees, respectively, as to the proper amount 
of said salaries for the then next approaching year 
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page 84 ~ shall be final and binding upon my Trustees when com-
municated to them my said shares of stock will be vuted 
by them for the salaries thus fixed. But in any year, by agreement 
of the parties, no appraisement may be made and in such case said 
shares of stock shall be voted for the salaries of the year then 
about to expire. Further, the said stock always shall be voted by 
my said Trustees against any unreasonable expenditures or expenses 
of salar.y, or unbusinesslike ventures, and in each instance always 
for the welfare of the corporation and of the school operated by it 
and for increasing its business and profits; it being remembered 
that I always desired, as a stockholder, all such expenditures to 
be made as appear reasonable and proper in the exercise of a fair 
businesslike discretion, and that it is my desire that my said 
Trustees in voting said stock shall be actuated by like motives. My 
said Trustees shall not sell the said shares of stock, or any of them, 
and shall not vote the said shares of stock, or any of them, at 
any meeting of the stockholders of the said Staunton Military Aca-
demy, a corporation, for the sale of the school conducted by said 
corporation or any property necessary or adventageous to the 
operation of the said schol, unless in order to replace the same with 
property more adventageous than that disposed of, and shall not 
vote the said shares of stock or any of them at any such stock-
holders' meeting, in favor of ceasing to operate the said school, 
unless because of some catastrophe or because of great losses not 
happening through their default, it shall appear to such court as 
may have jurisdiction of the matter, to which said Trustees may 
apply for direction, upon the evidence of not less than 
page 85 ~ three competent disinterested persons with full know-
ledge of the matter, that such sale or sales, such cessa-
tion of operations or such disposition of the stock of the school, or 
of the property, is necessary in order to avoid disaster to the trust. 
estate. In their voting the shares of said stock at any stockholders' 
meeting the said Trustees may vote the same in their own favor, 
if they deem it proper, for the various officers of said corporation, 
and themselves may act as directors or officers, or both, of said 
corporation, if otherwise competent, my intention being that their 
interest as Trustees shall not render them incompetent personally 
to fill the offices of said corporation. ( 2) In all matters requir-
ing the exercises of judgment and discretion on the part of my 
said Trustees in which there develops any difference of opinion 
among them, the opinion of the majority shall prevail and action 
be taken accordingly. ( 3) Out of the dividends, interest and pro-
fits arising and accruing from the estate in their hands, my Trustees 
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annually will pay alleged taxes and charges assessed against the 
trust estate of the income thereof, and all expenses during that 
year incurred, in and as the management and conduct of the trust, 
including therein the sum of Two Hundred Dollars per year to 
each of said Trustees as compensation for his services as Trustee 
during the year. ( 4) The net amount of the dividends and in-
come arising and accruing from said trust estate and coming into 
the Trustees' hands, after deducting the foregoing expenses and 
charges ( which net amount I hereinafter term "net income") my 
Trustees shall pay to my wife Eleanor Enslow Kahle, during each 
and every year of her natural life, or until some of my 
page 8Q ~ children shall attain the age of twenty-one years, at my 
wife's death or the coming of age of some of my child-
ren shall first occur. Such payments shall be made at least annually 
and each annual payment shall include all collections made to that 
time; but if sufficient funds then be in the hands of my Trustees 
for that purpose, partial payments during the year also are to be 
made by way of advancements of such annual payments. When 
and as each of my children shall become twenty-one years of age, 
my said Trustees thereafter shall pay to such children annually 
out of said net income, so long as my wife shall live, an amount 
equivalent to one-ninth of my said net income, so that when all 
three of my children have become twenty-one years of age, each 
of them from his majority will have enjoyed and thereafter until 
the death of my wife, will have and enjoy a one-ninth part of said 
net income as his absolute property. My said Trustees, after the 
eldest of my said children shall have become of age, shall pay to 
my wife the remaining eight-ninths of the said net income; and 
after the second child shall have become of age, shall pay to my 
wife the remaining seven-ninths of said net income; and after 
t?e youngest of my said children shall have become of age, shall 
pay to. my wife the remaining six-ninths of said net income: such 
payments to my said wife to continue so long as she shall live. 
In the event of the death of any of my said children after he has 
attained his majority, the proportion of such net income, which 
otherwise herein would have been payable to such child, thereafter 
shall be paid to my said wife during her natural life. 
page 87J The provisions herein made for my wife until my child-
ren become of age is made for the purpose that my wife 
therewith may provide comfortably for the support and mainten-
ance of herself and our children during their minority and for their 
proper education and that after the children, respectively, become 
of age my wife as well shall have some provision. And at the 
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death of my said wife, then upon the further trust that the said 
Trustees then and thereafter shall hold said trust estate for the 
use and benefit of my children surviving my said wife, and the 
then living children of such of my children as then are dead', per 
stirpes and not per capita managing said stock as hereinafter dir-
ected, and paying the net income, as hereabove divided, to the said 
beneficiaries according to their respective interests, in annual pay-
ments until all of my said children have attained the ages following 
namely, if a boy twenty-five years, and if a girl twenty-two years, 
at which last named time, the said Trustees will assign, transfer 
and deliver to the said beneficiaries under this clause all of the 
trust estate. ( 5) In the event of the death, disability, resignation 
or removal from the State of my said Trustee ( and excepting that 
the last contingency shall not apply in the case of W. C. Rowland, 
who now is a· non-resident of Virginia), or any of them, such 
successor or successors shall be appointed as may then be nominated 
by my wife; but in default of such nomination, as then may be 
nominated by the remaining Trustees; or in default of their nomi-
nation, by the beneficiaries of this trust other than my wife; and 
until such nominatiomi the remaining Trustees or Trustee may 
act. 
page 88r FOURTH: I appoint Thos. H. Russell, Gilpin Will-
son and W. C. Rowland to be executors of this my last 
will and testament. 
FIFTH: I appoint my wife, Eleanor Enslow Kahle, the guar-
dian of my infant children until they respectively arrive at the 
age of twenty-one years. I do hereby declare the foregoing paper, 
written in type on this and five preceding sheets of paper, which 
sheets other than the sixth are each identified by my initials signed 
by me on the margin of each sheet, to be my last will and testa-
ment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name 
and affixed my seal, this 27th day of December, nineteen hundred 
and nineteen. 
WILLIAM G. KABLE (Seal) 
Signed and published by William G. Kahle as and for his last 
will in the presence of us who in his presence and in the presence 
of each other, and at his request, have hereunto subscribed our 
names as witnesses : 
W. W. TIMBERLAKE 
H. L. OPIE 
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CODICIL 
Whereas I, William G. Kahle, having made my last will in 
writing, bearing date December 27th, 1919. Now I do hereby make 
this codicil thereto, to be taken as part thereof. 
FIRST : Some years ago a house was built by Thos. H. Russell 
on Pleasant Street on the "Bickle Field," ( then recently 
purchased by me for the Staunton Military Academy), 
page 89 r which since that time has been occupied by Thos. H. 
Russell as his residence, towards the erection of which 
house I contributed a certain sum, I now do give and devise the 
said residence, together with so much land is now used in connec-
tion therewith, the boundaries thereof being shown by hedges and 
fences, unto my sister Margaret H. Russell (wife of said Thos. H. 
Russell) so long as she shall live and at her death to her children 
then surviving her, or if there shall be no such surviving children, 
then unto such persons as then may answer the description of her 
heirs at law. And I direct my said executors, in the event that 
title to the said residence and lot at any time of my death shall be 
in the Staunton MilitaryAcademy, to require that proper convey-· 
ance thereof be made to my devises just herein named. But no con-
sideration thereof shall be required by the Staunton Military Aca-
demy, since the said house and lot will be held by it for my benefit, 
I being in fact the owner of said land. 
SECOND : I direct my said executors to convey to the Staun-
ton military Academy any real estate standing in my name, other 
than that just hereinafter mentioned, which within a year prior 
to my death may have been used in connection with or for the 
purpose · of that corporation-such real estate being regarded by 
me as in fact a portion of that corporation's property. 
THIRD: I bequeath unto Edward Williams, colored, if he shall 
survive me, and to Kate Harris, colored, if she shall survive me, 
each of whom has been a faithful servant, each the sum of Five 
Hundred Dollars. 
page 90r FOURTH: My executors are authorized and empow-
ered to continue any partnership of which I may be en-
gaged at the time of my death, until in their discretion further 
continuance thereof is unwise or not for the interests of my es-
tate; and for such purpose my executors further are authorized and 
empowered to borrow from time to time reasonable amounts of 
money as in their judgment may be necessary therefor, making 
and delivering on account of my estate such notes or other evi-
dences of indebtedness in their discretion may be proper and 
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necessary. And my executors are authorized and empowered to 
renew from time to time, in whole or in part, until payment readily 
may be made, any notes or other evidences of indebtedness made 
by me, if their judgment so requires, and to endorse, on behalf of 
my estate, any renewals, in whole or in part, of notes upon which 
I am such endorser, made in connection with any business venture 
of mine, until such time as my said executors deem it unwise fur-
ther to postpone payment and settlement thereof. My executors 
are authorized and empowered to sell, publicly or privately, any 
real estate owned by me individually, if in their judgment it is 
proper so to do, and upon such terms as to cash or credit as they 
may think best, and to make, execute and deliver any and all deeds, 
releases and conveyances of any kind which in their opinion may 
be necessary or proper and in furtherance of the interest of my 
estate or the execution of the Trustees herein declared. The be-
quests· and devises herein contained shall be treated and considered 
as subsequent to the bequest with reference to the capital 
page 91;~ stock of the Staunton Military Academy in any manner, 
and to diminish and devise any bequent of all of the 
residue of my estate to my wife, Eleanor Enslow Kahle only to 
the extent of the bequests and devises made in this codicil. But in 
all respects except as herein the same may be modified and amend-
ed, my said will shall remain as it is written. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto signed my name 
and affixed my seal this 27th day of March, 1920. 
WILLIAM G. KABLE (Seal) 
Signed, published and declared by William G. Kahle, as and for 
a codicil to his last will, in the presence of us, who in his presense 
and in the presense of one another, have hereunto signed our 
names as witnesses thereto. 
page 96~ 
WM. J. PERRY 
J.M. PERRY. 
Pages 91 through 94 inclusive omitted-
withdrawn from the record by 
consent of all counsel. 
OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Petitioner seeks to recover from the defendant in that he ( de-
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fendant) violated the duties as Trustee under the will of William 
G. Kahle, deceased, and as Director of Staunton Military Academy, 
in the following alleged acts : 
Item 1. Sold to the Academy drugs, paints, athletic supplies 
and other merchandise to the extent of $90,000.00, out of the drug 
store of which he is co-owner. 
Item 2. All the banking of the school was at the National Valley 
Bank, of which he "is Vice President and Director." 
Item 3. Placed "practically all the insurance upon the trust 
property" with W. J. Perry Corporation, in which he was a stock-
holder and director. 
Item 4. Placed "practically all the printing with McClure Com-
pany," of which he was stockholder and director. 
Item 5. Placed all cleaning of uniforms with Woodwards Clean-
ing and Dyeing Works, Incorporation, in which defendant, was 
stockholder and director. 
Referring to above Item 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, alleging: "All this 
business was placed and sales made to the school, without competi-
tive bidding or consideration as to whether or not goods or ser-
vices of a similar nature and quality could have been obtained from 
others at a more reasonable price, and without any consideration 
by the Board of Directors," and that the sales of the drugs, paints, 
etc., were at exorbitant prices, and far exceed retail values, and re-
sulted in profit to defendant of "many thou~ands or perhaps hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars." 
page 97 ~ Item 6. That "William C. Rowland, one of the trus-
tees and one of the directors, since the beginning, has sold 
to his trust military uniforms to the extent of approximately 
$1,200,000.00, under secret agreement with Thomas H. Russell, 
whereby said Russell received a commission or bonus of 6% of 
the gross sales made to the school by Rowland; this situation, 
though unknown to the Trustees and Directors, other than 
Rowland, Russell and defendant, was admittedly known to and 
approved by defendant; charging that because of this knowledge 
and approval defendant is equally and jointly liable "with said 
Rowland for his (Rowla11:d's) improper dealings with said Staun-
ton Military Academy." 
Item 7 .. While the will of William G. Kahle specified "the 
compensation to be paid to the persons managing his estate at XX 
($200.00) per year each, that in order to get around this provision, 
early in the trust, an executive committee was formed consisting 
of this defendant, Thomas H. Russell and W. H. Steele (meaning 
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of the Board of Directors of Staunton Military Academy), voting 
themselves a salary xx x ($2500.00) per annum·each." This sum 
was received by defendant each and every year from 1920 to 1933, 
both inclusive "with exception of those years that a flat ten or 
fifteen per cent reduction was taken by the entire personnel of the 
Academy in order to curtail expenses.'' In the year 1930 or '31, 
the Directors voted themselves an additional salary of One Thous-
and Dollars ($1,000.00) per year each. Defendant was elected 
president of the corporation in 1933 and served until July, 1937, 
during which years he received a salary ranging as high as Five 
Thousand Dollars, as president. 
page 98 ~ Charging that it was improper and illegal for def end-
ant "due to his trusteeship" to receive any compensatioa 
for his services as Executive Committeeman, Trustee, Director, or 
President, other than that specified in the will, "and that the said 
defendant holds· the entire sum so received by him for the use and 
benefit of those designated in this petition. 
Item 8. Defendant, on numerous occasions, "sold to his trust, 
bonds of a character not contemplated by the statute in such cases 
made and provided, which said sale of bonds has resulted in a loss 
to the trust in amount of something over Twenty-five Thousand 
Dollars x x x not including interest upon defaulting investments. 
That is to say that defendant, without the knowledge of his co-
fiduciaries, sold his own personal bonds to the trust, or Staunton 
Military Academy, certain of which bonds, amounting in the ag-
gregate to approximately Twenty Thousand Dollars x x exclusive 
of interest, have defaulted and are practically worthless, resulting 
in an enormous loss to the institution." (Italics mine). 
Item 9. Defendant, "without formal authorization by the Board 
of Directors, instructed the Treasurer of the Staunton Military 
Academy, to loan to one A. T. Cooksey the sum of xx ($250.00) 
on the personal note of the said A. T.Cooksey, without requiring 
security therefor, the said defendant initialing said note for the 
purpose of showing his authorization." This note was renewed 
October 1, 1936, for the sum of $200.00, curtailed January 18, 
1937, by $50.00 but balance claimed to be worthless. 
page 99 ~ Item 10. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of 
the Directors of the Corporation · ( Staunton Military 
Academy) on September 27, 1920, a resolution was adopted resolv-
ing that the life of the President (Thomas H. Russell) be insured 
for the sum of $50,000.00. This insurance was effected and the 
entire premiums paid by the Corporation, but 20% of the face 
\ 
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amount, or $10,000.00, was made payable to Mrs. Thomas H. ·Rus-
sell, as beneficiary. Petitioner charges that this action was noth-
ing short of a gift to Mrs. Russell of the trust property which 
the defendant was charged with preserving. 
The prayer of the petition is: That he be permitted to file his 
petition in the cause of William G. Kable's Executors v. William 
G. Kable's Trustees; that Gilpin Willson, Sr., be made defendant, 
both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as Trustee under 
the will of William G. Kahle; "that all proper accounts may be 
directed and all proper inquiries made into the transactions of . the 
said Gilpin vVillson, Sr., with the trust estate; that the said Gilpin 
Willson, Sr., be removed from his office as one of the Trustees 
under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and that he be re-
quired to account in this cause for all profits or emoluments made 
and derived by him from his dealings with the Staunton Military 
Academy, or the trust created under the will of \tVilliam G. Kahle, 
as well as to make good the losses sustained by reason of his im-
proper transactions therewith upon the several items hereinbefore 
set out; that judgment also be entered against Gilpin Willson, Sr., 
for such amount as may ultimately be found to be clue 
page 100 ~and owing from William C. Rowland to the Staunton 
Military Academy, and/ or the trust estate for the said 
Rowland's improper dealings therewith, said judgment to be dis-
charged, however, upon payment either by Rowland or Willson," 
and for further and general relief. 
Items 2, 3, 4, and 5 were practically disposed of in my opinion 
on demurrer to the petition. ( Page 12) . 
However, from the evidence now before me, I see nothing to 
sustain the charges made. \,\Tillson was in no way connected with 
the W. J. Perry Corporation, nor with the McClure Company, 
since prior to the death of Kahle. His connection with Wood-
wards Cleaning and Dyeing Works was not personal but on behalf 
of the Kahle estate and the Academy. I deem it unnecessary to 
discuss further the charges made in these items. The evidence 
fails to sustain the allegations, even if the allegations may be suf-
ficient in law. ' 
Item 7 has been disposed of by the decree heretofore entered sus-
taining the two pleas of res adjudica.ta filed thereto, except as to 
that portion of this item relating to the payment to Willson of 
salary as President of the Corporation from July 1, 1933 to June 
30, 1937, which, as shown by the evidence, was as follows: 1933-4, 
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$5,000.00; 1934-5, $2500.00; 1935-6, $2500.00, and 1936-7, 
$2500.00. 
This then leaves this portion of Item 7 and Items 1, 6, 8 and 9 
and 10 for consideration and determination as theevidence may 
justify. 
age 101 ~ Item 1: The facts relating to the charges contained in 
this Item are about as follows : 
At about the time he assumed his duties as Trustee under the 
will of William G. Kahle, deceased, and Director and officer in the 
Corporation, Gilpin Willson was a half owner of Willson Brothers 
( Drug Company). Later, in 1924, he reduced his ownership to 
one-fourth interest, having given his son one-half of his previous 
holdings. As had been done during the lifetime of William G. Kahle, 
owner of the entire capital stock, the Staunton Military Academy 
continued to purchase from said Drug Company practically all the 
paints, drugs, athletic and other supplies-exclusive of uniforms 
for students and food-needed by it in and about the conduct of its 
business, over a period of years set out in the petition, amounting 
to a total of about $86,000.00, of which more than $30,000.00 was 
for paints. 
By resolution of July 31, 1920, a purchasing agent for the Cor-
poration was directed to be employed at a salary of $3,000.00 per 
year. 'N. S. Morriss was employed as such and took office August 
· 2(), following. According to the testimony-which was not denied 
-of Steele and Morriss, Morriss was to handle the purchases of 
all materials and supplies needed by the Academy, except uniforms 
and food, and make requisitions to Steele, Treasurer, for approval 
and payment. 
Purchases of these supplies from Willson Bros., were made with-
out inquiry as to price and request for bids from others; while in 
some instances, where goods were "not purchasable" from 
page 102 ~Willson Bros., bids were asked and prices fixed before 
buying. Morriss explained his actions in purchasing the 
bulk of these supplies from Willson Bros.,-in his testimony-
without inquiry and bids from others, on the grounds that when 
. he took charge as purchasing agent for the school, he found that 
paints and other supplies were being-as for years had previously 
been done by William G. Kahle-bought from Willson Bros., and 
that he understood the school desired the account to be kept with 
them, so long as prices were reasonable and what was wanted could 
be gotten there; that persons representing painting manufacturers 
"at different times solicited business and submitted prices; but there 
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was no great difference in their prices, as I recall" ; that he listened 
to arguments of those selling competitor lines; "and, as far as I 
was able to do so, compared them. I did not see we could better 
ourselves in making a change. We had advantages from Willson 
Brothers we did not have in people shipping stuff in here." In 
reply to the questions (page 10) he says: 
"Ql6. During your whole connection with the school as Pur-
chasing Agent and up to the year ending July 1, 1937, has Mr. 
Gilpin Willson ever suggested to you in any manner, shape or form 
that you should purchase anything for the Staunton Military Acad-
emy from him or his firm? 
"A. No more than he has picked our line of supplies. 
"Ql7. Has he ever suggested that you buy from him? 
"A. I have never had any pressure exerted on me. 
"Q 18. Has any pressure been exerted on you to that effect 
by any official of the company, President Russell, Treasurer 
Steele, Mr. Rowland or any member of the Executive Com-
mittee? 
page 103 ~ "A. No, sir, not that I recall." 
W. H. Steele, on page 21 of his deposition, in reply 
to the inquiry as to the duties of Morriss as Purchasing Agent, 
says : "he handled the purchases for the buildings and grounds and 
repairs and renovations and books and stationery and such things, 
office supplies for the supply room ; in fact, practically everything 
except uniform equipment"; and that he (Steele) as Treasurer, 
audited, approved and paid the bills of the Academy; and that the 
goods purchased from Willson Bros., were "principally drugs, med-
icines of various kinds, paints and athletic equipment." 
Of the purchases made by the Academy to the amount, as shown 
by the evidence, of $86,822.64 during the period involved, nearly 
one-half was for paints. The residue was for drugs, medicines, 
and prescriptions for students. The larger items in the paint column 
of "W. H. Steele's Exhibit No. K," seems to have been purchases 
in connection with new buildings. All paint purchases-whether 
large or small-were made by Morriss, Purchasing Agent, and ap-
proved and paid for by Steele, Treasurer. 
The items under the column marked "Hospital'' in said exhibit 
include drugs and medicines. The column marked "athletics" cov-
ers purchases of Aethletic Goods. Dr. Phelps was Medical Officer 
for the Academy from 1919 until the session of 1934-5, when he 
resigned and was out for a year but returned. When he first took 
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the beginning, and gave me the authority, to buy what was neces-
sary for the hospital department, and told me he wanted me to deal 
with Willson Brothers. He gave as his reasons-I cannot 
page 104 ~quote his words, but the idea I had.then and have now is 
that Mr. Gilpin Willson had done so much for the Acade-
my that the Academy could not do enough for him; in fact, if it had 
not been for Mr. Willson there probably would not be an Academy; 
and I· started dealing with Willson Brothers." After William G. 
Kahle' s death he continued as before. When he found he could 
get a better price from a wholesale firm in Richmond, for supplies 
for hospital and infirmary use, he went to Mr. Willson and was 
told Willson Brothers could not meet the price named. He then 
bought from the Richmond firm. 
From the evidence, it appears that practically all supplies bought 
by the school-by Morriss, Phelps, and athletic coaches-were at a 
discount of 10% of prices to the public. This was a concession 
made to all schools in Staunton, not only by Willson Brothers, but 
by all merchants in Staunton. The allegation of the petition "that 
in a great many instances the sales of drugs, paints, athletic supplies, 
etc., sold by the defendant to the trust were at exorbitant prices 
and far exceed the retail value of the product, taking into con-
sideration its quality xxx" is not supported by the evidence. The 
sales to the Academy of all these supplies appear to have been open, 
fair,. and honest. Purchases for the Academy were made on the 
requisition of the purchasing agents to Steele, Treasurer-a member 
of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors-who ap-
proved and paid for the same, without solicitation or pressure by 
or on behalf of Willson or Willson Brothers. 
Taking these and other facts disclosed by the record into con-
sideration, I shall attempt to apply the equitable rules governing 
the dealings by a trustee with his trust, so far as they relate to the 
matters involved in the other items. 
page 105 ~ Justice Spratley, in the opinion in Rowland v. Kahle, 
recently decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals and 
now found reported in the advance sheets 6-S. E. 2d. p. 633, that 
case being an appeal from the decision of this court on the petition 
· of Kahle v. Rowland, said: 
"It is difficult to state a rule broad enough to cover all phases of 
the questions here involved. Text books, cyclopedias and the re-
ported cases are filled with varying principles applied to the special 
circumstances upon which the several questions are based. To rec-
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oncile the cases cited would result in a torture of logic. We must 
rely upon general principles of equity." 
He further said : 
"The authorities are agreed that a director of a private corpora-
tion cannot directly or indirectly, in any transaction in which he 
is under a duty to guard the interests of the corporation, acquire 
any personal advantage, or make any profit for himself, and if he 
does so, he may be compelled to account therefor to the corpora-
tion. This does not mean that he may not deal with his corpora-
. tion or sell his property to . the corporation if the transactions are 
open, fair and honest, and the corporation is represented by compe-
tent and authorized agents. The unbending rule is that the direct-
or must act in the utmost good faith, and this good faith forbids 
placing himself in a position where his individual interest clashes 
with his duty to his corporation. The purpose of the law is to se-
cure fidelity in the director. If, in violation of the general rule, 
he places himself in a position in which he may be tempted, by his 
own private interest, to disregard that of the corporation, his 
transactions are voidable at the option of the corpora-
page 106 ~tion and may be set aside without showing actual injury. 
One who is entrusted with the business of another cannot be al-
lowed to make that business an object of interest to himself." Cit-
ing Upton v. Produce Co. 147 Va. 937, and others. 
"In applying the above rules, it is necessary to keep in mind the 
distinction between the classes of cases where the director sells to 
the corporation property which is his own and which he could 
otherwise dispose of if he thought fit, and the class of cases where 
the officer makes a profit out of property belonging to his corpora-
tion. In the latter class, the director is required to refund all profits 
made, while in the former the transactions are not void, but void-
able at the option of the corporation." 
He further said : 
"In Waddy v. Grimes, 154 Va. 615 xx the majority rule is stated 
thus : 'There is a distinction to be made between transactions oc-
curring directly between a trustee and his cestui que trust, and those 
transactions in which the trustee deals with himself in respect to 
the trust estate. The latter class of transactions are voidable by 
the cestui que trust at his election without giving any reason or 
alleging any fraud, or any advantage of inadequacy of price. But 
where the trustee deals directly with the cestui que trust, the trans-
action is not ipso facto voidable at the election of the cesui que 
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trust; but only prima facie presumed to be invalid, which presump-
tion may be rebutted. 
page 107 ~ Further, he says: 
"In Virginia, we have held that, in administering the equitable 
remedies in a stockholders' suit to recover secret profits from the 
officers of a corporation, the fundamental theory upon which equity 
acts is that of restoration-of restoring the defrauded party pri-
marily and the fraudulent party as a necessary incident-to the 
position which they occupied before the fraud was committed." 
Upton v. Proditce Co. Supra (147 Va. 937; 133 S. E. 580). 
In H ecksher v. Blanton, 111 Va. 648, the court said: 
"It is not strictly true that all profits made by agents or trustees 
belong to their principals, but only such as are thereby diverted 
from, or ~ade out of, funds belonging to their principles. They 
cannot keep as their own what rightly belongs to their principals, 
but in order for such result to follow, the agency must be the prox-
imate or direct cause of the profit. The profit must be traceable 
to the agency as its efficient cause, and not as a mere incidental 
occasion. The principal cannot recover of the agent or trustee that 
to which he was at no time entitled, and could never have demand-
ed." 
In making the sales of supplies to the Academy, defendant was 
not selling to himself, neither was the partnership, of which he was 
a member selling to him. The transactions were directly with the 
corporation ( Staunton Military Academy) through its authorized 
and competent agents. • The supplies sold were the property of the 
partnership and not of the corporation. In addition, all transac-
tions appear to have been open, fair and honest. The evidence in-
troduced fails to support the indirect charge of fraud 
page 108 ~made in the petition and rebuts the claim that exorbitant 
profits were realized from said sales on the contrary the 
profits were reduced from profits ordinarily received, to the ex-
tent of 10% of the price to the public generally, which was allowed 
on alf sales. The mere fact that bids were not taken as to all sales 
-in some cases this was done both by Morris and by Dr. Phelps-
under the circumstances here is not sufficient to brand the defendant 
with dealing unfairly with his trust. The dealings here are quite 
different from the dealings between Rowland and Russell and the 
Academy in the purchase and sale of uniforms. 
The prayer for an accounting as to matters alleged in this item 
is denied. 
ITEM 7 ( Passing, for the time, Item 6) . 
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The matter for consideration relates to salary received by defend-
ant as President of the Corporation. 
A careful consideration of the evidence introduced, the several 
decrees heretofore entered by Judge Kerr in the parnet cause---cited 
below-and the actions of the Board of Directors relating to t_he 
salaries paid to the officers and directors of the Academy, discloses 
the following facts and equities upon which a just decision depends, 
as I view it. 
By its decree of November 10, 1920, entered in the parent cause, 
in the "Sixth" paragraph thereof, the court adjudged, ordered, and 
decreed as follows : 
"It appearing to the court that the executive committee of the 
Board of Directors of Staunton Military Academy con-
page 109 ~sists of Gilpin Willson, Thomas H. Russell, and William 
H. Steele, all of whom are of the testamentary trustees 
of William G. Kable, deceased, and of whom Thomas H. Russell 
and Gilpin Willson are executors, and that the said Thomas H. 
Russell and Gilpin Willson, ori account of the positions of trust 
so held by them, are embarrassed in fixing the compensation to 
be paid to the members of said Executive Committee by Staunton 
Military Academy by way of compensation for their services in 
conducting the affairs of said corporation as such Executive Com-
mittee; that the duties- of said Executive Committee are such and 
business of said Corporation is of such magniture as to require 
constant attention and service from the Executive Committee, and 
that it is proper in this cause that the court consider and determine 
the propriety of the members o.f sc,1.id Executive Committee accept-
ing compensation for their services as such, as well as the amount 
which properly they may so receive; that the said Gilpin Willson, 
Thomas H. Russell and William H. Steele, members of such Exec-
utive Committee may with propriety, receive for their service x.x 
a sum not exceeding $2500.00 each annually, to be paid by the 
Corporation so long as such services are rendered; the decree of 
the court in this respect being intended merely to determine the 
propriety of said Executive Committee directing such payment to 
its members, and the amount at which such payment shall be fixed 
for the current year, and not to prescribe what action shall be taken 
by said Executive Committee, or to limit its discretion in the con-
duct of the affairs of said Corporation. 
This salary was paid to Defendant and the other members of 
the Committee each year and that was all that was paid 
page 110 ~them---either as members of said Committee or as Di-
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rectors of the Corporation-until after the entry of the 
decree of December 4, 1930, hereafter quoted from. 
. No salary whatever was paid to anyone for services as Director 
of the Corporation until after the entry of said decree. However, 
salaries were paid to Thomas H. Russell as President, and to W. H. 
Steele, as Treasurer and Secretary of the Corporation; that to 
Russell being $5,000 annually-these are not involved here. 
The Court, by its decree of December 4, 1930, upon the petition 
of Gilpin Willson, William C. Rowland, Thomas H. Russell and 
William H. Steele, four of the five Trustees under the will of Wil--
liam G. Kahle, deceased, decreed as follows : 
"It appearing from the said petition and from certified extract 
minutes of a meeting of the Board of Directors of Staunton Mili-
tary Academy, held on November 10th, 1930 x x that the said 
Board had resolved to pay to each of the directors an annual salary 
of $1,000 so long as the annual net income of the corporation be-
fore payment of federal and state income taxes is in excess of 
$50,000 and to increase by the sum of $500.00 annually the com-
pensation paid to the chairman of the Executive Committee of Said 
Board, and it further appearing to the Court from said petition, 
as well as from the reports of audit of the accounts of said cor-
poration, that no compensation to this time has been paid, to the 
said directors, as such, their services to the· Academy, except in 
the case of the Executive Committee, having been gratuitous, the 
court is of opinion and doth adjudge, order and decree that in view 
of the financial result to the corporation of the services 
page 111 ~of said directors and of the which may be expected from 
a continuance of such· services it is proper that the com-
pensation so awarded be paid, subject to the conditions expressed in 
said resolution, although the said directors are also trustees under 
the will of William G. Kahle, dec'd." 
From Steele Exhibit No. C, found on page 110 of his deposition, 
· it appears: that acting under the provisions of the decree of Novem-
ber 10, 1920, Defendant was paid the annual sum of $2500.00 as 
member of the Executive Committee for the years 1920 to 1930, 
both inclusive. For the year 1931 following the entry of the de-
cree of December 4, 1930, he was paid $2500.00 as a member and 
$500.00 as chairman of said Committee and $1,000 as Director, 
making a total salary of $4,000.00 for that year. For the years 
1932 and 1933, all salaries were reduced because of the effects of 
the depression on the income of the Academy. For 1932, Willson 
was paid only $2862.50 and for 1935 only $2396.25 for his ser-
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vices; all years beginning July 1 and ending June 30 following. 
At the annual meeting of the stockholders held July 18, 1933, 
the death of Thomas H. Russell on May 26, 1933, was noted and 
defendant was elected President of the Corporation, and by resolu-
tion the question of his salary was ref erred to the Board of Direct-
ors and the following resolution adopted : 
"On motion it was resolved that during the ensuing year the 
directors resident in Staunton will receive no per diem fee for -at-
tending directors' meetings, this is to apply as well to 
page 112 ~meetings of the Executive Committee, but that the ex-
penses of directors elsewhere than Staunton in attending 
such meetings to be paid by the Company. and the Board of Di-
rectors, in its discretion, may provide them a per diem." 
The meeting of the Directors immediately followed this stock-
holders meeting. At that meeting, the directors fixed the salary of 
the President for fiscal year 1933-34 at $5,000.00 and that of Steele, 
as Secretary and Treasurer, at $4,800.00. Thomas H. Russell had 
been receiving as President, $10,000.00 a year. 
Willson, as President, was paid the $5,000.00 for said year but 
thereafter only $2500.00. During these years, nothing was paid 
him as member of the Executive Committee or as Director. 
If Judge Kerr thought it proper in all respects for the three mem-
bers of the Executive Committee eath be paid $2500 per year for 
the services and he did so adjudge by his decrees of November 10, 
1920, and of December 4, 1930, and, in addition, by the last named 
decree, for the reasons therein stated, ordered the additional sum 
of $500.00 to be paid the chairman of the committee, and that each 
director including the directors on said committee, should receive 
$1,000.QO per year, upon the condition named, as petitioned for by 
the Trustees; and thereafter the payment of salaries to the mem-
bers of the Committee and Board of Directors were abolished by 
the Trustees as stockholders, and the burden of carrying on the 
business of the Academy was placed upon Defendant as President, 
after the death of Russell, as was apparently done, thereby eliminat-
ing at least $7500.00 annually from the costs of running 
page 113 ~ the business; it is reasonable to believe that if the mat-
ter had been presented to the court, the court would have 
refused to ratify the action of the Board in fixing and paying the 
aforesaid salaries to defendant? Actually, the court by its decrees 
of November 10, 1920 and December 4, 1930, had authorizec.l the 
payment to defendant, as member of the Executive Committee 
$2500.00 of the $5,000.00 for the year 1933-34 and the whole of 
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the salary of $2500.00 paid for each of the years 1935, 1936 and 
1937. 
The prayer of the petition for an accounting on this item must, 
for the reasons set out above, be denied. 
ITEM 8. This involves the purchase of a number of bonds by 
the Academy out of the funds reserved for depreciation, etc. The 
petition alleges that said bonds were of a character "not contem-
plated by the statute" ( evidently Code Sec. 5431), and were "the 
own personal bonds" of defendant. However, the proof introduc-
ed shows that the bonds as to which attack is made are those ex-
ecuted by others and alleged to have been personally owned by de-
fendant and sold by him to the Academy. These bonds were paid 
for by checks of the Staunton Military Academy by W. H. Steele, 
Treasurer, payable to the order of defendant. 
These checks, in order introduced in evidence ( Steele Exhibits 
D. E. F. G. and L) are as follows: 
D-Dated December 30, 1929, marked 
"For 2 bonds" .................... ,·$ 2,000.00 
Interest........................... 34.17 $2,034.17 
E-Dated October 17, 1929, marked 
"For Commercial Credit Bonds 
Investment ....................... 10,000.00 
Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276.66 10,276.66 
F-Dated August 6, 1929, marked 
"For Bonds'' 
Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000.00 
Interest......................... 50.42 5,050.42 
page 114 ~G-Dated February 28, 1930, marked 
"For Bonds" 
Inyestments ...................... $1,000.00 
Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.87 $1,006.87 
L-Dated September 9, 1929, marked 
"For Bonds" 
Investments ...................... 10,000.00 
Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220.00 10,220.00 
Total p~r value $28,000 plus interest $588.12 ......... $28,588.12 
Check D covered two bonds; one of Seaboard Mortgage Com-
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pany for $1,00~this bond was sold by the Academy without loss 
-the other was bond of Brooklyn Post Office for $1,000. This 
last bond is still held by the Academy after a new bond at lower 
rate of interest was exchanged therefor. \i\Then purchased, the 
security therefor was a contract by the United States Government 
to-pay a certain amount of rental for a certain number of years for 
the building. Later, the Government repudiated the contract and 
bonds fell in value. The evidence does not disclose the present 
value-other than it is said to be practically worthless. 
Check E covered the purchase of $10,000.00 par value of Com-
mercial Credit Bonds. These were sold by the Academy at no loss. 
Check F was for $5,000 bonds of Maryland Mortgage National 
Title Company. Default in interest payment was made June 1, 
1933. On March 20, 1935, it was exchanged for Maryland Income 
Bond for $1250.00 and fifty shares of stock of that company. No 
income has been received since the interest period preceding the 
above named default. 
Check G covered bond of First National Company. This was 
purchased by the Academy February 28, 1930. On April 22, 1930, 
after default in interest was made, it was sold to Willson without 
loss to the Academy. 
page 115 ~ Check L covers $10,000.00 National Bond and Mort-
gage Company bonds. As shown by the audits of the 
Academy's business, 1932-:33 and 1933-34, were exchanged for 
bonds of National Consolidated Bond Corporation, same par, but 
interest rate only 2-5. 
From the foregoing, the only bond which Willson admits was 
owned by him and now held by the Academy is the Brooklyn Post 
Office bond covered in Check D. 
The last audit before me, as of June 30, 1936, shows that at 
that time the Brooklyn Post Office bond was, and is now, covered 
by "Certificate of Deposit No. 13, Postal Service Building," and 
is therein listed at net value of $1,000.00. 
Said audit shows that the Academy then held "Certificate of 
Deposit No. 218 for $10,000 Bonds, First National Company; 10% 
has been paid in liquidation." Cost $9,083.00; Reserve $9083.00; 
net value nothing. 
The same audit list Maryland Income Company bond of $1250.-
00 and $50.00 shares of stock at a net value of $1750.00, which 
were taken in lieu of $5,000.00 bonds of Maryland Mortgage Na-
tiona- Title Company. 
This leaves $16,000.00 of the $28,000.00 originally paid for by 
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checks of Willson, still held by the Academy. These now are of 
undisclosed but evidently little value. 
It is admitted by counsel for defendant in his brief, that three of 
these bonds belonged to Willson, namely Seaboard Mortgage Com-
pany ( sold without loss), Brooklyn Post Office and First National 
Company. Ownership of the others by him is denied. 
page 116 ~ As evidence, to support his denial of ownership, de-
fendant produces his bank book which shows that in 
each instance-including the three bonds admittedly belonging to 
him-on -the respective days checks were given to him by the Acad-
emy, his bank account was both debited and credited with the exact 
amount of the check. The only other evidence introduced on this 
question was the testimony of defendant and that of W. H. Steele, 
Treasurer of the Corporation. Steele, who testified on behalf of 
petitioner, produced and filed the checks. Willson does not, tn his 
testimony, definitely deny ownership but relies on the bank record 
and asserts that according to his recollection he never owned them. 
Neither does Steele say defendant owned them, but says that ·de-
fendant was paid for them because the checks were drawn payable 
to his order. 
Willson testified that he never made a profit on any of these 
bonds and this seems to be conclusively established by the evidence 
furnished by said bank book. 
Counsel for petitioner contends that since the bank book shows. 
like debits and credits on the days the admittedly owned bonds 
were sold to the Academy, the reasonable assumption is that all 
the other bonds were personally owned by him, and · because said 
checks were payable to defendant, the burden is on him to overcome 
that "assumption," which he claims has not been done, and that 
"when a truetee deals with his trust, the burden is upon him to 
show a state of facts which will relieve him of liability." 
It is true that when Willson delivered said bonds to the Acad-
emy and took check therefor, payable to his order, this trans-
action, standing alone, raised the prima facie presump-. 
page 117 ~tion that the bonds sold personally belonged to him; but 
when considered along with the fact that the same day 
the checks were delivered to and · deposited in the bank by him 
checks for exactly the same amounts were charged on his bank ac-
count; and the further fact that, as testified to by him and shown 
by these items of debits and credits, he never made a cent of profit 
on the transaction, this presumption is ove.rcome and the burden 
shifts to Petitioner to prove by other evidence that the bonds were 
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personally owned by defendant and sold by him to the Academy. 
No such evidence has been introduced. It is only because of ad-
mission of defendant that ownership of the Brooklyn Post Office 
is placed in him . 
. But whether he personally owned said bonds or not-that is, 
they were promarily bought for himself and then resold to the 
Academy-it is clear, from the evidence that he made not a cent 
from the transaction and that such o~nership was merely transi-
tory. 
That the bonds purchased from time to time by the Academy, 
out of the surplus and reserve funds, were generally considered 
sound and reasonably safe investments is made apparent by an 
inspection of the annual audits of the corporate books and accounts 
by certified public accountants. No reserve against loss on any of 
them was set up until the end of the fiscal year 1932-33 and then 
none was charged against the Brooklyn Post Office bond. The 
Post Office bond stands thus till after the 1936 audit. 
page 118} Therefore, while said bonds may not fall within the 
class of securities designated in Code Section 5431, in 
which Trustees may invest trust funds without liability, they should 
be classed as investments which a reasonable man would make. See 
Koteen v. Bickers, 143 Va. 676, where held that the provisions of 
said statute are not mandatory. 
. For the above reasons, the prayer for an accounting by defendant 
for loss on any of the bonds included in this Item is denied. 
ITEM 9. The A. T. Cooksey note. 
This note, dated October 1, 1936, due 60 days therefrom, for 
$200.00 is a renewal of a note for the same amount dated May 19, 
1936, which, from the evidence, must have been a renewal of a 
note for $225.00 given back in 1934. In the beginning, this note 
represented advancements against salary by Steele, Treasurer, out 
of "petty cash'' to Cooksey who was an instructor in the school. 
The note of May 19, 1936 (Steele Ex. N) has on its face "O. K. 
G. W.," which it appears was intended by Willson, as President of 
the Academy to authorize Steele to hold the note and release to 
Cooksey salary checks which he was withholding against said note. 
Up to this time, it would appear that Steele, Treasurer, was respon-
sible to the Academy for the amount of the note not paid by Cook-
sey. Wilson's direction (See Steele Ex. W) to extend the payment, 
and its subsequent renewal as a further indulgence, made Willson 
responsible for the payment of the debt, and he must be required 
to account for the balance due thereon. 
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page 119 ~ ITEM 10. This relates to the $50,000.00 insurance 
policy on the life of Thomas H. Russell who died in 
1933-$40,000.00 for the benefit of the Academy and $10,000.00 
for the benefit of Mrs. Thomas H. Russell-on which the entire 
premium were paid by the Academy. 
The Petition charges "that this action was nothing short of a 
gift to Mrs. Russell of the trust property which the defendant was 
charged with preserving." The petition contains no prayer for any 
specific relief in connection with this Item, but does contain the 
following: 
"That the said Gilpin Willson, Sr. x x be required to account in 
this cause for all profits or emoluments x x as well as to make good 
the losses sustained by reason of his improper transactions there-
with upon the several items hereinbefore set out." 
This prayer seems sufficient to cover any loss sustained by the 
Academy, or the beneficiaries of the trust created under the will of 
William G. Kahle, resulting from this transaction. 
This insurance was ordered by the Executive Committee at its 
meeting of .September 27, 1920, as shown by the following min-
utes: 
"There were present T. H. Russell, Gilpin Willson and W. H. 
Steele. xx The object of the meeting was to decide the question of 
insuring the life of the President in favor of the Academy. 
Mrs. Kahle, being the principal beneficiary, and having express-
ed the wish that such insurance be carried, she also being the guar-
dian of her children, it was ordered that a policy of 
page 120~$50,000.00 be written. The matter of the kind of in-
surance to be written was considered that an investment 
policy would be the best as it constituted a sinking fund in addition 
to the protection on the life of the President. 
By Mrs. Kable's request also, it was ordered that 20% of the 
face value of the policy be made in favor of Mrs. T. H. Russell, 
wife of the President." 
There is nothing in the evidence to indicate the amount of the 
premiums paid nor what the face value of the policy was at the 
death of the insured. 
Counsel for Petitioner conceded, in his brief, that in placing in-
surance on the life of Russell, President of the Corporation, and 
paying the premiums to keep it in force, the Corporation was with-
in its powers; so far as it relates to that portion of the policy which 
was for the benefit of the Academy, but contends that "trustees, 
or those that attended the Executive Committee meeting, di~sipat-
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eel funds of the Academy to the extent of 20% of the policy, by 
making Mrs. Russell its beneficiary for that amount." He later 
modified this claim by saying "Before an accounting can prope!·ly 
be had, the court must first determine whether the measure of lia-
bility is 20% of the premium paid, plus interest, or 20% of the 
face amount, with interest from the date of Russell's death. 
On the other hand, counsel for defendant contends that "Even 
if the action were ultra vires, the contract has been fully perform-
ed and the Academy enriched to the extent of $40,000.00. Under 
what principle can a court of equity rip open the contract 
page 121 ~as void; can the Academy, or any person having any in-
terest in the corporate property for it, recover back pre-
miums it has paid without its returning the $40,000? Can the 
Academy call on Mrs. Russell to pay the $10,000 received by her? 
No court could lend its aid to such an unconscionable thing." 
And further quoting him "For even a clearly ultra vires act the 
directors can be held liable only where loss ensues to the company. 
3 Cook, Corporations, Sec. 682, p. 2255. Certainly they cannot be 
required to pay the costs of an ultra vires bargain which has en-
riched the corporation. 
He claims as follows: 
" ( 1) The amended petition prays no relief as to the transaction. 
"(2) The evidence does not show what the policy cost the com-
pany, or even give a hint as to the amount. 
" ( 3) The Corporation, or the remotely interested equitable own-
er of a minority of its share, who can sue only through the corpora-
tion and for its benefits has no conceivable claim in view of its 
receipt of $40,000 under the insurance contract. 
" ( 4) The petitioner does not offer to, and cannot, restore the 
$40,000 received by the corporation xx nor does Staunton Military 
Academy make such offer x x. 
" ( 5) The contract of insurance was fully performed; Staunton 
Military Academy gained $40,000.00, the petitioners' guardian re-
quested and approved the act, the stockholders, with the minutes of 
the Executive Committee before them, approved them; and the 
Academy and the petitioner are es topped." 
page 122 ~ As to ground ( 1), I think the prayer is sufficient. As 
to ( 2), I think the lack of evidence as to what the policy 
cost the company does not def eat recovery if liability exists. That 
can be determined by an accounting, if ordered. Grounds ( 3) and 
( 4) may be sufficient to prevent recovery against defendant, if the 
purpo~e of this proceeding was to rescind the entire contract and 
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require an accounting for the premiums paid on the whole of the 
policy. 
That, however, is not the case. Petitioner is asking the court to 
require def end ant to account for the loss resulting to the Academy 
from the action of the Executive Committee in making the wife 
of the insured a co-beneficiary to the extent of 20% of the face 
value of the policy-the Academy being beneficiary of 80% there-
of-on which the Academy paid the entire premiums, claiming that 
such loss is to be measured either by the amount paid to Mrs. Rus-
sell, as beneficiary, or by the amount of the premiums paid on 
$10,000.00 of the $50,000 for which the policy was issued-an act 
or acts which they were without power to perform. 
The transaction appears to me to be as though the policy was 
only for $10,000.00, all for the benefit of Mrs. E.ussell and the pre-
miums all paid by the Academy. Can it be held that such a trans-
action would be a valid use of the trust funds, or in any way with-
in the general purpose of the corporation? The answer must be 
in the negative; at least unless it can be shown that thereby some 
benefit or financial gain would result to the corporation and that 
no loss was suffered by it by such action. 
page 123 ~ In the case at bar, there is no evidence introduced to 
show what, if any, benefit or gain was even expected to 
result from the transaction. On the contrary, the very nature of 
the transaction shows that the corporation was bound to lose to the 
extent of 20% of the premiums paid. 
This is the situation, as I see it, and since the directors of a cor-
poration. are jointly and severally liable for losses caused by their 
ultra vires act (19 C. J. S. p. 114 and Rowland v. Kahle, supra) 
defendant must be held liable to account to the Academy for the 
loss· sustained, as set forth, with simple interest from the date 9£ 
each payment of premium, notwithstanding Mrs. Kahle (White-
head) one of the beneficiaries of the trust operated by the corpora-
tion-not only approved but requested the policy as written. I am 
unable to see how her acts can operate. as an estoppe~ against Pe-
titioner who, as one of the beneficiary stockholders, is suing on be-
half of the Corporation. The fact that she was guardian for Pe-
titioner and her other infant children affords no ground of excuse 
fas waste of the trust assets, and ratified the transaction. It only 
furnishes an additional reason why she should not have participat-
ed in the action which brought about the loss. 
ITEM 6. Charges as to Rowland-Russell transactions, recent-
ly passed upon by the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
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It is unnecessary to set forth in this opinion, in detail, the facts 
relating to transaction upon which Petitioner bases the right to re-
cover from defendant for the breach of trust committed 
page 124~by W. C. Rowland in his and Thomas H. Russell's deal-
ing in connection with the sale of uni forms to the Staun-
ton Military Academy. These appear from the record in the orig-
inal cause and the record of the cause of William H. Kahle et al vs. 
William C. Rowland on Petition filed in the original suit, which 
has now been adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Appeals; and 
the deposition of Willson taken in this cause (pp 342 etc and 379). 
To the introduction of the record in the Rowland case, defendant 
objected to on the ground that it is incompetent and irrelevant and 
that Willson was not a party thereto. 
I do not think this objection is well taken~ under the peculiar cir-
cmnstances of this case. Defendant is asked to be held liable for 
a breach of trust committed by one of his co-trustees, Rowland, on 
the ground that defendant knew and approved of the acts which 
constituted the breach and permitted them to be done without pro-
test or effort to prevent. The record was introduced as evidence 
to prove the adjudicated fact that this breach of trust being ad-
ministered in the parent cause had been committed by Rowland. 
The record seems admissible for that purpose, even though defend-
ant was not a party to the proceedings establishing that fact. He 
was, however, a party to the original suit, wherein that petition was 
filed and litigated and wherein the question here is being heard. 
Clemens v. Ray, 6 Leigh is an authority on this. 
Neither do I think the objection to the introduction of the depo-
sitions taken in the Rowland case is well founded, for the above 
reasons, as well as because Willson's statements there, 
page 125 ~relating to the subject matter here involved, were admis-
sions against interest. ( N avh v. Yell ow Poplar Co. 109 
Va. 18; 22 C. J. page 341-2). However,' whether these deposi-
tions are admitted, or not, is of little importance, since his testi-
mony in this case is practically the same as that given in the dep-
ositions offered. 
The evidence in the instant case, including defendant's testi-
mony, definitely shows that Willson knew from the beginning all 
about the agreement between Rowland and Russell relating to the 
sales of uniforms to the school, by Rowland, and that he acquiesc-
ed in· and approved the actions by the parties to the agreement. 
These transactions have been adjudicated by the highest court of 
this State in Rowland v. Kahle, and there held to have been wrong-
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ful acts by Rowland-breaches of his trust relations extending over 
a period of twelve years and not disclosed to any of the other par-
ties interested or concerned, excepting defendant. 
Apparently, defendant did not realize any pecuniary gain out of 
these transactions. vVhy he approved and acquiesced, in and by 
his silence, and failure to advise the Board of Directors and his co-
trustees of the facts, is perplexing, even though he thought "it was 
good business," unless it be that he felt, as Russell did, that Rus-
sell had not been fairly dealt with by William G. Kahle in his will; 
and because of such belief, and of his friendship for Russell, justi-
fied his acts in consenting to the continuation of the dealings be-
tween Russell and Rowland, as authorized by Kahle in his lifetime, 
notwithstanding by so doing, he was recreant to his trust 
page 126 ~obligation in that by his silence and inaction Rowland and 
T. H. Russell were enabled to reap private profits from 
transactions. 
See First and Merchants, etc. v. Bank of Waverly, 170 Va. 496, 
where the court approved the rule that a trustee is liable for a 
breach of trust of a co-trustee, if he approves or acquiesces in or 
conceals a breach of trust committed by his co-trustee, and/ or if 
he neglects to take proper steps to compel his co-trustee to redress 
a breach of trust. . 
Under this authority, and the circumstances and facts as dis-
closed by the evidence, I am constrained to hold that defendant 
must be held liable for the amount which Rowland is found due and 
owing to the Academy, as prayed for in the petition, but with the 
right of defendant to combat the amount for which he may be 
held liable. 
Having found the defendant, Willson, recreant to his trust, it 
follows that he must be removed as trustee under the will of Wil-
liam G. Kahle. 
3/30, 1940. 
page 127~ 
H. W. BERTRAM 
Judge Designate 
DECREE OF MAY 18, 1940. 
This cause~ which was argued orally by counsel and submitted 
for decision on October 25, 1939, written arguments being filed 
thereafter on December 2, 1939, pursuant to such submission, came 
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on this day to be heard upon the petition of William G. Kahle, II, 
describing himself as suing for his own benefit, for the use and 
benefit of his co-beneficiaries under the will of William .G. Kahle, 
dec'd., and also for the use and benefit of Staunton Military Aca-
demy, a corporation, filed with leave of court on June 25, 1939, in 
the chancery cause pending in said court under the short style of 
William G. Kable's Exors. vs. William G. Kable's Trustees, et al., 
upon process thereon against the sole defendant, Gilpin Willson, 
returned duly executed, upon the answer and exhibits of the said 
defendant filed at rules, upon the depositions on behalf of the peti-
tioner of S. D. Timberlake, Jr., William H. Steele, W. S. Morriss, 
E. S. Bumgardner, Gilpin Willson, Jr., and Gilpin Willson, and 
the exhibits filed with and as a part of the respective depositions, 
upon the depositions for the defendant of William G. Kahle, II, 
Gilpin Willson and W. M. Phelps, and upon thirteen several reports 
of audits of Staunton Military Academy by Stockwell, Wilson 
& Linvill and by Wilson, Linvill & Parry, respectively, certified 
public accountants, introduced in evidence by the defendant, being 
reports of audits for each successive fiscal year from 1920 to 1936, 
inclusive; upon the amended petition of said William G. 
page 128 ~ Kahle, II, filed against said Gilpin Willson, defendant, 
in the office of the Clerk of this Court on August 16, 
1938, upon process thereon returnable to 1st September Rules, 
1938, upon the defendant's plea in abatement thereto filed at said 
rules, on the ground that the said petition was filed without pre-
vious leave of court, which plea on September 24, 1938, was over-
ruled and stricken out; upon the defendant's demurrer to the said 
amended petition filed with leave of court on October 8, 1939, and 
the petitioner's joinder therein, which demurrer was overruled by 
the court on January 28, 1939, with leave to the defendant . to 
plead or answer within thirty days upon three several pleas and 
the answer, with certain exhibits, including the will of William G. 
Kahle, dec'd., of ·said defendant filed on February 9, 1939, to the 
first and second of which pleas the petitioner replied nul tiel re-
cord and the defendant rejoined, and upon each of which said two 
pleas on April 20, 1939, there was a judgment for said defendant; 
and the third of said pleas in substance that the defendant was not 
guilty of negligence concerning the transactions of William C. 
Rowland, wherefore he should not be charged, as in said plea more 
fully appears, on petitioner's motion was stricken out on April 20, 
1939, as by the record herein appears, upon the general replication 
of the petitioner to said answer; upon the further deposition for 
the petitioner of T. G. Russell and a further deposition of Wii-
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liam H. Steele and the exhibits therewith; upon certain deposi-
tions of Gilpin Willson exhibited and offered in evidence by the 
petitioner taken on March 9, April 26, and May 5, 1937, 
page 129~in a certain cause pending in this court of William H. 
Kahle, Eleanor Kahle Miller and Staunton M;ilitary Aca-
demy, complainants, vs. William C. Rowland, defendant, and the 
defendant's objection to the admissibility of the same in evidence 
on the grounds that the same are and each of them is incompetent 
and irrelevant; and upon the printed record exhibited and offered 
in evidence by the petitioner of a certain cam~e then ( that is, on 
September 28, 1930 ) pending in the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia under the short style of William C. Rowland v. Will-
iam H. Kahle, et als., being Record No. 2117, and upon the defend-
ant's objection to the admissibility thereof in evidence upon the 
grounds that the same was incompetent· and irrelevent and that 
the defendant Willson is not and was not a party to the said peti-
tion of William H. Kahle, Eleanor Kahle Miller and Staunton 
Military Academy, complainants, v. William C. Rowland, defend-
ant; and upon the papers formerly read and proceedings formerly 
had, and was argued by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, for reasons stated in writing filed 
on April' 3, 1940, and a supplemental memorandum for the decree 
to be entered, filed May 13, 1940, in the office of the Clerk of this 
Court, and now made a part of the record, the Court doth adjudge, 
order and decree : 
FIRST: That the said defendant, Gilpin Willson, was in no 
manner whatever connected with or interested in the W. J. Perry 
Corporation, the McClure Company and Woodward's Cleaning 
& Dyeing Works, Inc., or any of them, that the charges 
page 130~of the original and amended petitions against the said 
Gilpin Willson with reference thereto, or any of them, 
are not true and that the petitioner's prayer in that connection be 
and it is denied. 
SECOND: That any and all purchases of drugs, paints and 
merchandise by Staunton Militar yAcademy from Willson Bros., 
a partnership doing business in the City of Staunton, in which 
until about 1925 the said Gilpin Willson owned a one-half interest 
and thereafter a one-fourth interest, were made by Staunton Mili-
tary Academy through its authorized and competent agents, inde-
pendently of said Gilpin Willson; that such purchases and sales 
were open, fair and honest, and without solicitation or pressure 
by or on behalf of Gilpin Willson or said partnership or any per-
son for them; that such sales were not made at exorbitant · prices, 
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but at prices 10% less than ordinary received from the general 
public by reason of a discount to Staunton Military Academy, as 
well as to other schools; that the charges of said petition as to such 
sales and purchases and such dealings are unsupported by the evi-
dence and untrue; and that the petitioner's prayer in that connec-
tion be and it is denied. 
THIRD: That the salary of $5,000 paid by said Staunton Mili-
tary Academy to Gilpin Willson as its President for the fiscal year 
1933-34 and of $2,500 as its President for each of the fiscal years 
1934-35, 1935-36, and 1936-37 were reasonable in amount and it:s 
payment was proper, wherefore the prayer of the petition for an 
accounting therefore is denied. 
page 131 ~ FOURTH: That the investments of said Staunton 
Military Academy in various bonds were such as a 
reasonably prudent man would make, that the bonds in which in-
vestments were made were generally considered sound and reas-
onably safe, that said Gilpin Willson made no profit whatever of 
any kind upon the purchase or sale of said bonds by said Staunton 
Military Academy, that the defendant, Willson is not liable to the 
Academy for any loss, if such there be, sustained on account of 
any of said bonds, and the petitioner's prayer in that respect is 
denied. 
FIFTH: That from the audit of certified public accountants 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1934, W. H. Steele, Treasurer, 
had in his petty cash account a personal check for $225.00 of 
A. T. Cooksey, an instructor, dated June 19, 1934, evidencing an 
advancement by Steele to Cooksey; from the audit for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1935, said Treasurer held in his petty cash 
account a note of said A. T. Cooksey, instructor, for $225., dated 
June 19, 1934, in substitution for said check, as to which the audit-
ors suggested that in the future no accommodations be made ex-
cept upon the written approval of the President; and from the 
audit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, a renewal of said 
A. T. Cooksey's said note for $200., dated May 19, 1936, due 
September 1, 1936, was in the same account ; that said renewal note, 
dated May 19, 1936, had on its face, written by said Gil-
page 132 ~pin Willson as President, "O. K. G. W," which appears 
to authorize the said Treasurer to hold the note and re-
lease to Cooksey certain salary checks which at that time said 
Steele testified were being withheld by said Steele, Treasurer; 
and that with said renewal note was exhibited a letter from said 
A. T. Cooksey to said Willson in which Cooksey asked for an 
extension, saying that very shortly a child would be born to his 
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wife, necessitating a hospital bill which "would take all that he 
had been able to scrape together" ; that thereafter the said Cook-
sey paid on account of said note the sum of $50., leaving a bal-
ance owing of $150., and it does not appear from the evidence 
what steps, if any, Staunton Military Academy has taken to col-
lect said n9te; and accordingly that the said Willson's aforesaid 
direction as President to extend the payment of said note made 
the said Willson responsible for its payment, and the same shall 
be paid by him. · 
SIXTH: '.That on September 27, 1920, the executive committee 
of the board of directors of Staunton Military Academy resolved 
that a policy of $50,000, of insurance on the life of Thomas H. 
Russell be taken out and at the request of Mrs. Eleanor E. Kahle 
( now Whitehead) then made, it was ordered by said executive 
committee-defendant being present and approving-that 20% of 
the face value of said policy be in favor of Mrs. Margaret K. 
Russell, wife of the President of Staunton Military Academy; that 
said policy was taken out so payable, and that the Staunton Mili-
tary Academy paid the premiums therefor, the amount 
page 133 ~of such premiums not being shown in evidence; that 
Thomas H. Russell died in May, 1933, and the insurer 
paid upon said policy, $40,000 thereof to Staunton Military Aca-
demy and $10,000 thereof to Mrs. Margaret K. Russell; that the 
absence of evidence of the amount of premiums the Academy im-
properly paid for said policy does not def eat recovery against Will-
son for the premiums actually so paid; that the directors of said 
corporation are jointly and severally liable for losses caused by 
their acts done beyond the power of the corporation; that in so 
far as said policy was made for the benefit of Mrs. Russell, the 
action of the executive committee was beyond the powers of the 
corporation; that the fact that Mrs. Eleanor E. Kahle (Whitehead) 
was one of the beneficiaries of the trust created by William G. 
Kable's will and guardian of petitioner, and not only approved but 
requested the policy as written, affords no excuse for waste of the 
trust assets; that Staunton Military Academy or the petitioner is 
not required to repay the $40,000 received by said Academy under 
said policy as a pre-requisite to having the taking out of said policy 
held void and an unauthorized act so far as concerns that part of 
the policy payable to Mrs. Russell; and that accordingly the said 
Gilpin Willson be and he is required to repay to the Staunton Mili-
tary Academy such part of the premiums paid for said policy as 
is proportionate to the part of the proceeds thereof paid to Mrs. 
Margaret K. Russell, wife of Thomas H. Russell, dec'd., with in-
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terest on each· such expenditure at. the rate of 6% annually. 
page 134 ~ Seventh: That the said depositions of Gilpin Willson 
given in the cause of William H. Kahle, et als., v. Will-
iam C. Rowland, offered in evidence by the plaintiff to the intro-
duction of which as evidence the defendant objected on the ground 
that the same was incompetent and irrelevant and that \i\Tillson was 
not a party .to said cause, are admissible in evidence, and the ob-
jections of said Willson to the introduction thereof be and they 
are overruled ; 
Eighth: That the said printed record of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, No. 2117, in the cause of William C. Rowland 
v. William H. Kahle, et als., offered in evidence by the petitioner, 
to the introduction of which as evidence the defendant Willson 
objected on the grounds that the same was incompetent and irreve-
lant and that he was and is not a party to said cause, is admissible 
evidence, and that the said objections of Gilpin Willson be and 
they are overruled; 
Ninth: That . the defendant, Gilpin Willson, was recreant to 
his trust in acquiescing in such dealings of William C. Rowland 
with Thomas H. Russell and the Staunton Military Academy; 
wherefore it follows that he must be and is hereby removed as 
trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, dee' d ; 
Tenth: That William C. Rowland, formerly a director of 
Staunton Military Academy, Inc., and formerly one of the trustees 
under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, has been adjudicated 
as being liable to account to Staunton Military Academy, 
page 135 ~Inc., for a sum equal to 6% of the gross price of goods 
sold by him to said Corporation, which 6% was paid by 
him to Thomas H. Russell his co-fiduciary, for the purpose of 
influencing the action and conduct of the said Thomas H. Rus-
sell in respect to the p·urchase by and on behalf of the said Cor-
poration from the said Rowland, and not for the purpose of com-
pensating the said Russell for. not proper and legitimate services 
rendered to the said Rowland; and also that the said Rowland 
was liable to account to the said Corporation for all profits made 
by him from the sale of goods to Staunton Military Academy, 
Inc., which were in excess of the fair market value of said goods, 
the fair market value being adjudged to be the cost of the goods 
to Rowland, including all necessary and proper handling and de-
livery charges, and the usual percentage of profit prevailing among 
the trade, from which profits so ascertained there was to be de-
ducted the commissions hereinbefore mentioned, paid to Thomas 
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H. Russell with simple interest upon such profits; and it further 
appearing to the Court that the defendant, Gilpin Willson, knew 
of the afore mentioned arrangement existing between Rowland 
and Russell, each of whom were his co-fiduciaries and negligent-
ly and improperly approved and acquiesced in the continuance of 
such arrangement, and negligently and improperly concealed Row-
land's and Russell's breach of trust from his remaining co-trus-
tees and negligently and improperly failed to take proper steps 
to compel his co-trustees, aforesaid, to redress their breach 
of trust, and that by reason thereof, Gilpin Willson, the de-
fendant, herein is equally and jointly and severally 
page 136~liable with the said William C. Rowland for the said 
Rowland's wrongful and fraudulent breach of his fiduc-
iary duty. · 
Eleventh: And it appearing to the Court that it will be necessary 
to refer this cause to one of the Master Commissioners of this 
Court for the purpose of ascertaining the liability of said defendant 
on the note of A. T. Cooksey hereinbefore mentioned, and for the 
premiums paid to maintain in force the policy of insurance here-
inbefore set out and for ascertaining the full and exact amount of 
commissions paid to Thomas H. Russell by William C. Rowland, 
and of the profits made by said Rowland on his sale of goods to 
Staunton Military Academy, Inc., it is further adjudged, ordered 
and decreed that this cause stand referred to one of the Master 
Commissioners of this Court, whose duty it shall be to take, state 
and report the following accounts : 
1. An account showing the balance due on the note of A. T. 
Cooksey, dated May 19, 1936, and held by Staunton Military Aca-
demy, Inc., together with interest thereon. 
·2. An account showing 20% of the premiums paid by Staunton 
Military Academy, Inc., to maintain in force a policy of insurance 
upon the life of Thomas H. Russell, herein referred to, with simple 
intrests from the date of each payment of such premium, the 20% 
of said premium and interest thereon to be set· up in separate 
columns. 
3. An account showing the full and correct amount of com-
missions paid by William C. Rowland of William C. Rowland, 
Inc., to Thomas H. Russell during the period from 
page 137Huly 5, 1920 to May 26, 1933, the period for which the 
said Rowland has been adj~dged to be liable to account, 
with interest on each of such payments from the time they were 
respectively made; the principal of such commissions and the in-
terest thereon to be set up in separate columns. 
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4. An account showing the full and correct amount of the re-
coverable profits made by, William C. Rowland or his Corporation 
aforesaid, by reason of his transactions with Staunton Military 
Academy, Inc., during the period above mentioned, the principal 
thereof, and interest thereon, as hereinafter set out, to be set up 
in separate columns. 
5. An account showing any other matters deemed pertinent by 
the said Master Commissioner or requi reel to be specifically stated 
by any party in interest. 
In making up the account showing the amount of commissions 
paid by Rowland or his Corporation to Russell during each year 
of the period above mentioned, the Master Commissioner shall 
make this ascertainment by taking the total amount paid each year 
by the Staunton Military Academy, Inc., to William C. Rowland 
or William C. Rowland, Inc., for goods sold by him or it to Staun-
ton Military Academy, Inc., during that year, and six per cent of 
that amount shall be taken to represent the commission so paid to 
Russell during each year. The Commissioner shall then proceed 
to compute interest upon each of said commission items and the 
aggregate of the said commission payments, with interest thereon 
computed as above directed will be the amount for which the de-
fendant is liable, as to this item. 
page 138 ~ In ascertaining the profits, if any, over and above the 
commissions paid Russell, made by William C. Rowland 
and for which the defendant is jointly and severally liable, the 
Commissioner will first ascertain the price paid each year by Staun-
ton Military Academy, Inc., for goods sold to it during that year 
by Rowland or his corporation. The Commissioner will next as-
certain the fair market value of the goods sold during that year 
and deduct the amount of such fair market value from that total 
price paid by the Academy. The balance will then represent the 
entire amount of profit so made by Rowland from the sale of goods 
to the School during that year. From this balance the Commis-
sioner will then deduct the amount of commissions paid to Russell 
on sales for that year, and the remainder will then be taken to re-
present the amount of profits for which Rowland is liable to 
account for that particular year, and for which the defendant, Gil-
pin Willson, is equally liable. Simple interests on such profits 
shall be allowed. The burden of proof throughout shall rest upon 
the defendant, and he may be required to establish the usual per-
centage of profit prevailing among the trade; and the Commissioner 
may take the cost of the goods to Rowland and by adding thereto 
such usual percentage of profit prevailing in the trade, ascertain 
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the price at which Rowland should have sold his goods to the 
Academy, and the difference between such price and the price· at 
which he actually sold to the Academy shall be taken to represent 
the amount of profits derived by Rowland as to this item, and· for 
which he is liable to account, and for which the defendant, Gilpin 
Willson is equally and jointly and severally liable. 
page 139 ~ When the Commissioner has ascertained the aggre-
ate amount of principal and interest of the item requir-
ed under headings One, Two and Three herein, and which re-
late to the. Cooksey note, the insurance upon Russell's life and the 
commissions paid by Rowland to Russell, he shall forthwith report 
the same to the Court without awaiting his findings with reference 
to the liability for for the profits made on the sale of goods to the 
Academy by Rowland. 
But before proceeding to execute this decree, the said Master 
Commissioner shall give 10 days notice of the time and place of 
his primary appointment, by written notice to the parties or their 
counsel of record in this cause. And it appearing to the Court that 
a decree of reference similar to the reference herein directed, in 
so far as the same relates to profits made by Rowland from his deal-
ings with the Academy, on another petition filed in this cause 
against said William C. Rowland, is now before C. Franklin Will-
iamson, one of the Master Commissioners of this Court, for exe-
cution, but that no evidence respecting such inquiry has yet been 
introduced, it is ordered that the portion of this reference relating 
to such profits, be, and the same is hereby consolidated with the 
decree of reference as the same relates to William C. Rowland, upon 
the said Master Commissioner giving notice to the parties herein 
or their counsel of record, of his appointments for the taking of 
testimony therein, and the defendant, Gilpin Willson, shall be 
bound by the rules of accounting provided for by decree this 
Court entered on the Rowland petition on August 23, 
page 140~1938, except so far as the same may be modified herein, 
as the same relates to the accounting of profits made by 
the said William C. Rowland. 
At the instance of the defendant, Gilpin Willson, who desires 
to present to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia his petition 
for an appeal from and supersedeas to this decree, the execution of 
this decree is suspended for ninety days from the date of its entry 
and thereafter until said petition is acted on by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals, if such petition is actually filed within the specified 
time, when the said Gilpin Willson, or some one for him, shall 
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give or file a bond in the Clerk's Office of this Court, with surety 
to be approved by the Clerk thereof, in the penalty of $5000, con-
ditionned as and with the provisions set forth in Sec. 6338 of the 
Code of Virginia. 
ENTER H. W. BERTRAM 
Judge designate. 
page 141 ~IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 
OF VIRGINIA 
June 9, 1941 
WILLSON 
v. 
KABLE, et al 
Appeal from Corporation Court of Staunton, H. W. Bertram, 
Judge. 
Petition by William G. Kahle, II, fo,r the removal of Gilpin Will-
son, Sr., as a testamentary trustee. From an adverse decree, Will-
son ·appeals. 
Reversed and rendered. 
Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, HUDGINS, 
GREGORY, BROWNING and SPRATLEY, J. J. 
J. M. Perry, of Staunton, and R. Gray Williams and J. Sloan 
Kuykendall, both of Winchester, for appellant. 
Joseph I. Nachman, of Staunton, for appellees. 
GREGORY, Justice. 
The entire capital stock of the Staunton Military Academy was 
owned by Captain William H. Kahle. He acquired it in 1894 and 
operated this military school for young men until his ·death in 1912, 
when his son, William G. Kahle became the sole owner of the 
stock of the corporation. He operated the school until his death 
in 1920. 
In 1904 Thomas H. Russell, a man of experience in· military 
schools became headmaster of the Staunton Military Academy, 
and continued with the school until his death in 1933. 
page 142 ~In 1910 he married Margaret H. Kahle, a sister of Wil-
liam G. Kahle. She survives him. 
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widow, who has since married Dr. Lawther Whitehead, and three 
children: Eleanor H. Kahle, who became twenty-one years of age 
June 4, 1933, and who has married one Miller; William H. Kahle, 
who became twenty-one years old on July 10, 1932, and who has 
changed his name to William G. Kahle, II; and Helene H. Kahle, 
who became twenty-one years old August 19, 1935. 
William C. Rowland, of Philadelphia, was a manufacturer of 
military uniforms and a warm friend of the Kables. He sold to 
the school the unifor111s needed. 
Gilpin Willson, Sr., a resident of Staunton, was also a friend of 
the Kables. He was connected with the school from 1894 in the 
capacity of director and remained in that capacity until his resig-
nation in 1937. He served as president from 1933 until 1937. He 
was a business man and operated a drug store in Staunton with his 
brother. He was also vice-president of Staunton's largest bank. 
At the time of the death of William G. Kahle, on June 4, 1920, 
he owned the entire capital stock of the corporation. He le£ t a will 
and bequeathed the entire stock to five trustees. They were his 
widow, Eleanor, Thomas H. Russell, Gilpin Willson, William C. 
Rowland and W. H. Steele, and their successors. The stock was to 
be held by the trustees for the benefit of the widow and children. 
These trustees were directed to continue the school and 
page 143 ~for that purpose to vote the stock. They were authorized 
to elect themselves as officers and directors of the cor-
poration and to employ Thomas Russell as principal of the school 
as long as he lived at a salary of not more than $10,000 a year. 
The trustees were each to receive $200 a year for their services. 
The net income from the school was to go to the widow during 
her life, or until one or more of the children attained the age of 
twenty-one years, upon which event such child would receive a 
one-ninth part of the income. Upon the death of the widow, the 
trustees were to hold the estate for the benefit of the testator's 
children until the males became twenty-five years of age or the 
females became twenty-two years of age. At that time the estate 
was to be turned over to the children. The widow, now Mrs. White-
head, still survives, and therefore the trust continues. 
The widow was given the power to nominate trustees in case one 
or more of them died or removed from the State. 
The testator appointed Thomas H. Russell, Gilpin Willson, and 
William C. Rowland as his executors. They have long since settled 
their accounts as executors after satisfactorily administering the 
estate. 
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A short time after the will was probated Gilpin Willson, Thomas 
H. Russell, T. G. Russell (a brother) W. H. Steele and W. C. 
Rowland were elected directors of the corporation. Thom-
page 144 ~as Russell was elected President. Willson, vice-president, 
and Steele treasurer. An executive committee of Will-
son, Thomas Russell, and Steele was named to conduct the affairs 
of the school between meetings of the board. 
In 1923 Mrs. Kahle was elected director in the place of T. G. 
Russell. Dr. Whitehead, whom Mrs. Kahle had married in 1927, 
was elected a director in 1933. He served one year and declined 
re-election. William A. Pratt was elected in his place. Steele was 
not re-elected dit:ector in 1936, but was re-elected in 1937. 
William A. Pratt had also been appointed a trustee succeeding 
Thomas Russell, who died in 1933. Upon Pratt's death in 1937, 
Mrs. Whitehead nominated S. D. Timberlake, Jr., in his place. 
In 1920 the executors instituted a friendly suit against the trus-
tees in order to obtain the aid of the court in the administration of 
the estate. The purpose of the suit, insofar as the executors were 
concerned, had ended, but the cause was retained on the docket. 
In 1920, at the death of Kahle, the financial affairs of the school 
were in poor condition. The corporation owed $362,000, and had 
no prospect of paying it, but by great effort on the part of the direct-
ors and by excellent and intelligent management the debts were 
paid. Some $250,000 of net income has been paid Mrs. White-
head and the other beneficiaries, and some $510,000 has been added 
to the physical properties of the school. Mrs. Whitehead and others 
interested in the school have attributed the financial success largely 
to the efforts of Gilpin Willson. The record shows that he was 
untiring in his efforts ahd that he has rendered faithful 
page 145 ~and valuable service to the school. Under his leader-
ship and by the exercise of his good business judgment 
the school has prospered. 
Rowland began to sell uniforms to the school in 1905. Thomas 
Russell had an agreement with him and the Kables dating back to 
Russell's first connection with the school, whereby Rowland would 
pay Russell six per cent on sales of uniforms to the cadets. This 
six per cent was paid to Russell from 1908 to 1933, the date of 
his death. 
\\Tillson testified in this case that the agreement between Russell 
and Rowland was approved by both of the Kables during their 
lives; that William G. Kahle expressed the desire that it be con-
titmed; and that all of the directors knew of it. This testimony, so 
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far as an exhaustive examination of the voluminous evidence in 
the case discloses, was not contradicted by any witness. We cannot 
find that Steele contradicted it, although he testified at length. 
The sale of uniforms to the students was a very substantial part 
of the business of the school. In sixteen years a profit of $330.000 
was realized. Willson thought it good business to continue the 
contract with Rowland for the purchase of uniforms because the 
academy was making so much profit through it, and at the same 
time getting at a reasonable price uniforms that were satisfactory. 
After Russell's death in 1933, friction resulted between Row-
land and Steele. 
On June 25, 1937, William G. Kahle, II, filed a petition against 
Gilpin Willson in the' old executors' suit in which he 
page 146 ~made ten separate charges of fraud and mismanagement 
against Willson in connection with the trust estate and 
the conduct of the school. He later filed an amended petition add-
ing to those charges already made many others. The trial court 
held that all but three of the charges were unfounded. The sixth, 
ninth and tenth charges were upheld. 
The sixth charge was that Gilpin Willson knew of a secret agree-
ment adverse to the financial interest of the school between Russell 
and Rowland whereby Rowland paid° six per cent commissions to 
Russell on all uni forms sold to the cadets. 
The ninth charge was that Wilson had by gross neglect permitted 
A. T. Cooksey, a teacher, to have credit to the extent of $150, 
which has never been paid, and that Willson should be held liable 
for that amount. 
The tenth charge is that Willson had permitted the executive 
committee, in 1920, to purchase a $50,000 policy of insurance on 
the life of Thomas Russell $40,000 of which was for the benefit 
of the school and $10,000 for the benefit of Mrs. Russell. The 
court held that Willson should be held for twenty per cent of the 
premiums paid. 
From our view of the case it will be unnecessary to discuss the 
pleadings. 
A petition had already been filed against Rowland by Kahle, II. It 
was prosecuted through this court under the style of William C. 
Rowland v. W. H. Kahle, et al., and is reported in 174 Va. 343, 
6 S. E. 2d. 633. This court, upon the evidence in that case, held 
that Rowland was guilty of a breach of trust in dealing 
page 147 ~with the trust for his own benefit while he was one of 
the trustees. He was required to account for the six per 
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cent commission he had paid Russell, and was removed as trustee. 
His liability has been settled by him. 
It is charged in the present case that Gilpin Willson knew of 
the agreement between Russell and Rowland and that, inasmuch 
as he made no protest, he was also guilty of a breach of trust and 
therefore should be removed as trustee. The liabliity of Rowland 
having been settled, no recovery against Willson is now sought for 
any part of the percentage paid Russell. This transaction is inject-
ed into this case now for the sole ptirpose of showing that Willson 
is unfit to be a trustee. 
The question of the removal of Mr. Willson as testamentary 
trustee is the principal issue in the suit. There are many other 
matters asserted that we will not undertake specifically to discuss. 
Generally, the removal of a trustee is within the reasonable dis-
cretion of the court. More is required to remove a trustee appoint-
ed by the creator of the trust than is required to remove one 
appointed by the court. In all cases the real guide is whether or 
not it is best for the trust estate that the trustee be removed. 
Friction between the trustee and the beneficiary is not in itself 
sufficient ground for removal. Some beneficial end must be achiev-
ed by the removal or it will not be justified. Restatement, Trusts 
Par. 107; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 3, Par.527. 
The evidence in the present suit discloses that all of 
page 148 ~the directors knew of Rowland's agreement with Russell 
and that he had a monoply on the sale of uniforms. The 
appellee's mother, Mrs. Whitehead, knew of it. There is no denial 
of this evidence. The evidence in this suit further shows beyond 
any doubt that Willson never profited in any manner by that agree-
ment, and that the school has not lost anything through Willson. 
Russell has been removed as a trustee by death ; Rowland by 
the court. The other trustees and directors, while they knew of 
the agreement have not profited bv it. 
Cases of this kind must be decided upon their peculiar facts and 
circumstances. The duties and liabilities of fiduciaries are· clearly 
stated in Rowland v. Kahle, supra. The cases there referred to are 
numerous. Nothing said here is intended to modify the decision in 
that case. There Rowland profited; here Willson has not. There 
the testimony was to the effect that the six per cent commission 
paid Russell was under a secret agreement prejudicial to the school 
and was not known to the other directors and trustees, except 
Willson; here, the testimony is that all of the directors knew of 
the percentage paid Russell and that it was no secret. 
The directors and trustees, other than Rowland and Willson, I 
j 
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have not been proceeded against. The Thomas Russell Estate has 
not been proceeded against , though it was he who received the six 
per cent commissions. Just why Willson has been singled out is 
not disclosed. There appears to· be considerable feeling against 
Willson by the appellee, whicl1 is disclosed in part by the many ad-
mittedly false and unfounded charges made by him against 
Willson. 
page 149 ~ We are not unmindful of the rule laid down in First & 
Merchants Bank v. Bank of Waverly, 170 Va. 496, 197 
S. E. 462, 116 A. L. R. 1156, to the effect that if a co-trustee par-
ticipates in a breach of trust, or approves or acquiesces in or con-
ceals a breach, or fails to exercise reasonable care, and the like, he 
is liable jointly and severally for any loss sustained by the trust 
estate. But here, on this phase of the case, no loss is shown to have 
been sustained by the trust, and therefore none is sought to be re-
stored. Only a removal of Willson as trustee is desired by the 
appellee. 
What is best for the trust estate? Willson has been connected 
with the school since 1894, a period if forty-six years. He is a 
successful merchant and banker. His is an intimate knowledge of 
the school ; its needs .and problems are well known to him. He has 
observed it when it was at a low financial status, and he has seen 
it prosper. When the school was in need of money he endorsed 
paper for -it to the extent of $20,000. There is not a particle of 
evidence tending to show that he is incapable or unfit to act as 
trustee. There is none that reflects upon his character or tends to 
show that he is not honest or moral. He has been a great asset 
to the trust, and the school through the many years of his connec-
tion. With his experience he will continue to be an asset. 
The many charges of fraud, breach of trust, and gross neglect 
made by William G. Kahle, II, against Willson have not been 
proven. They must be proven by clear, strong, and cogent evi-
dence. There is no evidence here of any secret agreement 
page 150~between Rowland and Russell whereby the former was 
to pay the latter six per cent on the sale of uniforms, or 
that there was any ulterior or corrupt motive which actuated them. 
The officers and directors knew of the arrangement. It had its in-
ception in the hiring of Russell by the elder Kahle in 1905; and 
with the knowledge and express approval of William H. Kahle 
and Wiliam G. Kahle, this arrangement continued until the death 
of William G. Kahle in 1920. 
The facts of this case do not warrant the application of the rule 
laid down in First & Merchants Bank v. ~ank of Waverly, supra, 
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which states the circumstances under which a trustee is jointly and 
severally liable for the misconduct, gross neglect, and bad faith of 
his co-trustee. Willson's knowl~dge of the Rowland arrangment 
with Russell, without more, is not sufficient to brand Willson as 
a violator of his trust. It is not ground for his removal as trustee. 
Realizing the lack of evidence in the peresent case to show any 
fiduciary misconduct on the part of Willson, Kahle, II, at the end 
of the evidence and not in chief, introduced the entire record of 
the case of Row land v. Kahle, supra, which included the deposi-
tion of Willson given in that case. He also introduced the deposi~ 
tion separately. This was ·done over the objection of counsel for 
Willson. The evidence in that case was different from the evidence 
in the present one, though there was no substantial difference in 
the testimony of Willson. Witnesses testified in that case who did 
not testify in the present case, among them Mrs. White-
page 151 ~head. Of course Willson has never had an upportunity 
to cross-examine the witnesses who testified in the Row-
land case. The issue there was the misconduct of Rowland in mak-
ing secret profits from the trust estate. That is not the issue here. 
the case of Rowland v. Kahle, supra, which included the deposi-
sition and the Rowland record inadmissible. Winston v. Starke, 
12 Grat. 317, 53 Va. 317; Read, et al. v. Gold, 102 Va, 37, 45 S. 
E. 868; Murray v. Moore, 104 Va. 707, 52 S. E. 381; Krebs v. 
Welch, 111 Va. 432, 69 S. E. 346. 
A. T. Cooksey was an instructor at the academy. The treasurer, 
Steele, advanced Cooksey $200, intending to make deductions from 
his salary from time to time. At the end of the session ·wmson 
instructed Steele to turn over the salary check to Cooksey. Cooksey 
did not return to school for· the following session, but made a pay-
ment of $50. on the debt, reducing it to $150. Because Willson 
authorized the extension of credit to Cooksey it is asked that he be 
adjudged guilty of a breach of his trust. The trial court held him 
liable for it. 
The record does not show where Cooksey it at present or 
whether or not the account may be collected in the future. How-
ever, if Willson exercised erroneous judgment in extending credit 
of $150 to Cooksey, this would not constitute a breach of trust. 
In fact, when this transaction is compared with the vast amount 
of funds supervised by Willson, it is de minimis. 
The minutes disclose that, at a meeting of the executive com-
mittee held on September 27, 1920, it was decided to in-
page 152 ~sure the life of Thomas Russell, the president, for 
$50,000, of which $40,000 was to be payable to the 
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academy, Mrs. Kahle ( now Mrs. Whitehead), being the principal 
beneficiary under the will, expressed the wish and desire that twenty 
per cent of the amount of the policy be made payable to Mrs. Rus-
sell, the wife of the president. In accordance with this authority and 
direction such a policy was procured and premiums were paid by 
the academy. Upon the death of Mr. Russell in 1933, $40,000 of 
the insurance was paid the school and $10,000 paid Mrs. Russell. 
In the petition filed in the court below Kahle, II, charged that this 
transaction amounted to a diversion of trust funds to the extent 
of the cost of that part of the policy paid to Mrs. Russell and that 
Willson, a trustee and director, was liable for the full $10,000, 
the amount realized from such diversion. The court below held hi~ 
liable for twenty per cent of the premiums paid for the policy. 
Counsel for Willson contended that he should not be held for 
the $10,000 or any portion of the premium. The minutes of the 
meeting were recorded in the permanent minute book and it was 
open to all who were interested. 
The premiums were paid by the academy from 1920 to 1933. 
The transaction was open and above-board and known to the 
trustees and directors. It was approved by the stockholders at their 
next meeting. No protest was ever made by any of the trustees or 
directors. All of the trustees except Rowland actively participated 
in the meeting at which the purchase of the insurance was 
authorized. 
page 153 ~ Mrs. Kahle, who was entitled to the net profits of the 
academy, made the request that twenty per cent of the 
face of the policy be made payable to Mrs. Russell, who was her 
sister-in-law. 
If the premiums were paid from the net profits of the corpora-
tion then they were paid from funds belonging to Mrs. Kahle. Of 
course, there can be no question about that portion of the prem-
iums of the policy set apart for the academy. It had the right to 
insure Russell's life for its benefit. We are only concerned with 
the twenty per cent of the premiums paid by the academy and the 
$10,000 of insurance paid to Mrs. Russell, who is not a party here. 
No move has been made to require her to return the $1.0,000. 
Mrs., Kahle, being entitled to the net profits, could expend them 
as she wished. The testator directed the trustees to refrain from 
"unreasonable expenditures" or unbusiness like ventures." They 
were always to consider the welfare of the corporation, and the 
school was to be operated so as to increase the business and profits. 
Under this provision the trustees from time to time used a portion 
of the income to construct new buildings, adding to the capital in-
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vestment and putting aside a reserve. The evidence fails to show 
that the amount used for premiums was taken from the reserve 
or from capital invested. The burden was upon Kahle, II, to prove 
that they were so taken. This he has failed to do. It certainly 
would not be presumed, in the absence of proof, that the 
page 154 ~directors and trustees would permit the premiums to be 
paid from the reserve or from capital. Besides, the re-
solution shows on its face that Mrs. Kahle was the principal bene-
ficiary under the will and that it was upon her request that the 
policy was obtained. If the premiums were not to come from the 
net income, why was it necessary to mention Mrs. Kahle as the 
"principal beneficiary?" Our conclusion is that the premiums were 
paid from net income that belonged to Mrs. Kahle; that she was 
anxious to obtain the policy for the benefit of the school and her 
sister-in-law; and that neither the corporation nor the petitioner 
below is· entitled to have the amount or to hold Willson for the 
$10,000 paid Mrs. Russell. Willson is no· more responsible than 
the other directors and trustees. The trial court erred in holding 
him liable. The cross-error assigned, directed at this phase of the 
case, is without merit. 
It was charged that Willson was guilty of a breach of trust in 
the purchase of securities for the academy and that the drug firm 
in which he had a substantial interest sold quanties of drugs, paints, 
and athletic equipment to the school. The trial court held that the 
purchase .of securities and the sale to the academy by the Willson 
firm of various supplies was not a violation of the duties and ob-
ligations of Willson as a director of the corpor·ation or as trustee 
of the estate. We concur in this holding by the court, which is 
abundantly supported by the evidence. There is no merit in the 
cross-assigned of error touching these matters. 
The evidence discloses that more than $400,000 was 
page 155 ~used in the purchase of bonds for the academy and, not-
withstanding the adverse condition of the bond market 
due to the crash of 1929, the school sustained only a small loss. 
It is now sought to place this loss on Willson. He has not profited in 
any way or to any extent by the purchase and sale of the bonds and 
no liability should be found against him for the small loss sustained. 
The evidence shows that the articles purchased from Willson's 
firm were purchased at reasonable prices. No secret or unreason-
able profits were made by Willson. In fact, a discount of ten per 
cent was allowed the academy on its purchases. In Rowland v. 
Kahle, supra, it was held that a ·director could deal with his cor-
poration and sell his property to it so long as the transaction is fair, 
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open and honest, and the corporation is represented by competent 
agents. In the case at bar the purchases ran over a period of many 
years and amounted to many thousands of dollars; they were made 
by the duly authorized purchasing agent and athletic coaches of 
the school; the transactions were fair and honest and no exorbi-
tant prices were charged. 
Upon the whole record, which is entirely too voluminous, we 
are of opinion that Willson's conduct has been above reproach and 
that he has been guilty of no infidelity regarding his duties as 
trustee of the estate or as director or officer of the corporation. The 
evidence fails to justify his removal as trustee. 
The decree will be reversed and a final decree will be entered 
here in favor of Willson, dismissing Kable's petition. 
Reversed and final decree. 
page 156~0RDER OF JANUARY 20, 1942, FILING 
PETITION 
This cause came on this day to be heard, upon a motion of Gilpin 
Willson that he be permitted to file his petition in his own right 
and as testamentary trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, 
deceased, in this cause against Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W, H. 
Steele and L. W. H. Peyton, trustees under the will of William G. 
Kahle, deceased, and Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, William G; 
Kahle, II, Eleanor Kahle Miller and Helene Kahle Ferguson, in 
their own right, and Staunton Military Academy, a corporation, 
defendants. 
Upon consideration whereof, the court doth hereby order and. 
decree that the said Gilpin Willson, in his own right and as test-
amentary trustee under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, be 
and he is hereby permitted to file- his petition in this cause against 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, W. H. Steele and L. W. H. Peyton, 
trustees under the will of William G. Kable, deceased, and -Eleanor 
Enslow Whitehead, William G. -Kahle, II, Eleanor Kahle Miller 
and Helene Kahle Ferguson, in their own right, anq. Staunton Mili-
tary Academy, a corporation, def end ants; and that process issue 
thereon against all defendants, returnable to the First February 
Rules, 1942. 
page 157~DEMURRER OF ELEANOR ENSLOW WHITE-
HEAD, W. H. STEELE AND L. W. H. PEYTON, 
TRUSTEES UNDER THE WILL OF WILLIAM G. KABLE, 
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DECO 
The joint and several demurrers of Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, 
W. H. Steele, and L. W. H. Peyton, Trustees under the will of 
William G. Kahle, deceased, to petition filed in the above styled 
cause of February 20, 1942, by Gilpin Willson, in his own right 
and as Trustees under the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, 
against these defendants and others. 
These defendants say that the said petition filed in this cause 
is not sufficient in law. 
ELEANOR ENSLOW WHITEHEAD 
W. H. STEELE 
L. W. H. PEYTON 
Trustees under the will of 
William G. Kahle, deceased 
W. B. Timberlake, Jr. 
COUNSEL 
Filed in the Oerk's Office of 
the Corporation Court City of 
Staunton March 12, 1942 
Test: Earl McF. Taylor, Clerk 
page 158~DEMURRER OF STAUNTON MILITARY 
ACADEMY 
The demurrer of Staunton Military Academy, a Corporation, to 
petition filed in the above styled cause on February 20, 1942, by 
Gilpin Willson, in his own right and as Trustees under the will of 
William G. Kahle, deceased, against this defendant and others. 
This defendant says that the said petition filed in this cause is 
not sufficient in law. 
STAUNTON MILITARY ACADEMY, 
a corporation 
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BY COUNSEL 
W. B. Timberlake, Jr. 
COUNSEL 
Filed in the Clerk' sOffice of 
the Corporation Court City of 
Staunton March 12, 1942 
Teste: Earl McF. Taylor, Clerk 
page 159~ DEMURRER OF ELEANOR ENSLOW WHITE-
HEAD, IN HER OWN RIGHT, ELEANOR KABLE 
MILLER AND HELENE KABLE FERGUSON 
The joint and several demurrers of Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, 
in her own right, Eleanor Kahle Miller, and Helene Kahle Fer-
guson, to petition filed in the above styled cause on February 20, 
1942, by Gilpin Willson, in his own right and as Trustee under 
the will of William G. Kahle, deceased, against these defendants 
and others. 
These defendants say that the said petition filed in this cause is 
not sufficieent in law. 
ELEANOR ENSLOW WHITEHEAD, in 
her own right 
ELEANOR KABLE MILLER 
HELENE KABLE FERGUSON 
BY COUNSEL 
W. B. Timberlake, Jr. 
Counsel 
Filed in the Clerk's Office of 
the Corporation Court of the 
Qty of Staunton March 12, 1942 
Teste: Earl McF. Taylor, Clerk 
page 160~DEMURRER OF WILLIAM G. KABLE II 
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The separate demurrer of William G. Kahle, II, to a petition 
filed against him and others by Gilpin Willson by leave of court 
in the above entitled cause, demurs and says that the said petition 
is bad in substance and insufficient in law. 
JOS. I. NACHMAN 
Attorney for William G. Kahle, II 
Filed in the Clerk's Office of 
the Corporation Court City of 
Staunton March 12, 1942 
Teste: Earl McF. Taylor, Clerk 
page 161 r ORDER OF MAY 8, 1942 
DISQUALIFICATION OF HON. J. H. MAY, JUDGE 
Hon. J. H. May, the Judge of this Court, being so situated in 
respect to this case as to render it improper in his opinion for him 
to preside therein, it is ordered that the clerk of this court certify 
such facts to the Olief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
as provided by Section 5898 of the Code of Virginia. 
J. H. MAY, Judge 
page 162~ CERTIFICATE OF SUPREME COURT 
DESIGNATING HONORABLE A. D. DABNEY TO 
HEAR THIS CASE 
J ~me 9, 1942 
VIRGINIA: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS: 
TO ALL OF WHOM THESE PRESENTS 
SHALL COME* GREETING: KNOW. YE, that 
I, Henry W. Holt, Justice of the Supreme ·court of Appeals of 
Virginia, by virtue of authority vested· in me by law, do hereby 
designate Honorable A. D. Dabney, Judge of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Charlottesville, to preside in the Corporation 
<;:ourt of the City of Staunton in the case of Gilpin Willson &c. v. 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead and others, b«?ginning the day of. 
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, in the place of the Honorable J. Harry May, Judge of said 
Court, who deems it improper for him to sit. 
Given under my hand and seal this 8th .day of June,1944. 
HENRY W. HOLT (SEAL) 
Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia 
page 163 ~DECREE OF JULY 18, 1942, SUSTAINING 
DEMURRERS 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the petition of 
Gilpin Willson, in his own right and as co-Trustee under the will 
of William G. Kahle, deceased, and exhibits filed therewith, the 
joint and several demurrer of Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, 
W. H. Steele, and L. W. H. Peyton, Trustees under the will of 
William G. Kahle, deceased, the joint and several demurrer of 
Eleanor Enslow Whitehead, in her own right, Eleanor Kahle Miller 
and Helene Kahle Ferguson, the demurrer of Staunton Military 
Academy, a corporation, and the demurrer of William G. Kahle II, 
all filed to the aforesaid petition, and was argued by counsel. 
Whereupon, it appearing to the court that the aforesaid . de-
murrers in each instance are well taken, it is, accordingly, adjudg-
ed, ordered, and decreed that said demurrers be and the same here-
by are sustained and that the aforesaid petition of Gilpin Willson, 
in his own right and as co-Trustee under the will of William G. 
Kahle, deceased, be and the same hereby is dismissed. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Staunton, to-wit: 
I, Earl McF. Taylor, Clerk of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Staunton, State of Virginia, do certify that the foregoing 
is a true transcript of the record and proceedings as asked for or 
agreed upon and stipulated by counsel for both petitioner and de-
fendants in the chancery cause of William G. Kable's Executors 
v. William G. Kable's Trustees pending in said court, as the same 
appears of record and on filed in the office of said court. I further 
certify that the notice required by law has been duly given to all 
counsel of record. 
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Given under my hand this 16th day of October, 1942. 
Fee for transcript: 
$11.00 
A copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
EARL McF. TAYLOR 
Clerk 
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